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Introduction 
The maritime transport sector (henceforth shipping sector) can be seen as the backbone 
of globalization since it transports 80% of the merchandise traded internationally 
(UNCTAD, 2008). It transported about 8.4 billion tons of merchandise throughout the 
world in 2010 (UNCTAD, 2011). Needless to say, the shipping sector is a global sector. 
Over 170 countries are engaged as maritime states.
1
 Ships are globally mobile and can 
have multiple nationalities, i.e., ships can be owned and operated by different nationali-
ties, and registered in different countries. Furthermore, ships are subject to multiple 
regulations, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
the Conventions of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Conventions of 
the International Labour Organization (ILO), the laws of the flag states, and the laws of 
the coastal states (Stopford, 2009). Thus, regulating such a global sector is a challenging 
task. 
The papers presented in this cumulative dissertation deal with economic aspects of 
regulating this global sector in two areas of interest. Thus, the dissertation is divided 
into two parts. Part I (first paper) deals with regulating the transit charges of an interna-
tional waterway in the context of price discrimination. Part II (second, third, and fourth 
paper), which is the main emphasis of the dissertation, deals with regulating CO2 
emissions of the shipping sector in the context of climate change policy. 
 
Part I 
Looking at the geographical aspect of maritime trade, we find that maritime trade is 
dominated by Asia, Europe, and North America. These three regions are interconnected 
by major shipping routes that are primarily used by container ships or other specialized 
ships. In addition, the three regions also serve as destinations for raw materials trans-
ported by bulk ships from other regions, such as Australia (Stopford, 2009). 
Ships engaged in maritime trade have the choice of alternative shipping routes to sail 
from one port to another. Some shipping routes provide the opportunity to shorten the 
                                                 
1
 The International Maritime Organization, which is an agency of the United Nations concerned with 
safety, security, and environmental issues of international shipping, counts 170 Member States and three 
Associate Members (http://www.imo.org/About/Membership/Pages/Default.aspx). 
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distance by using passageways, such as the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, or the Kiel 
Canal. In this context, questions arise that deal not only with the demand side of using 
such passageways, but also with the supply side of providing such passageways. 
Research focuses mostly on the competiveness of certain shipping routes from an 
operator’s point of view (Notteboom, 2012, Lasserre and Pelletier, 2011, Schøyen and 
Bråthen, 2011, Liu and Kronbak, 2010, Somanathan et al., 2009, 2007, Baird, 2006). 
Liu and Kronbak (2010), for example, deal with the economic potential of the Northern 
Sea Route (NSR) as an alternative transit route to the Suez Canal route. But there is also 
some research that focuses on the competiveness of shipping routes from a canal 
authority’s point of view (Hutchinson, 1912, Böhme and Sichelschmidt, 1997). 
Hutchinson (1912) deals with the Panama Canal. He investigates the US government’s 
action to exclude coastwise shipping from paying charges and offset the decrease in 
revenue by increasing the charges for international shipping. His results indicate that the 
resulting loss will not be offset by such a policy. Böhme and Sichelschmidt (1997) deal 
with the factors that cause the Kiel Canal’s balance sheet loss in order to determine how 
to lessen the loss. They find that the main way to lessen the loss is to reduce costs rather 
than to increase revenue. However, neither they nor anyone else provide an analysis of 
how to set optimal transit charges from a canal authority’s point of view. This is what 
the first paper aims to do. 
The paper presented in Part I (the first paper in the dissertation) is entitled “Deter-
mining optimal Transit Charges: The Kiel Canal in Germany.” It was coauthored by 
Katrin Rehdanz and Ulrich Schmidt and deals with regulating the transit charges levied 
by an international waterway in the context of price discrimination, namely the Kiel 
Canal in Germany, which connects ports on the Baltic Sea with the rest of the world. 
The Kiel Canal is the most-used artificial waterway in the world, but despite this fact, it 
generates a balance sheet loss (WSD Nord, 2011). Its revenues, which are mainly 
generated by the transit charge, do not cover its operating expenses. This situation raises 
the question if and how the current charging system could be redesigned to make the 
canal generate a balance sheet profit. In this paper, the focus is solely on the canal’s 
revenue. Because the canal is a monopoly that allows, in principle, for perfect price 
discrimination, the current charging system is contrasted with an optimal charging 
system based on the willingness-to-pay (WTP) approach. A general approach to 
3 
 
calculate optimal transit charges is devised and applied in a case study that includes four 
ship types on three routes. The findings of the case study indicate that, in principle, 
much higher revenues could be generated if the transit charges were based not only on 
ship size but also on fuel prices and a ship’s departure and destination ports, as these 
affect a ship’s costs in terms of fuel costs and required sailing time. 
 
Part II 
Combating climate change is one of the major global challenges that mankind faces 
today and in the future. Deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions, in particular in anthro-
pogenic CO2 emissions, are necessary in order to prevent climate change to unfold its 
dangerous impacts (IPCC, 2007, UNFCCC, 2010). Therefore, decarbonization policies 
urgently need to be aimed at the shipping sector for two reasons. First, the shipping 
sector relies on heavy fuel oil, which is emission-intensive, and, second, it is projected 
to grow in the coming decades, thus causing more emissions (Gilbert and Bows, 2012). 
Nevertheless, environmental issues, e.g., issues related to the emissions caused by 
ships, did not receive much attention until fairly recently (Stopford, 2009). The reasons 
for this are pointed out by Gilbert and Bows (2012): 
“Treating climate change as a central environmental concern has come 
relatively late in the day for the shipping sector for a combination of rea-
sons: more obvious local pollutants, its omissions from national inventories 
under the Kyoto Protocol, its importance in globalization and its reputation 
as the most energy efficient mode of freight transport.” (p. 613) 
The newly emerging concern to regulate the shipping sector’s CO2 emissions was 
spawned to a large extent by the Second IMO GHG Study 2009 (Buhaug et al., 2009) of 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) on greenhouse gases (GHG) in the 
shipping sector. This study presented two important insights. First, the shipping sector 
generated about 3.3% of global GHG emissions in 2007, which is more than what was 
assumed before.
2
 Second, the shipping sector’s CO2 emissions are projected to increase 
significantly in the coming decades if its CO2 emissions remain unregulated (Buhaug et 
                                                 
2
 In addition, the shipping sector was one of the world’s major CO2 emitters in 2007 (evidenced by 
comparing the shipping sector’s CO2 emissions in 2007 (Buhaug et al., 2009) with data on CO2 emissions 
from fuel combustion per country in 2007 (IEA, 2009).  
4 
 
al., 2009). The consequence would be that in the next decades the shipping sector’s CO2 
emissions would constitute a considerable proportion of the maximum allowed emis-
sions, i.e., the maximum emissions that are in line with the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC) 2°C target (UNEP, 2011). As a conse-
quence other sectors would have to emit less to offset the increase in shipping CO2 
emissions. 
These insights have sparked discussions on how to regulate the shipping sector’s 
CO2 emissions, which are continuing not only in the IMO, but also in the scientific 
community, and which center around the question whether this sector should be subject 
to an emission cap or whether it should be subject to some other means of reducing 
emissions (UNEP, 2011). However, a final decision has not been reached yet. 
The literature related to shipping sector’s CO2 emissions can be split into two broad 
bodies of literature. The first discusses the pros and cons of various options to allocate 
shipping emissions to countries and on the effects of the various options on specific 
country groups. Research on this matter has been qualitative (Åhman, 2008, Kågeson, 
2008, Zetterberg, 2008, Faber et al., 2007, Bode et al., 2002) and quantitative (Gilbert 
and Bows, 2012, Wang, 2010, Faber et al., 2009, den Elzen et al., 2007). Nevertheless, 
there are some options that have not yet been assessed by the existing quantitative 
literature. In order to obtain an overall picture, an analysis and comparison of all the 
options becomes necessary. This is what the second paper of the dissertation aims to do. 
The second body of literature presents technical abatement potentials and the costs of 
different measures (Faber et al., 2011/Wang et al., 2010,
3
 Eide et al. 2011, 2009, 
Longva et al., 2010, Buhaug et al., 2009, Faber et al., 2009). However, the literature on 
how much the shipping sector should contribute to global emission reductions from an 
efficiency point of view remains limited.
4
 Further, whether CO2 emissions should be 
regulated at all depends on the potential cost savings. This is what the third and fourth 
papers of the dissertation aim to determine. The third paper focuses on global climate 
change policy and the fourth on the European Union climate change policy. 
                                                 
3
 Note that Faber et al. (2011) is an updated version of Wang et al. (2010), but that only the later provides 
data that we make use of in this paper. 
4 
Only Eide et al. (2009) derive a decision criterion for regulating CO2 emissions in the shipping sector 
that is in line with the 2°C target. 
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The first paper presented in Part II (the second paper in the dissertation) is entitled 
“Accounting for Carbon Dioxide Emissions from International Shipping: Burden 
Sharing under Different UNFCCC Allocation Options and Regime Scenarios.” It was 
coauthored by Setareh Khalilian and frames the discussions about regulating CO2 
emissions within the framework of the UNFCCC. In this paper, the various options 
suggested by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) of 
the UNFCCC for allocating CO2 emissions generated by the international shipping 
sector to individual countries are investigated. Economic and regulatory issues related 
to these options and the consequences of applying them are discussed. The various 
options are evaluated on the basis of environmental effectiveness, feasibility of legal 
implementation, and the fairness of burden sharing. The paper concludes that the 
international shipping sector’s emissions should be allocated on the basis of the 
operating company. 
The second paper presented in Part II (the third paper in the dissertation) is entitled 
“The Potential Contribution of the Shipping Sector to an Efficient Reduction of Global 
Carbon Emissions.” It was coauthored by Sonja Peterson and analyzes how much the 
shipping sector could contribute to global CO2 emission reductions from an efficiency 
point of view. To do this, a marginal abatement cost curve (MACC) for the shipping 
sector is generated that can be combined with a MACC for conventional CO2 abatement 
in the production and consumption sectors around the world. These two MACCs are 
used to assess the following as regards the various global reduction targets: (a) what the 
maximum global cost savings would be that could be achieved by abating emissions in 
the shipping sector, (b) how much the shipping sector could contribute to abating 
emissions cost efficiently, and (c) what the potential additional costs of implementing a 
separate solution for the shipping sector would be. The focus is on the year 2020. The 
findings are that the shipping sector could always contribute to efficient global emission 
reductions and thus could always achieve global cost savings, but also that the size of 
the contribution and the size of cost savings depend heavily on the MACC case 
assumed, i.e., on how the existence of negative abatement costs is treated in a MACC, 
and on the reduction potentials and costs of measures assumed. 
The third paper presented in Part II (the fourth paper in the dissertation) is entitled 
“Including Maritime Transport in the EU’s Climate Change Policy: Country-Based 
6 
 
Allocation and Effects”. This paper analyzes an option to include the shipping sector’s 
emissions in the EU’s greenhouse gas reduction commitment for 2020 that is based on 
the nationality of a ship, namely the nationality of the ship owner, the nationality of the 
ship operator, and the flag state registration. In doing so, emissions generated by ships 
owned, operated, or flagged by the 27 EU countries are allocated to the EU’s total GHG 
emissions. First, the effects on the reduction commitment caused by the three allocation 
ways are analyzed. Then, marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) are used in order to 
determine how much the shipping sector of the 27 EU countries, defined by the three 
allocation ways, could contribute efficiently to a total given emission reduction target 
for all sectors in the EU. Moreover, MACCs are used in order to determine if some 
country fleets could reduce emissions in the shipping sector relatively more efficient 
than other countries under a given emission reduction target for all sectors. The findings 
indicate that the increase in the amount of required emission reductions and resulting 
abatement costs are in particular pronounced if the allocation ways owner and operator 
are applied and the more ambitious approach (partial integration approach) is chosen. 
Moreover, the findings indicate that the shipping sector could contribute efficiently to 
emission reductions (at most by 8.5%) if it was included in reduction efforts, and that 
the composition of both the individual country fleets and efficient measures applied to 
them is on average the same. 
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Abstract 
The Kiel Canal in Germany connects ports on the Baltic Sea with the rest of the world 
and is the most-used artificial waterway in the world. Despite this fact, it generates a 
balance sheet loss. Revenues, which are mainly generated by the transit charge, do not 
cover its operating expenses. This situation raises the question how the current charging 
system could be redesigned to make the canal generate a balance sheet profit. 
In this paper, we focus solely on the canal’s revenue. Because the canal is a monopo-
ly that allows, in principle, for perfect price discrimination, we contrast the current 
charging system with an optimal charging system based on the willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) approach. We devise a general approach to calculate optimal transit charges and 
apply it in a case study that includes four ship types on three routes. The findings of the 
case study indicate that, in principle, much higher revenues could be generated if the 
transit charges were based not only on ship size but also on fuel prices and a ship’s 
departure and destination ports, as these affect a ship’s costs in terms of fuel costs and 
required sailing time. 
 
Keywords: Optimal transit charge, Kiel Canal, shipping cost, Germany, price discrimi-
nation 
JEL classification: R48, L92 
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1. Introduction 
Maritime transportation of goods is a costly business. Major determinants of the costs 
are fuel consumption and the time it takes a ship to sail from one port to another. Ships 
operating between ports of the Baltic Sea and the rest of the world, for example, have 
the choice of alternative passageways to leave or enter the Baltic Sea. They can use the 
Kiel Canal passageway, the most-used artificial waterway in the world
1
 and, according 
to Knowles (2006a), one of the world’s strategic ship canals, or one of the two natural 
passageways around Denmark: through the Great Belt passageway or through the 
Øresund passageway. Sailing through the Kiel Canal saves, on average, 250 nautical 
miles
2
 and, depending on the type of ship, up to several hours.
3
 Figure 1 shows the three 
alternative passageways for four ports in the region.
4
 
 
Figure 1: Shipping routes and alternative passageways. Source: Own presentation 
based on ESRI Base Map; Shipping routes are based on Kerbaol and Hajduch (2009) 
and Helcom (2011). 
                                                 
1
 http://www.kiel-canal.org/english.htm. 
2
 ibid. 
3
 For example, a 1,400 TEU container ship on the route Helsinki-Rotterdam would save about 8.5 hours if 
the Kiel Canal were used instead of the Great Belt passageway. 
4
 We define route as the connection between ports, and passageways as the alternative ways on that route. 
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The Kiel Canal is used by roughly the same number of ships as the Panama Canal and 
Suez Canal
5
 taken together, but handles significantly less cargo tonnage. 43,378 ships 
transporting 99.78 million tonnes of cargo passed the Kiel Canal in 2007, (WSD Nord, 
2011b).
6
 In comparison, during the same year, 14,721 ships transporting 208.2 million 
tonnes of cargo passed through the Panama Canal (Panama Canal Authority, 2009), and 
20,384 ships transporting 848.2 million tonnes of cargo passed through the Suez Canal.
7
 
Despite the large amount of ship traffic the Kiel Canal handles, it nevertheless gener-
ates a balance sheet loss. Its revenues, which are mainly generated by the transit charge 
(charged by the Waterways and Shipping Authority North (WSD Nord)), do not cover 
its operating expenses. The transit charge is determined by the gross tonnage (gt) of a 
ship and includes up to four components, such as a transit toll, a pilotage due, a pilotage 
fee, and a helmsmen fee.
8
 The last two components (pilotage fee and helmsmen fee) are 
passed on to the pilots and helmsmen for providing their services.
9
 The pilotage due is 
used by the WSD Nord to maintain the pilotage facilities.
10
 The WSD Nord relies 
mainly on the transit toll to cover expenses such as investments in extensions, operating 
and maintenance costs, and administrative costs.
11
Revenues in the period 2005–2010 
covered only between 14% and 30% of expenses (WSD Nord, 2011a). The difference 
was covered by funds provided by the federal government. This loss and the current 
discussion on further widening and deepening of the Kiel Canal raise the question 
whether the current transit charges collected by the WSD Nord are too low and could be 
raised. 
                                                 
5
 The Panama Canal links the Pacific Ocean with the Caribbean. The Suez Canal links the Mediterranean 
with the Red Sea/Indian Ocean. Both canals provide the opportunity to significantly shorten the distance 
of shipping routes (Knowles, 2006a). 
6
 This includes 39,239 cargo (bulker, tanker, etc.) and 4,139 non-cargo ships (fishing ships, service ships, 
etc.), but excludes 14,865 small boats (sailing boats etc.). 
7
 http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/TRstat.aspx?reportId=3. 
8
 The German terms distinguish between fees that are regulated by public law and fees that are regulated 
by private law. The transit toll (Befahrensabgabe) and the pilotage due (Lotsenabgabe) are regulated by 
public law, whereas the pilotage fee (Lotsengeld) and the helmsmen fee (Kanalsteurergeld) are regulated 
by private law. We follow the official English translation of the WSD Nord to emphasize that differences 
in terms exist. 
9 
Pilots and helmsmen are not employed by the WSD Nord. Pilots work freelance in accordance with §21 
Seelotsgesetz (SeeLG, 2010) and helmsmen are organized in a registered association 
(http://www.kanalsteurer.de/index.html). 
10
 In accordance with Seelotsgesetz § 6 (SeeLG, 2010). 
11
 In accordance with Seeaufgabengesetz §13 (SeeAufgG, 2008). Note that the WSD Nord collects 
additional revenues in the form of fines, grants, refundings, and other fees, but that these additional 
revenues are of minor importance. 
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The Kiel Canal is a monopoly that allows, in principle, for perfect price discrimina-
tion. Under perfect price discrimination, a monopolist charges according to the willing-
ness-to-pay (WTP) of each customer (Besanko and Braeutigam, 2005). WTP is the 
maximum price the customer is willing to pay for a good, i.e., the customer is just 
indifferent between buying the good at his/her WTP and not buying the good at all. We 
define the WTP as the optimal price. Applied to the Kiel Canal, optimal pricing under 
perfect price discrimination implies charges that amount to the total cost savings a ship 
operator realizes when choosing the route via the Kiel Canal instead of the one around 
Denmark. These cost savings result mainly from reduced sailing time and reduced 
consumption of bunker fuel. 
The first paper analyzing this topic with the theory of price discrimination was by 
Hutchinson (1912), who considered the Panama Canal. He investigated the US govern-
ment’s action to exclude coastwise shipping from paying charges and offset the 
decrease in revenue by increasing the charges for international shipping. His results 
indicate that the resulting loss would not be offset by such a policy. Despite 
Hutchinson’s early analysis, the literature related to this field of research remains 
limited. Most of the literature studies the competiveness of certain shipping routes from 
an operator’s point of view (Notteboom, 2012, Lasserre and Pelletier, 2011, Schøyen 
and Bråthen, 2011, Liu and Kronbak, 2010, Somanathan et al., 2007, 2009). Liu and 
Kronbak (2010), for example, study the economic potential of the Northern Sea Route 
(NSR) as an alternative transit route to the Suez Canal route. Their results indicate that 
the ice-breaking fee is one of the main factors influencing the competiveness of the 
NSR. 
Two studies exist that look at the Kiel Canal. Baird (2006) analyzes transport-
distance-associated costs for established and potential alternative hub locations to find 
the optimal hub location for northern Europe. Thereby, he includes the current Kiel 
Canal transit charge into his cost calculations. He finds that using established hub 
locations, including Rotterdam and Hamburg, to serve the Baltic Sea region via feeder 
shipping routed through the Kiel Canal, is more costly than using the alternative hub 
location Orkney, located in the north of Scotland, to serve the Baltic Sea region via 
feeder shipping routed around Denmark. 
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Böhme and Sichelschmidt (1997) analyze the factors that cause the Kiel Canal’s 
balance sheet loss in order to determine how to decrease the loss. They find that the 
main way to leverage the loss is to reduce costs rather than to increase revenue. We 
build upon their results but also challenge them by analyzing the revenue part of the 
profit equation in more depth. 
We contribute to the existing literature by taking the point of view of the canal au-
thority to determine the optimal canal transit charges under perfect price discrimination. 
Charging the cost difference yields the maximum revenue for the canal authority. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents information on the Kiel Canal, 
including its history, traffic data, and transit charge system. Section 3 introduces a 
general approach to calculate optimal transit charges. Section 4 presents the design of a 
case study based on four ship types that typically use the Kiel Canal on three routes and 
the data used. Section 5 presents the results of the case study. Section 6 discusses the 
results. The final section, Section 7, concludes. 
 
2. The Kiel Canal 
2.1 History 
In the past, the route around Denmark was considered to be a time-consuming and 
difficult shipping route. At that time, the main trade routes were land routes between 
Italian ports and the North Sea and Baltic Sea ports. But after the discovery of America 
and the route to India, shipping to and from the North Sea ports gained momentum. 
Ships from America, India, and Africa started to transport goods to ports of the North 
Sea, since it was more cost effective than to transport goods over land. Due to an 
increased interest in trading with the states in the Baltic Sea region, there was a need for 
a short and safe waterway connecting the North Sea with the Baltic Sea. This need was 
originally fulfilled by the Eider Canal, which was opened in 1784.
12
 It went from the 
Kiel Bay to Rendsburg, where it merged with the Eider, which finally provided access 
to the North Sea. However, by the middle of the 19th century, the Eider Canal was no 
                                                 
12
 The Eider Canal had a width of 29 m, a depth of 3 m, and could handle ships up to a maximum of 300 
tons (http://www.kiel-canal.de/kiel-canal/history/index.htm).  
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longer able to handle the growing number and size of naval and merchant ships. Thus, 
construction work on the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal was begun in 1887 and it was opened 
in 1895. It was declared, by the Treaty of Versailles, to be an international waterway in 
1919 and since then has been known internationally as the Kiel Canal (Wulle, 1927).
13
 
In the following years, the number and size of naval and merchant ships continued to 
grow and the volume of traffic thus increased considerably, by 66%, or from 19,960 to 
33,158 ships, in the period 1896–1906 (Wulle, 1927). Therefore, in recent decades the 
canal has been widened and deepened several times.
14
 The most recent planning phase 
to widen and deepen the canal and to build a new lock began in 2008, but construction 
work has not started yet.
15
 
2.2 Traffic data 
Today the Kiel Canal, which is approximately 99 km long, has a general width of 162 m 
(in places only 102.5 m) at the waterline, a general width of 90 m (in some places only 
44 m) at the bottom, and a depth of 11 m. It is the most traveled artificial waterway in 
the world: 40,105 ships per year, on average, passed through it in the period 2005–2009 
(WSD Nord, 2011b).
16
 Traffic on the canal is predominantly transit traffic, i.e., it 
consists of ships passing completely through the canal in transit. Transit traffic amount-
ed to approximately 30,500 ships per year, on average, in the period 2005–2009. 
Section traffic, i.e., traffic consisting of ships that leave from or call at a port in the 
canal, or travel from one port to another in the Canal, amounted to approximately 9,500 
ships per year, on average, in the same period (Figure 2). 
                                                 
13
 The Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal was renamed the Nord-Ostsee-Kanal in 1948  
(http://www.kiel-canal.org/english.htm). 
14
 The first time construction work took place from 1907 to 1914. The second time it took place from 
1965 to 2000 (http://www.wsa-kiel.wsv.de/Kanal/index.html). 
15
 http://www.wsa-kiel.wsv.de/ausbau_nok/. It is planned to deepen the canal 1 m and to widen it from 44 
m to 70 m at its current bottleneck (Oststrecke) so that ships of a maximum allowed length of 280 m, a 
beam of 40 m, and a draught of 9.5 m are able to use the canal after the construction work has finished. 
16
 Small boats are omitted, although their share in total traffic is not negligible. For example, in 2008, an 
average of 117 merchant and non-cargo ships and about 43 small boats used the canal per day (transit and 
section traffic) (WSD Nord, 2011b). In addition, cruise ships are less common on the Kiel Canal, e.g., 
119 canal transits of cruise ships were counted in 2010. 
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Figure 2: Traffic through the Kiel Canal (2005–2009). Source: Own presentation based 
on data from WSD Nord (2011b). 
 
For comparison, total traffic around Denmark amounted to 54,492 ships per year, on 
average, for the same period (2005–2009), see Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Total traffic around Denmark and total traffic through the Kiel Canal (2005–
2009).  
 
Source: Own presentation based on data from WSD Nord (2011b). 
 
The reasons for traveling around Denmark are manifold. Ships may be simply too 
large to use the Kiel Canal.
17
 The maximum allowed length and beam of ships using the 
                                                 
17
 Note that ships traveling around Denmark can travel either through the Great Belt or through the 
Øresund. The Great Belt has a height constraint for shipping of 65 m and a draught constraint of 17 m 
whereas the Øresund Bridge has a clearance of 57 m (55 m above high water mark) and a draught 
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 50,000 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
Number of ships 
Y
ea
r 
Transit traffic Section traffic 
Year Denmark Kiel Canal Total overall % Kiel Canal
2005 39,521 42,552 82,073 52
2006 52,075 41,472 93,547 44
2007 59,721 43,378 103,099 42
2008 58,402 42,811 101,213 42
2009 62,743 30,314 93,057 33
Ø 2005-2009 54,492 40,105 94,598 42
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canal is 235 m and 32 m, respectively (WSD Nord, 2001).
18
 But more importantly, a 
significant number of ships make weekly round trips from and to ports on a fixed 
schedule and a fixed route and thus are not free to choose between different routes. 
Another reason is that the demand for maritime transportation decreased sharply during 
the recession in 2009 and led to overcapacities in the market. Ship operators reacted by 
laying-up ships, reducing services, or by slow steaming, which reduces fuel consump-
tion and overcapacity (UNCTAD, 2011). As a consequence, maritime transportation 
became so cheap that the passageways around Denmark become more attractive 
economically. The volume of traffic (transit and section) through the canal decreased by 
29% between 2008 and 2009 (see Table 1). This decrease was more pronounced in 
transit traffic than in section traffic (Bösl, 2010). 
Analyzing traffic through the Kiel Canal by ship type reveals that the canal is mainly 
used by merchant ships.
19
 Figure 3 shows that general cargo ships (including dry bulk 
carriers) clearly make up the largest portion of the merchant ships (45%) using the 
canal, followed by container ships (16%), and oil tankers (15%). Non-cargo ships, e.g., 
such as fishing, naval, or service ships, account only for approximately 10 percent of 
total ship traffic. Most of the ships using the canal have a tonnage of 2,501–6,000 gt. 
Ships smaller than 700 gt or larger than 10,000 gt are much less common on the canal 
(WSD Nord, 2011b). PLANCO (Meesenburg et al., 2010) estimates that about 50,000 
merchant ships will transit the Kiel Canal per year by 2025, with an increase in general 
cargo ships (including dry bulk carrier) and container ships. 
                                                                                                                                               
constraint of 8.4 m whilst Øresund's Drogden channel between Amager and Saltholm has no height 
constraint but a draught constraint of 8 m over the Øresund Tunnel (Helcom, 2009, Knowles, 2000, 
Knowles, 2006b). 
18
 Ships with a length and beam larger than 235 m and 32 m, respectively, could be classified as medium-
sized or large-sized ships. For example, a Panamax bulk carrier (60,000–79,999 dwt) has a beam of 32 m 
and a Sub-Panamax (container with 2,000–2,999 TEU) has a beam of 31 m (Stopford, 2009). Helcom 
(2009) provides numbers for ships passing the Skaw (Denmark) according to their draught. The majority 
of ships (where the draught is known) has a draught of less than 7 m. Thus, the number of larger ships in 
total traffic between the Baltic Sea and North Sea could be assumed to be small compared to small or 
small middle-sized ships. 
19
 Here the term “merchant ships” includes general cargo ships (including dry bulk carrier), ro-ro ships, 
container ships, passenger ships, crude oil tankers, gas tankers, chemical tankers, and other tankers.  
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Figure 3: Types of ships using the Kiel Canal (2005–2009). Source: Own presentation 
based on data from WSD Nord (2011b). 
2.3 Transit charge system 
The transit charge to travel through the canal includes, as mentioned in the introduction, 
up to four components: a transit toll, a pilotage due, a pilotage fee, and a helmsmen 
fee.
20
 These are charged according to a ship’s characteristics, e.g., its length, width, and 
draught and the classification of its cargo (whether or not it is classified as dangerous or 
environmentally hazardous goods).
21
 The amount that has to be paid for each compo-
nent depends on a ship’s gross tonnage. Sport boats, unmotorized boats, and ships with 
a gross tonnage of 300 or less pay the transit toll only. All other ships, excluding the 
service ships of the WSD Nord, are obliged to pay the transit toll and the pilotage due
22
. 
Pilotage and helmsmen fees are charged if a ship exceeds predefined dimensions.
23
 
There are, however, several exceptions, and discounts exist. For example, a feeder ship 
that travels the canal on a regular basis per year is eligible for a discount of up to 50% 
                                                 
20
 NOKBefAbgV (2003), LTV (2010), Kanalsteurertarifverordnung (2010). 
21
 Ships are classified according to six different traffic groups (so-called Verkehrsgruppen 1–6). This 
classification helps the canal’s traffic controllers plan traffic through the canal to avoid collisions and to 
determine the transit charges. 
22
 Pilotage dues are charged to provide pilotage facilities in a pilotage district (SeeLG, 2010 and LTV, 
2010). 
23
 See §42 Abs.5 SeeSchStrO (SeeSchStrO, 2006, NOK-LV, 2003, Bekanntmachung WSD Nord: 
Annahmepflicht Kanalsteurer). 
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on the transit toll.
24
 Note also that in addition to the transit charge for the Kiel Canal, a 
pilotage due and a pilotage fee for the Kiel Bay (before entering/after leaving the canal) 
and the Elbe estuary (after entering/before leaving the canal) might be due (NOK-LV, 
2003). 
Pilotage dues and pilotage fees for the Kiel Canal are adjusted on a regular basis, 
e.g., the last two adjustments were in 2010 and 2011 (LTV, 2011, 2010). In contrast, 
transit tolls and helmsmen fees are adjusted much less frequently, e.g., the last two 
transit toll adjustments were made in 1996 and 2003 (NOKBefAbgV, 2003, 1996) and 
the last two helmsmen fee adjustments were made in 2004 and 2010 (Kanalsteurer- 
tarifverordnung, 2010, 2004). 
 
3. Method 
Sailing a specific route incurs costs in terms of required time, fuel consumption, and 
charges. A ship traveling from a Baltic Sea port to a North Sea port, or vice versa, can 
use one of three passageways on its route: the Kiel Canal, the Øresund, or the Great Belt 
passageway. The costs incurred by using a particular passageway differ for several 
reasons, e.g., navigational conditions (such as length, possible speed, or canal transit 
with reduced speed) that affect mainly the duration of a trip and a ship’s fuel consump-
tion. Thus, a ship operator would choose the passageway that incurs the least cost. From 
the point of view of the canal authority, the difference in costs between the passageways 
is the amount that would make a ship operator indifferent between using the Kiel Canal 
or one of the two passageways around Denmark. The difference in costs is the ship 
operator’s WTP. Thus, we define the difference in costs as the optimal transit charge. 
In order to calculate the optimal transit charge, the canal authority needs to determine 
the total costs associated with each of the three passageways.
25
 Total costs of running a 
ship can be divided into five cost categories: (1) capital costs, (2) operating costs, (3) 
periodic maintenance costs, (4) voyage costs, and (5) cargo-handling costs (Stopford, 
2009). Capital costs include interest and capital payments when debt financed, or 
dividend payments when equity financed. Operating costs include factors necessary for 
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 NOKBefAbgV (2003). 
25
 Note that when calculating the optimal transit charge, the actual Kiel Canal transit charge is not part of 
the total costs per route when the Kiel Canal passageway is used. 
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the day-to-day running of a ship. It does not matter whether the ship is actually on a 
voyage. These factors include costs for manning, stores and consumables, maintenance 
and repairs, insurance, and general costs like registration fees. Periodic maintenance 
costs include interim dry-docking and major survey costs. Voyage costs include the fuel 
consumption of a ship whether it is at sea, in estuary (with possible speed restriction), in 
canal or in port. In addition, they include charges as well. Cargo-handling costs include 
loading and discharging costs, and any claims that may arise (Stopford, 2009). 
To simplify calculations, the canal authority could assume that costs associated with 
port stopovers are generally the same, no matter which passageway is actually chosen. 
Thus, a part of the voyage costs (port costs including port charges and fuel consumption 
in port) and cargo-handling costs could be excluded from calculations. Then, total cost 
differences per route associated with one of the three passageways only include the 
remaining four cost components: (1) capital costs, (2) operating costs, (3) periodic 
maintenance costs, and (4) the remaining part of the voyage costs, in particular fuel 
costs and charges for entering a pilotage district. Capital costs, operating costs, and 
periodic maintenance costs could be taken together and defined as costs for providing a 
ship. Because it would be difficult for the canal authority to gather information on 
capital costs, operating costs, and periodic maintenance costs per ship, it could use time 
charter rates as a proxy for these costs. According to Baird (2006), time charter rates are 
a representative measure of the costs of providing a ship. Time charter rates are often 
based on a fixed per-day basis ($/day). Thus, the canal authority needs to consider only 
the charter rate payment and the voyage costs of a ship on a specific route in their 
calculations.
26
 
The charter rate payment depends on the charter rate per hour (char/24) and the 
duration (in hours) of sailing a specific route (Dij,z). The voyage costs include bunker 
fuel costs per route (FuelCij,z) and, if applicable, charges for entering a pilotage district 
(k). The total costs per route (Cij,z) for a ship on a voyage from port i on the Baltic Sea to 
a port j on the North Sea via passageway z, with z = Kiel Canal, the Øresund or the 
Great Belt passageway can, therefore, be written as: 
                                                 
26
 We had preliminary communication with one operator and the Waterways and Shipping Authority 
North in order to identify the factors that operators take into account when selecting one of the three 
passageways. 
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kFuelCDcharC zijzijzij  ,,, )24/(      (1) 
Knowing the total costs per route, the canal authority can calculate the difference in 
costs (Cdif) between the alternative passageways to obtain the optimal transit charge  
( *
trk ): 
diftr Ck 

         (2) 
More detailed information on the modeling approach is provided in Appendix A. 
Given the geographical scope of our analysis, certain ports and route sections can be 
clustered to simplify the calculations, e.g., all ships coming from a port on the eastern 
Baltic Sea need to pass Bornholm before they enter one of the three passageways and, 
therefore, these ports can be clustered. For this reason, we define intersection points to 
calculate, for each route, the differences in costs associated with each of the three 
different passageways (Kiel Canal, the Great Belt, or the Øresund). The advantage of 
doing this is that instead of calculating the costs for the total length of the route three 
times for each of the different passageways and subtracting the three sets of costs from 
each other, only the costs for the diverging sections of the routes, i.e., the costs associat-
ed with each of the passageways, need to be calculated (see Figure 1, black lines). 
The intersection point for all ships departing from or heading for one of the major 
ports on the eastern Baltic Sea (west of Bornholm, Denmark) is IP1 (see Figure 1 
above). The intersection point for all ships departing from or heading for a North Sea 
port between Rotterdam and LeHavre (west of Eierland, Netherlands) is IP6.
27
 The 
intersection point for all ships departing from or heading for the North Sea port of 
Hamburg is IP5. Other intersection points are defined for other routes such that the 
points are as close as possible to the ports, e.g., IP7 for Leith. 
 
4. Study design and data 
The purpose of the study is to determine the optimal transit charge for specific ship 
types on specific routes and compare it to the actual transit charge in order to determine 
                                                 
27
 The intersection point would be further northwest for those ships required to use the deep water route. 
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whether the optimal transit charge system could increase the canal authority’s revenues 
to mitigate its current balance sheet loss. We selected the following ships for our 
analysis: a 550 TEU container ship, a 1,400 TEU container ship, a handymax bulk 
carrier, and a container-oriented multipurpose ship (MPP ship). Our reasons for 
selecting these types of ships are as follows. Container ships regularly use the canal. 
Typical container ships traveling through the Kiel Canal had a capacity of 508, 658, or 
822 TEU in 2004 (Kågeson et al., 2009). Following the general trend to larger ships, 
ships (feeder ship segment) with a capacity of 1,200–1,700 TEU are common on the 
canal as well (Bösl, 2010). We selected the bulk carrier to include a ship that belongs to 
the group of large ships (20,000–30,000 gt) that can use the canal but are nevertheless 
not frequent users (~1% of total ship traffic in the period 2005–2009; WSD Nord, 
2011c). Further, we selected the MPP ship in order to account for possible differences 
in cost per ship types, since the MPP ship is comparable in size to the container ships. 
We selected the following three routes for our analysis: (1) the route between the Baltic 
Sea port of Helsinki (Finland) and the North Sea port of Rotterdam (Netherlands), (2) 
the route between Helsinki and the North Sea port of Leith (UK), and (3) the route 
between Helsinki and the North Sea port of Hamburg (Germany). Helsinki is exemplary 
for all ports in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea located to the east of IP1 (see Figure 1). 
Rotterdam is exemplary for all ports in the southwestern part of the North Sea located to 
the west of IP6. Leith is exemplary for ports in the northwestern part of the North Sea. 
Hamburg has a unique position as it is located next to the Kiel Canal. The data we use 
in our case study to calculate the actual and optimal transit charge come from different 
sources. The ship type specifications we used are presented in Table 2. Specifications 
for gt, dwt, TEU capacity, sizes, and SFOC of main and the auxiliary engines are based 
on Buhaug et al. (2009) and represent world fleet average values for specific ship 
types.
28
 Values for beam, design draught, and speed were taken from Stopford 
(2009).
29,30 
                                                 
28
 The respective ship categories in Buhaug et al. 2009 are Container 0–999 TEU, Container 1,000–1,999 
TEU, Bulk 35,000–59,999 dwt, General Cargo 5,000–9,999 dwt, 100+ TEU, and General Cargo 10,000+ 
dwt, 100+ TEU. We use the average value for the MPP ship, which falls between two size classes of one 
category. 
29
 The respective ship types in Stopford (2009) are Feedermax and Handy for container ships, Handymax 
for bulk carriers (including length), and Grand total for the MPP ship (including only speed). 
30
 Stopford (2009) bases his values on the Containership Register 2006, Clarkson Research Services Ltd 
and Bulk Carrier Register 2006, Clarkson Research Services Ltd. 
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Table 2: Ship type specifications. Source: Own presentation based on Buhaug et al. 
(2009), Stopford (2009). 
 
a 
The allowed draught (dal) of a ship using the Kiel Canal is determined by its size dimensions: length 
and beam.
31
 Its actual draught (dac) depends on the load it is carrying and, thus, can range from the 
minimum draught (dmin), if not laden at all, to the design draught. We assume that ships are not fully laden 
and that they do not exceed the allowed draught. 
b Depending on a ship’s classification into one of the six traffic groups (see Section 2), its allowed speed 
is 6.5 or 8.1 kn.
32
 
 
Data on time charter (T/C) rates for the bulk carrier (45,000 dwt) and the two con-
tainer ships (550 TEU and 1,400 TEU) are taken from Fearnleys Monthly Report 
(Fearnresearch 2005–2009) and cover the period January 2005 to December 2009. 
These T/C rates are charged in dollars per day for a period of 12 months T/C. Since 
rates vary between months, the canal authority would need to know the month the ship 
was chartered to calculate the optimal transit charge exactly. For simplification, we use 
                                                 
31
 § 42 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 und Abs. 6 SeeSchStrO: Zulassung zum Befahren des Nord-Ostsee-Kanals;  
Bekanntmachung der Waterways and Shipping Authority North. 
32
 In accordance with § 26 Abs. 3 SeeSchStrO: Höchstgeschwindigkeit; Bekanntmachung der WSD Nord. 
Characteristics
Container vessel Container vessel Bulk carrier General cargo
Type of ship Handy Feedermax Handymax Multipurpose (MPP)
Length (m) 160 135 182 130
Beam (m) 26 21 31 23
Design draught (m) 9.7 7.7 11.4 8.5
Allowed draught (m) 9.5 9.5 8.4 9.5
Actual draught (m) dmin<dac<dal dmin<dac<dal dmin<dac<dal dmin<dac<dal
Gross tonnage (gt) 16,438 6,967 27,596 10,468
Deadweight (dwt) 45,000 12,500
Container capacity (TEU) 1,400 550 600
Main engine (kW) 12,364 5,703 8,209 5,801
Engine type
2-stroke                       
slow-speed
4-stroke 
medium/high-speed
2-stroke              
slow-speed
4-stroke 
medium/high-speed
Auxiliary engine (kW) 985 600 533 628
Engine type
4-stroke 
medium/high-speed
4-stroke 
medium/high-speed
4-stroke 
medium/high-speed
4-stroke 
medium/high-speed
Design speed (kn) at 90% MCR 19 16.8 14.4 15
Allowed max speed Kiel Canal (kn) 8.1 8.1 6.5 8.1
SFOC (g/kWh) main engine 165–175 180–195 170–180 175–185
SFOC (g/kWh) auxiliary engines 220 230 230 230
Type of bunker fuel ME/AE HFO/MDO HFO/MDO HFO/MDO HFO/MDO
Ship category
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the average over the last 12 months. For example, if a ship travels through the Kiel 
Canal in July 2008, we use the average T/C rate for the period August 2007 to July 
2008. The T/C rates used for the 1,400 TEU container are calculated as the average of 
the rates for a 550 TEU and a 1,700 TEU container taken from the Fearnleys Monthly 
Report for the period January 2005 to December 2009 (Fearnresearch, 2005–2009). The 
T/C rates used for the MPP ship are taken from Gardiner (2010), but are available on an 
annual basis only. 
Data on monthly bunker prices (heavy fuel oil and marine diesel oil) for the period 
2005–2009 are taken from the Shipping Statistics Yearbook (ISL Bremen, 2009, 2008). 
Actual transit charges (in euros) for the Kiel Canal are those discussed above and are 
determined according to various regulations. The following regulations determine 
whether a ship is obliged or not to take helmsmen and pilots on board: 
Seeschifffahrtsstraßen-Ordnung (SeeSchStrO, 2006), NOK-Lotsverordnung (NOK-LV, 
2003), and Elbe-Lotsverordnung (Elbe-LV, 2003). The Kanalsteurertarifverordnung 
(2004) is used to determine the helmsmen fee in the years 2005–2009. The 
Lotstarifverordnung (LTO, 2008, 2006, 2005, LTV, 2009) is used to determine the 
pilotage fee in the years 2005–2009, whereas the Lotstarifverordnung (LTO, 2006, 
2001, LTV, 2009) is used to determine the pilotage due in the years 2005–2009. The 
Verordnung über die Befahrensabgaben auf dem Nord-Ostsee-Kanal (NOKBefAbgV, 
2003) is used to determine the transit toll in the years 2005–2009. 
Data on monthly dollar-euro exchange rates for the period 2005–2009 are taken from 
the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Shipping route length is also important in determining the costs of shipping. Table 3 
presents an overview over the length of the three possible routes when using each of the 
three passageways, i.e., the Kiel Canal, the Great Belt, and the Øresund.
33
 For our 
calculations, we assume that all ships operate without intermediate stops, i.e., ships that 
operate on a fixed route with multiple stops and fixed schedule around Denmark are 
excluded. 
Total shipping route length is measured for each of the three routes when using each 
of the passageways (see Figure 1). We are, however, primarily interested in the length 
                                                 
33
 The Øresund passageway is restricted to ships with a draught of 8 m or less (Helcom, 2009). If a ship’s 
draught exceeds 8 m, it would have to travel through the Great Belt passageway, thus having to travel a 
greater distance. 
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of those sections of the route that are coterminous with each of the passageways (black 
line), as, for example, the section of the Helsinki-Rotterdam route between Helsinki and 
IP1 and between Rotterdam and IP6 is a constant (dotted line) regardless of which 
passageway is used. We define the length of the sections that are coterminous with each 
of the passageways as relevant length (see Table 3). 
According to our calculations, by using the Kiel Canal on the Helsinki-Hamburg 
route, for example, more than 400 nm could be saved (668.6–225.8 nm) compared to 
the Helsinki-Leith route, where less than 150 nm would be saved (833.9–689.1 nm). 
 
Table 3: Relevant length (in nm) between Helsinki and the three alternative ports at the 
North Sea.  
 
Source: Own calculations based on ESRI Base Map. 
 
While most of our model parameters, such as bunker price and route lengths, are 
observable and discrete, other parameters, such as travel time, may vary from voyage to 
voyage, and are thus unobservable. In order to take this into account, we make assump-
tions about the distribution of these unobservable parameters, namely the actual speed 
of the ship at sea, the canal waiting time, and the SFOC. 
Based on the model devised by Somanathan et al. (2009), we use a triangular distri-
bution with parameters a = 0.85 and b = c = 1 for speed at sea. This is to account for 
varying navigational conditions at sea, such as wind and the resulting waves. For the 
Route Passageway Route length Relevant length
Nm saved by using  
Kiel Canal
Kiel Canal 941.1 398.9 n.a.
Øresund 1103.2 561.1 162.1
Great Belt 1211.0 668.8 269.9
Kiel Canal 703.3 225.8 n.a.
Øresund 1038.4 560.9 335.0
Great Belt 1146.2 668.6 442.8
Kiel Canal 1161.4 689.1 n.a.
Øresund 1198.3 726.1 37.0
Great Belt 1306.1 833.9 144.8
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canal waiting time (in minutes) at the two locks of the Kiel Canal, which is included in 
the variable duration (D) (see Section 3, Equation 1), we assume waiting times to be 
exponentially distributed with parameters  = 18, 12, 15 and 12, for the four different 
ships entering the canal at the Kiel-Holtenau lock, and  = 6, 6, 9 and 6, for the four 
ships exiting the canal at the Brunsbüttel lock. The variation in the parameters is due to 
the different ship sizes. The exponential distribution is chosen to reproduce potentially 
long delays in times of heavy traffic and moderate average latencies. To account for 
differences in types of main engine, we assume a uniform distribution of SFOC over the 
interval given in Buhaug et al. (2009) (see Table 2).
34
 
 
5. Results 
Figures 4a–4l show the results of our case study based on the mean values of our 
simulation runs with 95% confidence bounds for the various ship types. These figures 
show the difference in total costs for the two passageways around Denmark (black 
dotted line for Great Belt and grey crossed line for Øresund) compared to the total costs 
of the Kiel Canal passageway (without transit charge). The Kiel Canal functions as the 
benchmark (normalized to 0).
35
 A positive cost difference shows that it is more costly 
for a particular ship type to travel around Denmark than to travel via the Kiel Canal, 
whereas a negative cost difference shows that it is less costly. This cost difference is, 
according to our definition, the optimal transit charge. Calculating the actual Kiel Canal 
transit charge (light dashed line) for each particular ship type makes it possible to 
compare it to the optimal transit charge (cost differences in total costs excluding actual 
Kiel Canal transit charge) at a glance. 
                                                 
34
 Since the transformation of this variable is linear throughout the model, the point estimate is the same 
as it would be for a deterministic value equaling the mean of this random variable. However, for interval 
estimations, this assumption is useful. 
35
 Note that for the ship types 1,400 TEU container, 550 TEU container, and bulk carrier the results are 
based on monthly data (December 2005–July 2009). For the MPP ship, the results are based on yearly 
data (2005–2009) due to limited data availability. 
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Figure 4a: Cost differences and the actual 
Kiel Canal transit charge for the 1,400 TEU 
container on a voyage from Helsinki to 
Rotterdam (in thousand dollars). Source: 
Own calculations. 
 
 
Figure 4b: Cost differences and the actual 
Kiel Canal transit charge for the 550 TEU 
container on a voyage from Helsinki to 
Rotterdam (in thousand dollars). Source: 
Own calculations. 
 
Figure 4c: Cost differences and the actual 
Kiel Canal transit charge for the ship bulk 
carrier on a voyage from Helsinki to 
Rotterdam (in thousand dollars). Source: 
Own calculations. 
 
 
 
Figure 4d: Cost differences and the actual 
Kiel Canal transit charge for the multipur-
pose ship on a voyage from Helsinki to 
Rotterdam (in thousand dollars). Source: 
Own calculations. 
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Figure 4e: Cost differences and the actual 
Kiel Canal transit charge for the 1,400 TEU 
container on a voyage from Helsinki to 
Hamburg (in thousand dollars). Source: Own 
calculations. 
 
 
Figure 4f: Cost differences and the actual 
Kiel Canal transit charge for the 550 TEU 
container on a voyage from Helsinki to 
Hamburg (in thousand dollars). Source: Own 
calculations. 
 
Figure 4g: Cost differences and the actual 
Kiel Canal transit charge for the ship bulk 
carrier on a voyage from Helsinki to 
Hamburg (in thousand dollars). Source: Own 
calculations. 
 
 
Figure 4h: Cost differences and the actual 
Kiel Canal transit charge for the multipur-
pose ship on a voyage from Helsinki to 
Hamburg (in thousand dollars). Source: Own 
calculations. 
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Figure 4i: Cost differences and the actual 
Kiel Canal transit charge for the 1,400 TEU 
container on a voyage from Helsinki to Leith 
(in thousand dollars). Source: Own 
calculations. 
 
Figure 4j: Cost differences and the actual 
Kiel Canal transit charge for the 550 TEU 
container on a voyage from Helsinki to Leith 
(in thousand dollars). Source: Own calcula-
tions. 
 
 
Figure 4k: Cost differences and the 
actual Kiel Canal transit charge for the 
ship bulk carrier on a voyage from 
Helsinki to Leith (in thousand dollars). 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Figure 4l: Cost differences and the actual 
Kiel Canal transit charge for the multipur-
pose ship on a voyage from Helsinki to Leith 
(in thousand dollars). Source: Own calcula-
tions. 
 
In general, the Great Belt is the most expensive passageway. The cost difference for 
this passageway is considerably larger than for the Øresund passageway (costs of the 
Kiel Canal serve as the benchmark). Comparing the cost difference to the actual Kiel 
Canal transit charge shows that in most cases the actual transit charge is lower than the 
optimal one. Most notably so for the Helsinki–Hamburg route, where the cost difference 
peaks in the middle of 2008 at approximately $95,000. One exception is the Helsinki–
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Leith route, for which the optimal transit charge is lower or close to the actual transit 
charge in some months. 
The results for the Øresund passageway are different. Here, for all ship types on the 
Helsinki-Rotterdam route the optimal transit charges is close to the actual transit charge. 
For the Helsinki–Leith route, the optimal transit charge is lower than the actual transit 
charge. In almost all cases, it is even below zero. This is particularly pronounced in the 
case of the bulk carrier, where it is approximately $11,000 below the benchmark. The 
only exception where the actual Kiel Canal transit charge is considerably lower than the 
optimal charge is on the Helsinki–Hamburg route. 
However, looking at the different ship types shows the following. The differences in 
costs between the bulk carrier and the 1,400 TEU container, and the MPP ship were 
nearly the same in the beginning of the time period analyzed (e.g., approximately 
15,000 euros for ships on the Helsinki–Rotterdam route using the Great Belt passage-
way, and, approximately 6,000 euros for ships using the Øresund passageway). Cost 
differences for the bulk carrier started to increase faster than the cost differences for the 
other two ship types in 2007. This is particularly the case for the Helsinki–Hamburg 
route. The 550 TEU container had the lowest level of cost differences for both passage-
ways. 
In addition to analyzing the impact of ship type and route on the optimal transit 
charge, we also analyzed the differences in charter costs, fuel costs, and charge costs, 
including the actual Kiel Canal transit charge. We did this for all ship types on all three 
routes and all three passageways. This approach sheds light on the cost level of the 
individual cost components in total cost differences and how they vary within the time 
period analyzed. Moreover, it shows how varying charter and fuel costs could impact 
the economics of passageways when charges are held constant. The results are as 
follows (for more details on individual numbers see Appendix B):  
On the route Helsinki–Rotterdam it is more often economical for the two container 
ships to travel the Øresund passageway than to use the Kiel Canal, although the 
passageway around Denmark incurs higher charter and fuel costs. The reason for this is 
that the sum of the charges (Kiel Bay, Kiel Canal, and Elbe) outweighs the sum of the 
higher charter and fuel costs. This is particularly pronounced in times of low charter 
rates and low bunker prices. It is more often economical for the bulk carrier and the 
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MPP ship to travel through the Kiel Canal than to travel around Denmark via the 
Øresund passageway. The opposite is true for the Great Belt passageway, i.e., it is 
always more economical to travel through the Kiel Canal. Using the Great Belt pas-
sageway incurs higher charter and fuel costs that are not offset by the sum of charge 
costs. 
On the route Helsinki–Hamburg it is more economical for all ship types to travel 
through the Kiel Canal than through the Øresund or the Great Belt passageway. Using 
the Øresund or the Great Belt passageway saves charge costs but incurs considerably 
higher charter and fuel costs. Therefore, the fuel and charter costs savings achieved by 
using the Kiel Canal offset the charge costs. 
On the route Helsinki–Leith it is more economical to travel around Denmark than to 
use the Kiel Canal. The only exception is the MPP ship using the Great Belt passage-
way, where in three out of five years it is more economical to use the Kiel Canal. Using 
the Øresund passageway incurs higher fuel costs but saves charter and charge costs. 
Using the Great Belt passageway incurs higher fuel and charter costs but saves charge 
costs. Therefore, the fuel and charter costs savings achieved by using the Kiel Canal are 
usually not high enough to offset the higher charge costs associated with this passage-
way. 
The results of our simulation indicate that the actual Kiel Canal transit charge is not 
optimal. However, it is not possible to state that it is in general too low or too high. This 
depends on route and ship type. Results vary significantly for all routes, all passage-
ways, and all ship types. In some cases, the actual transit charge is close to the optimal 
transit charge, whereas in other cases it is considerably far away from it. 
 
6. Discussion 
As mentioned above, the Kiel Canal generates a balance sheet loss. To get an idea about 
whether and by how much this loss could be reduced by an optimal transit charge 
system, we calculate the difference in revenues compared to the approach using the 
actual transit charge. We base our calculation on the four ship types and the three routes 
in our case study. To do so, we first evaluate the importance of individual elements 
(port, passageway, and ship type) that determine the costs. 
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A comparison of the three ports on the North Sea in the light of cargo flows with the 
Baltic Sea region shows that Hamburg is the most important port, at least in contain-
er/feeder shipping (Notteboom, 2010, Lorenz, 2006). According to Kågeson et al. 
(2008), the majority of container/feeder shipping that travels through the Kiel Canal 
goes to Hamburg and Bremerhaven, and a minority goes to UK ports, Rotterdam, and 
Antwerp. 
Comparing the two passageways around Denmark, the Øresund passageway is short-
er and is used more frequently than the Great Belt passageway, but it has a draught 
constraint of 8 m maximum. For this reason, it is used particularly by ships with a 
draught of less than 7 m (Helcom, 2009). The Kiel Canal has a similar draught con-
straint of 7.0–9.5 m, depending on the beam and the length of a ship. This implies that 
larger ships that cannot use the Øresund passageway might also be too large to use the 
Kiel Canal. For example, if the bulk carrier referred to above were fully laden, its actual 
draught would exceed the allowed draught of both the Øresund (8 m) and the Kiel Canal 
(8.4 m) (see Section 4.1). Thus, as long as the Kiel Canal is not deepened, such ships 
can only use the Great Belt passageway. For other ships, including the 1,400 TEU 
container in our case study, which might be too large for the Øresund passageway but 
not for the Kiel Canal, the Great Belt passageway would serve as the substitute to the 
Kiel Canal. 
Statistics provided by the WSD Nord about ship transits per year differentiate either 
between ship types or size classes (in gt). There are no statistics available about how 
many ships of a specific ship type in a specific size class pass through the Kiel Canal 
per year. Statistics are only available for size classes. Thus, we take the number of ships 
in a particular size class to which our ships in the case study belong and multiply this 
number by the optimal and the actual Kiel Canal transit charge to determine the 
difference in revenues. For example, the 550 TEU container ship belongs to the size 
class 6,000–8,000 gt. 3,633 ships of this size class passed the Kiel Canal, on average, 
counting both directions, in the time period (2005–2009) (WSD Nord, 2011c). 
As discussed above, the three ports, Hamburg, Rotterdam, and Leith are not equally 
important for maritime transportation in the Baltic Sea (northern Europe) region. Thus, 
we assume that most of the ships in a particular size class generally have Hamburg as 
their destination or departure port, e.g., 70% go to or depart from Hamburg and 30% go 
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to or depart from Rotterdam. We assume that 100% of ships similar to the 550 TEU 
container go to or depart from Hamburg because within the time period analyzed, the 
Øresund passageway was often the more economical choice for ships going to Rotter-
dam (see Section 4). Thus, we assume that these types of ships only used the Kiel Canal 
if their destination or departure port was Hamburg. For simplicity, we do not consider 
Leith, since, for the majority of the ship types studied, it is not economical to travel 
through the Kiel Canal (see Section 4). Furthermore, we assume that ships in the size 
class (in gt) similar to the 550 TEU container have an actual draught of less than 8m, 
i.e., they are allowed to travel through both the Øresund and the Kiel Canal. We assume 
an actual draught of more than 8m for the majority of ships in the size classes similar to 
the 1,400 TEU container, the MPP ship, and the bulk carrier; i.e., these ships are not 
allowed to use the Øresund but to use the Kiel Canal or the Great Belt instead. We 
assume an actual draught of less than 8 m only for a minority of these ships, e.g., when 
a bulk carrier is in ballast. 
The results of our calculation are shown in table 4. Evidently, under the assumptions 
made, the optimal transit charge approach yields higher revenues than the actual transit 
charge approach. Differences in revenues are in a range of up to several million dollars. 
 
Table 4: Difference in revenues between the optimal and actual transit charge approach 
(in million dollars).  
Year Con550TEU Con1400TEU Bulker MPP 
2005 26.4 8.4 5.0 10.3 
2006 29.3 9.2 6.5 11.6 
2007 34.6 12.2 14.8 9.4 
2008 44.7 17.7 22.3 24.5 
2009 15.5 8.2 6.8 11.7 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
However, differences are smaller if fewer ships with an actual draught of more than 8m 
are assumed to travel to Hamburg. For example, if we assume that only 50% of the 
ships travel to Hamburg and 50% to Rotterdam (instead of 70% and 30%), the differ-
ences in revenues would range from $0.4 to $21.4 million compared to $5 to $24.5 
million (Table 4, columns 3–5). 
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7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose an optimal transit charge system that is based on the maximal 
WTP of customers. The WTP amounts to the cost savings that ship operators could 
achieve by choosing the Kiel Canal passageway instead of the passageways around 
Denmark. We conduct a case study based on four ship types and three routes to 
compare the optimal transit charge system with the actual Kiel Canal transit charge 
system, which is based on the gross tonnage (gt) of a ship. 
The main findings of our case study are that the optimal transit charge is considera-
bly higher than the actual transit charge for all four ship types and both passageways on 
the route Hamburg–Helsinki (whereby Helsinki is exemplary for all ports east of IP1, 
see Figure 1). However, the picture is more heterogeneous for the routes Rotterdam–
Helsinki and Leith–Helsinki (whereby Rotterdam is exemplary for all ports west of IP6, 
see Figure 1). In both cases the optimal transit charge is either higher, close to, or lower 
than the actual transit charge, depending on the passageway used. Moreover, the 
discussion in Section 5 shows that if the majority of ships go to or depart from Ham-
burg, the optimal transit charge system would achieve higher revenues than the actual 
transit charge system, even though the optimal transit charge would be lower than the 
actual transit charge for some ship types and routes. 
Thus, we conclude that under an optimal transit charge system, the canal authority 
could set higher charges for ships going to or coming from Hamburg and lower charges 
for ships that are currently not using the Kiel Canal because it would not be profitable to 
do so, e.g., ships traveling to ports near Rotterdam if they use the Øresund passageway. 
However, setting higher charges might prove difficult. On the one hand, political 
acceptance might be low and, on the other hand, the legal practicality needs to be 
proved. But it needs to be noted that transit through the Kiel Canal is highly subsidized 
at present, because the difference between revenues and expenses of the Kiel Canal is 
covered by funds provided by the German federal government. Without these funds, 
operating the Kiel Canal would not be possible and ships would have to travel around 
Denmark. Reducing this imbalance should be in the interest of the Kiel Canal authority 
as well as the taxpayers. 
In order to discuss the practicability of the proposed transit charge system, the fol-
lowing points need to be highlighted. To determine the WTP, the canal authority would 
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theoretically require complete knowledge about a ship’s departure and destination, cost 
structure, and operating conditions. Such knowledge is generally not available to the 
canal authority. Therefore, it would have to rely on information it can actually obtain. 
The canal authority could ascertain the departure and destination port of a ship in the 
course of ascertaining its size dimensions, which is already done in order to classify 
ships for the purpose of traffic control. We propose using charter rate payments and fuel 
costs per ship type on a particular route as WTP indicators. However, charter rates and 
bunker prices vary over time and would require the transit charge to vary too. We thus 
propose adjusting charges regularly after a given time period in order to account for 
such fluctuations. While some components of the charge could be adjusted on an annual 
basis, it would be preferable to adjust other components, like bunker prices, on a 
monthly basis. At present, some components of the current charge have not been 
adjusted for several years. 
It is important to point out that a number of limitations apply. The case study is based 
on specific ship types on specific routes and the results might change by employing 
other ship types or routes. For example, taking Gothenburg or any other port in the 
Baltic Sea west of IP1 (Figure 1) would change the results. However, the major share of 
the volume transported via Kiel Canal comes from the states located to the east of 
intersection point 1, such as Finland or Russia (WSD Nord, 2006). Time charter rates 
are often only available for ships of a certain size, particularly for large ships, but the 
Kiel Canal is mostly used by small and lower-middle-sized ships. Further, some of the 
ships might operate on a fixed route and a fixed schedule, so that they cannot choose 
between alternative passageways. 
It would be interesting to know whether considering external costs would change the 
results. For example, additional costs caused by CO2 emission regulation in the shipping 
sector could change the results because ship operators might decide to travel the less 
CO2-intensive passageway. Furthermore, the marginal costs of providing canal services, 
in particular, the costs of repairing marginal damages to the canal must also be taken 
into account when determining optimal transit charges, i.e., optimal charges amount to 
the maximum of marginal costs and WTP. We assume for convenience that WTP 
always exceeds marginal costs such that the latter can be ignored when calculating 
optimal charges. This assumption simply means that it is economical for all ship types 
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to use the canal, i.e., that the marginal costs of canal passage are less than the total cost 
savings for a given ship. All these additional aspects are deferred for future research. 
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10. Appendix A 
The Appendix provides more detailed information on the methodological approach, and 
in particular, on Eq. (1). 
The total costs per route (Cij,z) for a ship on a voyage from port i on the Baltic Sea to a 
port j on the North Sea via passageway z, with z = Kiel Canal, the Øresund or the Great 
Belt passageway, is determined by 
zijzijcharzij VCPC ,,,,          (A1) 
where 
zijcharP ,, denotes the charter rate payment per route and VCij,z denotes the voyage 
costs per route. The charter rate payment depends on the charter rate (char), which 
approximately represents capital and operational costs (plus a benefit for the owner for 
providing the ship), and on the duration (D) of the voyage. The duration (in hours) of 
sailing a specific route Dij,z depends on the length (in nm) of the route and the speed (in 
kn) of a ship. In addition, if a ship uses the Kiel Canal, it also depends on the lock time 
(dlock) and the waiting time before entering the lock (dwaiting): 
waitinglockzijzijzij ddknnmD  ,,, / .      (A2) 
Bunker costs (FuelC) are a function of a ship’s fuel consumption and the bunker price. 
ker,, bunzijzij pfcFuelC  .       (A3) 
The fuel consumption (ton/h) of a ship’s main engine is determined by 
ßssfcfc )/(          (A4) 
where fc
*
 is defined as design fuel consumption (in ton/h), s as speed (in kn), s
*
 as 
design speed (in kn) (Stopford, 2009). The exponent β indicates the type of engine. 
According to Stopford (2009), β = 3 for diesel engines. 
In general, ships are designed to fulfill a predetermined transport performance/demand 
per period of time. To do so, they have to operate at a specific speed. Thus, ships are 
designed to operate at a specific speed, called the design speed s
*
. After determining the 
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design speed, the engine (and the hull) is designed to provide the required speed. The 
relationship between engine size (Esize) and speed (s) is approximately given by  
Esize ≈ s 
3
 (Holst, 2008; Corbett et al. 2009). 
In general, the design fuel consumption per hour is determined by 
610/SFOCFEfc loadsize 
       (A5) 
where Esize is the engine size (in kW), 
*
loadF is the design engine load factor (in % 
Maximum Continuous Rating (MCR)), and SFOC is the related specific fuel oil 
consumption (in g/kWh) (Buhaug et al., 2009). 
A ship generally has a main engine that provides motive power and more than one 
auxiliary engine that provide power for other necessary services on board.
36
 Thus, the 
fuel consumption of the main engine (
zijMEfc ,, ) and the fuel consumption of the 
auxiliary engines (
zijAEfc ,, ) need to be differentiated. The fuel consumption per route 
(fcij,z), taking the different route sections into account, is then given by 
zijAEzijMEzij fcfcfc ,,,,,         (A6) 
Because fuel consumption varies along a shipping route due to differences in naviga-
tional conditions, a shipping route can be divided into four different sections: at sea, in 
speed restricted estuary/pilotage district, in port and in canal. Depending on the section, 
traveling speeds differ and waiting times might occur.  
The fuel consumption of the main engine is given by 
ß
cMEc
ß
eMEe
ß
sMEszijME ssfcdssfcdssfcdfc )/()/()/(,,
   (A7) 
where fc
*
ME is defined as design fuel consumption per hour and ds as the time spent 
sailing at sea, de as the time spent sailing in estuary (pilotage district), and dc as the time 
spent sailing on the canal. 
The fuel consumption of the auxiliary engines is given by 
rrrr AErloadsizezijAE
n
r
dSFOCFEfc   )10/(
6
,,1
    (A8) 
                                                 
36
 Ships are equipped with several auxiliary engines, with generators (small diesel engines) for producing 
electricity as the most important auxiliary engine. Ships usually have at least three of these generators, 
which operate by turns, to guarantee failure-free operation (Buhaug et al., 2009). 
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where r=1, …, n denotes the number of auxiliary engines and 
rAE
d the duration of their 
operating time. The number of auxiliary engines in operation and the actual time they 
spend in operation depends on the type of ship.
37
 If the main engine and the auxiliary 
engines would require a different type of bunker fuel, than the bunker costs are given by 
wv bunzijAEbunzijMEzij
pfcpfcFuelC ker,,ker,,,      (A9) 
where v and w denote different types of bunker fuel.  
                                                 
37
 Ships usually have one generator in operation, i.e., the others are put on hold, i.e., they are available for 
maintenance or are on standby (Buhaug et al., 2009). In some cases, ships are additionally equipped with 
a shaft generator for generating electricity, which reduces the need to operate generators at sea. 
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11. Appendix B 
Tables B1 to B3 show the cost differences in total costs, including the actual Kiel Canal 
transit charge, for all ship types on all three routes and all three passageways. It presents 
the highest cost difference (highest Δ), the lowest cost difference (smallest Δ), and the 
median cost difference (median Δ) in the time period December 2005–July 2005 and 
2005–2009 for the MPP ship. In addition, the numbers in brackets show how many 
times (months or years for the MPP) a positive cost difference occurs during the time 
period analyzed. Moreover, the total cost differences of the highest and the lowest 
values are divided into charter costs, fuel cost, and charge costs. 
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Table B1: Difference in costs for the Helsinki–Rotterdam route (in $).  
Passage-
ways 
compared 
Type of 
ship 
Difference in total costs 
(Δ) 
Difference composed of 
median 
Δ (≥0) 
highest Δ 
lowest Δ 
charter 
costs Δ 
fuel costs 
Δ 
charge 
costs Δ 
              
Ø
re
su
n
d
-K
ie
l 
C
an
al
 
Container  
550 TEU 
-976 -2,752 1,671 2,472 -6,895 
(4/44) -22 1,800 5,008 -6,830 
            
Container  
1400 TEU 
-696 -3,928 1,939 4,391 -10,258 
(15/44) 13 3,478 5,193 -8,658 
            
Bulker 
313 11,423 14,309 11,896 -14,782 
(23/44) 308 8,500 4,747 -12,939 
            
MPP 
1,282 3,469 3,100 12,159 -11,790 
(4/5) -98 2,000 8,029 -10,127 
            
G
re
at
 B
el
t-
K
ie
l 
C
an
al
 
            
Container  
550 TEU 
3,569 7,758 4,309 11,534 -8,085 
(44/44) 739 3,843 3,791 -6,895 
            
Container  
1400 TEU 
6,967 14,607 6,296 20,339 -12,028 
(44/44) 1,681 5,253 6,686 -10,258 
            
Bulker 
13,424 37,175 33,777 18,180 -14,782 
(44/44) 6,700 10,001 8,358 -11,659 
            
MPP 
8,588 13,149 6,521 18,418 -11,790 
(5/5) 6,241 4,207 12,161 -10,127 
            
Source: Own calculations. 
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Table B2: Difference in costs for the Helsinki–Hamburg route (in $).  
Passage-
ways 
compared 
Type of 
ship 
Difference in total costs 
(Δ) 
Difference composed of 
median 
Δ (≥0) 
highest Δ 
lowest Δ 
charter 
costs Δ 
fuel costs 
Δ 
charge 
costs Δ 
              
Ø
re
su
n
d
-K
ie
l 
C
an
al
 
Container  
550 TEU 
8,000 14,237 5,789 13,969 -5,521 
(44/44) 5,046 5,162 4,592 -4,708 
            
Container  
1400 TEU 
15,446 25,943 8,699 24,563 -7,319 
(44/44) 9,091 7,257 8,076 -6,242 
            
Bulker 
27,748 60,364 45,582 21,992 -7,210 
(44/44) 17,915 13,498 10,110 -5,693 
            
MPP 
16,693 23,615 8,588 22,201 -7,174 
(5/5) 14,038 5,541 14,659 -6,162 
            
G
re
at
 B
el
t-
K
ie
l 
C
an
al
 
            
Container  
550 TEU 
12,874 20,687 8,226 17,982 -5,521 
(44/44) 8,538 7,335 5,911 -4,708 
            
Container  
1400 TEU 
23,059 36,900 12,671 31,548 -7,319 
(44/44) 14,700 10,571 10,371 -6,242 
            
Bulker 
40,769 86,150 65,075 28,285 -7,210 
(44/44) 26,580 19,270 13,003 -5,693 
            
MPP 
23,999 33,295 12,009 28,460 -7,174 
(5/5) 20,378 7,748 18,792 -6,162 
            
Source: Own calculations. 
  
 48 
 
Table B3: Difference in costs for the Helsinki–Leith route (in $).  
Passage-
ways 
compared 
Type of 
ship 
Difference in total costs 
(Δ) 
Difference composed of 
median 
Δ (≥0) 
highest Δ 
lowest Δ 
charter 
costs Δ 
fuel costs 
Δ 
charge 
costs Δ 
              
Ø
re
su
n
d
-K
ie
l 
C
an
al
 
Container  
550 TEU 
-6,271 -6,889 -938 2,010 -7,961 
(0/44) -5,851 -923 1,902 -6,830 
            
Container  
1400 TEU 
-9,702 -10,448 -1,911 1,721 -10,258 
(0/44) -8,804 -2,128 3,485 -10,161 
            
Bulker 
-14,641 -18,909 -7,648 3,504 -14,765 
(0/44) -11,607 -2,574 2,247 -11,280 
            
MPP 
-7,616 -7,774 -873 4,889 -11,790 
(0/5) -7,204 -852 3,096 -9,448 
            
G
re
at
 B
el
t-
K
ie
l 
C
an
al
 
            
Container  
550 TEU 
-1,695 -3,314 1,321 2,260 -6,895 
(1/44) -70 1,474 6,134 -7,678 
            
Container  
1400 TEU 
-1,952 -4,838 1,402 4,018 -10,258 
(4/44) 313 1,620 9,653 -10,960 
            
Bulker 
1,833 7,252 11,157 10,878 -14,783 
(15/44) 239 6,693 6,357 -12,811 
            
MPP 
101 1,906 2,548 11,148 -11,790 
(3/5) 101 2,489 7,060 -9,448 
            
Source: Own calculations. 
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Abstract 
CO2 emissions from international shipping, which are currently unregulated, are 
predicted to rise dramatically if no regulations are implemented. International bunker 
fuel emissions have been excluded from the Kyoto Protocol; the UNFCCC conference 
in Copenhagen also failed to bring about clear directions on how to proceed with these 
emissions.  
In this paper, the various options suggested by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice of the UNFCCC for allocating CO2 emissions from international 
shipping to individual countries are investigated. This is followed by a discussion of the 
economic and regulatory issues related to these options and the consequences of 
applying them. Then, the various options are evaluated on the basis of environmental 
effectiveness, possibility of legal implementation, and fairness of burden sharing. The 
evaluation shows that there is no single allocation option that can be regarded as 
environmentally effective, legally effective and allowing for fair burden sharing. 
Nevertheless, it is concluded that an allocation of international shipping emissions 
should be conducted on the basis of the operating company. 
 
Keywords: climate change, international shipping, CO2 emissions, International 
Maritime Organization 
JEL classification: Q52, Q54, Q56 
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1. Introduction 
In 2007, 3.3% of the world’s total anthropogenic CO2 emissions were caused by global 
shipping, with the international shipping sector accounting for the major share of 2.7% 
[1].
1
 The International Maritime Organization (IMO) estimates that these emissions, if 
not curbed, could grow significantly until 2050—amounting to 12–18% of the total 
allowable CO2 emissions under the WRE [2] 450 ppm stabilisation scenario [1]. 
To date, the major share of these global shipping emissions is unregulated. Interna-
tional bunker fuel emissions have been excluded from the Kyoto Protocol. In contrast to 
emissions from domestic shipping, which amount to less than 0.6%, emissions from 
international shipping are not assigned to national emissions inventories. Therefore they 
remain unaffected by the Kyoto regulations. The UNFCCC conference in Copenhagen 
in 2009 also failed to give directions on how to proceed with emissions from interna-
tional shipping. As a consequence, IMO and International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) will continue to discuss regulating emissions in their respective sectors yet 
without formal guidance.  
The present lack of regulation can be traced to the truly global nature of the shipping 
sector. In 2005, the world merchant fleet counted 90,662 million ships of 100 gross 
tonnes (gt) and more, transporting 7 billion tons of cargo between 160 countries [3, 4]. 
A significant part of the emissions caused by international shipping therefore takes 
place on the high seas outside of the jurisdiction of any country. Here only the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and ratified IMO conventions 
apply. Moreover, regulating shipping emissions is difficult due to the multiple nationali-
ties involved in shipping. Often ships are registered in one country – their flag state – 
but their owners may be citizens of another country while the operating company is 
based in a third country. Regulating this global business therefore needs a global 
inclusive approach that limits free-riding. 
Abatement cost studies analysing potential technological and operational measures 
for reducing CO2 emissions and their costs show that many cost-effective abatement 
                                                 
1
 In accordance with the 2006 IPPC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories 
(http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/vol2.html), [1] define international shipping as shipping 
activities that cross borders, whereas domestic shipping is defined as local shipping activities without the 
crossing of borders. Both shipping definitions exclude fishing and military vessels. The term global 
shipping includes international and domestic shipping as well as fishing vessels but excludes military 
vessels.  
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measures are available to the shipping sector [1, 5–7]. They show that their implementa-
tion is beneficial even in the absence of a CO2 regulation. Thus, integrating CO2 
emissions of the shipping sector into a UNFCCC climate regime or regulating these 
emissions within a sectoral approach based on IMO regulations could be economically 
beneficial. This makes a strong case for regulating shipping emissions because it is a 
cost-effective way of reducing emissions in general. 
There are essentially two ways in which emissions from international shipping can 
be regulated: a UNFCCC-based versus a sectoral approach. If regulation based on the 
UNFCCC framework is chosen, emissions would have to be allocated to individual 
countries, adding to their total national emissions. Individual countries would then 
decide how to reduce their total national emissions, probably opting for cost-effective 
sectors and measures. Hence, regulation of the shipping sector may or may not be the 
consequence, depending on what national policy makers consider the most efficient 
method. Alternatively, a sectoral approach could be aimed for, which would focus only 
on the shipping sector’s emissions and allocate them within the shipping sector. A 
global approach should be pursued to avoid free-riding, as shipping regulations 
introduced in some countries could easily be avoided if other non-committed countries 
lack regulation. From an economic perspective, an allocation to total national emissions 
combined with a global carbon price – e.g., within an international emissions trading 
system – would be most efficient. For this reason the focus is on regulations based on 
the UNFCCC framework. 
For both options, however, an allocation of emissions to individual countries is nec-
essary—even if a global scheme is set up in the sectoral approach. Governments will 
want to know the quantitative and financial effects of regulations on their industries 
before they agree to an international scheme. Additionally, their support and policing is 
necessary for the effective implementation and enforcement of regulations. Hence, the 
question of how to allocate shipping emissions to individual countries is relevant for 
every option. So far, research on this matter has been mostly qualitative [8–12] and few 
quantitative assessments exist [7, 13]. 
The analysis in this paper is a quantitative assessment, adding to the existing litera-
ture by analysing the UNFCCC options that have not yet been assessed and comparing 
them with those that have, e.g. by [13, 7]. This quantitative assessment differs from 
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previous studies because it is based on country-level data allowing a more detailed 
investigation into the effect of different allocation rules. Furthermore, the literature is 
extended by adding further allocation options proposed by the UNFCCC, such as 
proportional allocations based on national emissions, nationality of the ship owner and 
nationality of the operator. Furthermore, more recent and more detailed data are applied 
and a calculation approach is used, which enables a more sophisticated allocation based 
on flag state registry. Also updated data for an allocation based on the sale of bunker 
fuels is applied. 
 
2. The shipping sector 
2.1. Structure and emissions inventory of the shipping sector 
The maritime transport industry carries over 80% of the world’s merchandise trade by 
volume and exhibits an estimated annual growth rate of 3.1% on average over the last 
three decades [14], which has accelerated to 6.5% on average per year in the period 
2004–2008 [3].2 In 2007, the world fleet consisted of slightly more than 100,000 ships 
of 100 gt and above [1]. Thereof, 44,971 ships belonged to the world merchant fleet 
(cargo ships) with over 1 billion deadweight tonnage (dwt), representing 89% of world 
total tonnage [1, 3]. Tankers, bulk carriers, and container ships represent the largest 
share of total world fleet in terms of dwt [3], in terms of fuel consumption and conse-
quently in terms of emissions [1]. 
The structure of the shipping sector is complex due to multiple ownership natures of 
vessels. A ship can be owned by a company based in one country, whose owners are 
citizens of another country; it can be registered in another country (its flag state) and be 
operated by a company that is based in yet another country. Hence, multiple jurisdic-
tions may apply in addition to the UNCLOS framework and IMO conventions. How-
ever, the country of registration, the flag state, is most relevant because it has the 
obligation to comply with international agreements. 
                                                 
2
 In 2008, growth in international seaborne trade decreased and growth in world merchandise exports 
decreased by 4 percentage points from 6% in 2007 to 2% in 2008 due to the economic downturn [14]. 
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The difference between registration and ownership (control) of fleets becomes evident 
when comparing Tables 1 and 2.
3
 
 
Table 1: Presentation of top 5 countries by number and deadweight tonnage in registra-
tion of world fleet, ships of 300 gt and more.  
 
country number of ships country deadweight tonnage (in 1000) 
Panama 6 380 Panama 250 287 
Japan 2 528 Liberia 114 975 
China 2 428 Greece 61 141 
Liberia 2 067 Hong Kong 59 554 
Indonesia 1 878 Marshall Islands 58 368 
        
Source: [3]. 
 
Table 2: Presentation of top 5 countries by number and deadweight tonnage in control 
of world fleet, ships of 1000 gt and more.  
 
country number of ships country deadweight tonnage (in 1000) 
Japan 3 433 Greece 175 711 
Germany 3 189 Japan 160 722 
Greece 3 087 Germany 94 513 
China 2 975 China 83 064 
Norway 1 400 Norway 45 118 
        
Source: [3]. 
It is clear that non-Annex I countries like Panama and Liberia are used as registration 
countries whereas actual control of the fleet mostly lies in developed countries like 
Greece, Japan, Germany and Norway, with the exception of China.  
Establishing emission inventories for the shipping sector is a challenging task, inter 
alia due to limited data availability [15, 16]. The main reason for limited data availabil-
ity is that ships are neither obliged to report their route of navigation nor their consump-
tion of fuel during their voyages. In addition, ships vary greatly in their emission 
intensities caused by different factors such as size, age, purpose, condition and opera-
tion - in particular speed. This makes a general analysis of average fuel consumption 
and emissions per ship type difficult [1].  
                                                 
3
 Note that due to availability of data table 1 refers to ships of 300 gt and more while table 2 refers to 
ships of 1000 gt and more. While the difference in total ships is substantial when comparing number of 
ships (44,553 versus 34,915), the difference in dwt is much smaller (1.0796 billion versus 1.0719 billion) 
[3]. 
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In recent years different approaches to estimating overall global shipping emissions 
have been presented in the literature [1, 7, 17–21]. 
[1] predicts that without any policy measures international shipping emissions will 
lie between 6% and 22% (925–1058 Mt of CO2 emissions) higher in 2020 than emis-
sions in 2007. By 2050 emissions are predicted to even lie between 119% and 204% 
(1903–2648 Mt of CO2 emissions) higher than in 2007. 
2.2. Legal structures: IMO, UNCLOS and ownership of vessels 
Ships are mobile emitters, and, if engaged in international trade, cross different 
jurisdictions. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) applies 
in international waters, called the High Seas, but in the exclusive economic zone, i.e., 
the coastal area, national jurisdiction applies. UNCLOS provides ships with the right of 
“innocent passage” through national territorial waters and economic zones, meaning 
that national or regional laws and regulations do not apply to the design, construction or 
equipment of foreign ships wanting to pass through—“unless they are giving effect to 
generally accepted international rules or standards” [22]. Therefore, national or regional 
laws, e.g. within the EU, cannot affect ships registered in a foreign country. Moreover, 
UNCLOS only regulates affairs between states; its regulations do not directly apply to 
ship owners or operators [1]. 
Ships are regulated by the laws of their country of registration. The process of “flag-
ging out a ship”, i.e., registering it in a country other than the owner’s office location, is 
predominantly used to avoid regulation at home. From Table 1 above it becomes 
apparent that a large part of the fleet is registered in “open registry” countries, i.e., 
countries that have open or easy access to their flag. Under this system of “open flag” 
more than two thirds (68.3% in 2008) of ship tonnage are flying a “flag of conven-
ience”, a trend which is increasing [3]. 
The IMO has 168 Member States representing almost 99% of the world tonnage and 
provides the legislative framework for international shipping with 50 conventions and 
protocols. Once a convention is agreed upon, the member states are asked to ratify it, 
thereby agreeing to implement it as part of their national legislation. Consequently, flag 
states must enforce this legislation upon their flag ships. Once IMO legislation has 
entered into force, it is considered to be a generally accepted international rule and 
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thereby overrides the UNCLOS right of innocent passage. Hence countries that have 
ratified it can apply it to all ships landing in their ports regardless of their flag.  
In addition, the IMO principle of equal treatment of ships must be resolved with the 
UNFCCC principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” that governs climate 
negotiations and ensures differentiation between contributions of developed and 
developing countries—this principle is a matter of continued disagreement at climate 
conferences and developing countries have argued that any IMO convention on curbing 
shipping emissions should only apply to developed countries in accordance with the 
spirit of the Kyoto Protocol [1]. Yet, three quarters of all merchant vessels, by dead-
weight, engaged in international shipping are registered in countries that have no 
binding emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol.
4
 
The UNFCCC working group report of 2009 has also touched upon the regulation of 
shipping emissions by presenting several options in their negotiation text for the Cop15 
in Copenhagen [23], but no agreement was made. Hence, the UNFCCC has yet to 
provide the input the IMO was hoping for. 
 
3. Options under the UNFCCC to allocate shipping emissions 
In its 1996 National Communication by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Techno-
logical Advice (SBSTA) [24], the UNFCCC proposes eight possible allocation options 
for shipping emissions: 
1. No allocation 
2. Allocation to Parties in proportion to their national emissions 
3. Allocation to Parties according to the country where the bunker fuel is sold 
4. Allocation to Parties according to the nationality of the transporting company, or to 
the country where the vessel is registered, or to the country of the operator 
5. Allocation to Parties according to the country of departure or destination of a 
vessel. Alternatively the emissions related to the journey of a vessel could be 
shared between the country of departure and the country of arrival 
                                                 
4
 If ownership is considered, instead of registration, then, of the total merchant fleet, 68% of dwt is 
controlled by OECD countries and 95% of dwt is controlled by only 35 countries [3]. 
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6. Allocation to Parties according to the country of departure or destination of 
passenger or cargo. Alternatively, the emissions related to the journey of passen-
gers or cargo could be shared by the country of departure and the country of arrival 
7. Allocation to Parties according to the country that owns the cargo or origin of the 
passengers 
8. Allocation to the Party of emissions generated in its national space 
Options 2, 7 and 8 have already been dismissed by the SBSTA. [13] and [7] have 
assessed options 3 (IEA data from 2000), 5, 6 and parts of 4 (flag state). This paper 
adds option 2 because its general approach can provide a benchmark for comparison 
with other options, despite the fact that the SBSTA has dismissed it. Further, also an 
updated version of 3 (IEA data from 2007) and a complete analysis of option 4 (flag 
state/operator/owner) with new data and a different calculation method are added. 
 
4. Calculation of emissions allocation to national inventories 
4.1. Data set description and calculation approach of allocating CO2 emissions 
The analysis is based on different statistical databases for 2007. Data from the Interna-
tional Energy Agency [25] on CO2 emissions from fuel combustion and the World Bank 
[26] on country specific per capita CO2 emissions are used as databases for determining 
a country’s national CO2 emissions inventory—in the following denoted as total 
national emissions.
5
 For attributing the share of emissions from international marine 
bunker fuel sold to a country (allocation option 3 (fuel sold)), data from the IEA on CO2 
emissions from international marine bunker fuel sold is used [25]. For allocation options 
2 (proportional) and 4 (flag state/operator/owner), additional data from the second 
IMO GHG study [1] is employed. In this study, a CO2 emissions inventory for the 
shipping sector is established for the year 2007 by estimating fuel consumption based 
                                                 
5
 For the year 2007 the data sets only contain data on a country’s total CO2 emissions from fuel 
combustion and not for a country’s GHG emissions. The latter is only available in the IEA statistics for 
the year 2005. Nevertheless, they are chosen as databases for determining a country’s national emissions 
total because all datasets used on shipping emissions are based on the year 2007 too. 
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on activity data.
6
 This data set covers all ships larger than 100 gt (in total 100,243 
ships), excluding military vessels, and contains information for different ship categories 
on size, number of ships, annual average fuel consumption, and used fuel type. Emis-
sions per category are calculated based on conversion factors: ε = 3.13 for heavy fuel oil 
(HFO) or ε = 3.19 marine diesel oil (MDO).7  
Information on the nationality of the transporting country (ownership)
8
, country of 
registration (flag state), and country of ship operator (operator) was provided by the 
Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics for 2007 [27]. By employing this data the 
analysis is limited to ships of 1,000 gt and more, which amounts to 32,292 for the two 
categories flag state and owner and 33,088 for the category operator.
 9
 These ships are 
predominately cargo ships most often used on the high seas. 
The emission calculation for allocation option 2 (proportional) is straightforward: 
According to [1], international shipping emitted 870 Mt of CO2 emissions and caused 
2.7% of the world’s CO2 emissions in 2007. Consequently, 2.7% are added to all total 
national emissions, irrespective of whether a country is land-locked or sold international 
marine bunker fuel [24].
10
 
For allocation option 3 (fuel sold) emissions from 2007 international marine bunker 
fuel sales are allocated to the respective countries.  
To investigate allocation option 4 (flag state/operator/owner), emissions must be 
attributed to the individual countries’ fleet. This can be done in terms of flag state 
registry (option 4a), operating company (option 4b), and ownership (option 4c). To gain 
                                                 
6
 The applied activity-based model cannot differentiate between international and domestic shipping, 
since some types of ships can be used in both international and domestic shipping. To differentiate 
between them, domestic fuel consumption based on fuel statistics is subtracted from the calculated global 
fuel consumption based on activity data [1]. To date, domestic shipping emissions are included in the 
national GHG emissions inventory reports of the UNFCCC Parties. 
7
 The emission factors employed in [1] are in line with the 2006 IPCC Guidelines on National Green-
house Gas Inventories (http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/vol2.html). Since some types of 
ships are able to use both types of bunker fuel, a conversion factor of ε = 3.16 is assumed for those ships. 
8 Lloyd’s Register is followed by defining “ownership” as the “true nationality” of the controlling interest 
behind the fleet. In this case “true nationality” means where the benefits of the operation of the ships 
finally go to. So for example, if the owner of a ship is Greek and based in New York but remits the profits 
back to his home country Greece, then the “true nationality” would be Greece.  
9
 Information on ship ownership and flag state registration is based on July 2007 data and information on 
operator is based on January 2008 data. Although [27] includes only around 1/3 of the ships (mainly 
cargo ships) that are included in [1] more than 70% of the world fleet’s total fuel consumption is covered. 
10
 As it is worked with a different database compared to [1] to determine a country’s total national 
emissions, the relative share of international shipping of worldwide CO2 emissions differs from the 2.7% 
mentioned in the second IMO GHG study. In the case of IEA data on CO2 emissions from fuel combus-
tion in 2007 [25] a share of around 3% is obtained. 
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insight into the country specific distribution of overall emissions, data on annual 
average fuel consumption per ship type derived from the activity-based approach by [1] 
is combined with data on ship ownership, flag, and operator taken from the Institute of 
Shipping Economics and Logistics [27].  
To calculate the total emissions for a country’s fleet, information on annual average 
fuel consumption per ship type is used and multiplied by the corresponding emission 
factors. The resulting emissions per ship type are then multiplied by the number of ships 
that each country owns, operates, or has registered in that category. The emissions E for 
a country i’s fleet are thus given by 
)( ijj
j
iji dcqE   , 
where ε represents the corresponding emissions factor, q the number of ships of country 
i in category j, )( ijj dc the specific fuel consumption value that gives yearly average fuel 
consumption depending on the ship size d. 
Note that due to the unavailability of ship movement data, the above calculation 
assumes equal activity for ships in the same category and does not represent the actual 
miles that a country’s fleet in a specific category travelled annually. It merely represents 
the share of a country’s fleet in a specific category in comparison. This assumption is 
made due to limited data availability.
11
 Furthermore, 2007 was a good year for interna-
tional seaborne trade in terms of ton-miles [14]. It can therefore be assumed that 
(almost) full employment of merchant ships existed, i.e. it can be reasoned that all 
registered ships were in use during the year 2007, which, in turn, supports our assump-
tion of equal activity. 
4.2. Results 
The results of allocation options 2 (proportional), 3 (fuel sold), and 4a (flag state), 4b 
(operator), and 4c (owner) are presented in figure 1. 
 
                                                 
11
 Lloyd’s Register maintains data on ship movements [7] but the authors have no access due to financial 
constraints. 
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Figure 1: Top 10 countries of allocated shipping emissions. The figure shows the top 
10 countries according to relative share in total international shipping emissions per 
allocation option in comparison to the rest of the world. (a) Note that option 3 is based 
on 610 Mt of CO2 emissions instead of 870 Mt of CO2 emissions. This is because IEA 
statistics use a different methodology than [1] to account for international shipping 
emissions [1]. (b) Further, since two different climate regime scenarios are going to be 
analysed in Section 5.1, countries that have agreed to emission reduction targets under 
the Kyoto Protocol have been marked with an asterisk. Source: Own calculations based 
on IEA [26], Buhaug et al. [1], and ISL [3]. 
 
The results show that all option 4 cases would allocate roughly 50% of the emissions 
to the top ten countries and the other 50% to the rest of the world. This is considerably 
lower than allocation options 3 and 2 (70% and 65% respectively). However, the 
distribution of emissions varies significantly among options. Option 4c (owner) would 
allocate the highest CO2 shares to Germany, Japan and Greece – all three have agreed to 
emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol – followed by China and the US. 
Option 4b (operator) allocates the highest share to Japan, Greece and China, followed 
by Denmark and the US. The third case of option 4, allocation according to flag state, is 
not as balanced because Panama and Liberia alone would have to account for roughly 
25% of all emissions—whilst both countries have small economies and a small amount 
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of total national emissions overall. In this scenario, only two out of the top ten countries 
have agreed to emission reduction targets under Kyoto.  
The results for taking into account not only the increase in absolute emissions but 
also the relative increase in total national emissions is shown in the Appendix A (Tables 
A1–A4): the highest relative increase in total national emissions would fall on countries 
known for commonly “flagging out” ships and some large European shipping nations 
such as Denmark, Greece or Norway.  
The result of allocation option 3 (fuel sold) shows that over 70 % of CO2 emissions 
from international marine bunker fuel sold would be comprised of the top ten countries 
with the largest shares burdened on Singapore and the US, followed by the Netherlands.  
Allocation option 2 (proportional) – proportional add-on of shipping emissions to 
existing total national emissions – gives a cross-sectoral balance of emission totals. 
Hence, the countries that would be burdened the most by this allocation are those that 
have the highest share of total national emissions to begin with, i.e. China and the US: 
they alone account for almost 40% of global emissions, whilst none of them have any 
Kyoto Protocol commitments. 
4.3. Putting the results into perspective 
Now, the different options analysed in section 4.2 will be compared to the options 
analysed in the studies of [13, 7]. In order to make them comparable, the regional 
aggregation of [7] is chosen. Their analysis is conducted at the level of 10 world 
regions, whereas the analysis of [13] is conducted at the level of 17 world regions. The 
analysis in this paper is conducted at the level of countries.
12
 Also note that allocated 
emissions in option 5 (departure/destination of ship) are based on the year 2006 [7], 
option 6 (destination of goods) on the year 2000 [13], and options 2–4 on the year 2007. 
Figure 2 shows the regional allocation effects of international shipping emissions 
according to the various options. 
 
                                                 
12
 The aggregation of country level data to the level of the 10 world regions is straightforward, whereas 
the aggregation of the 17 world regions to the level of the 10 world regions is not. The reason is that the 
regions do not coincide in terms of geographical scope (assigned countries per region). For example, in 
[13] Russia belongs to one region, whereas in [7] it is split up and assigned to different regions. Thus the 
accuracy of option 6’s indicated Mt of CO2 emissions is limited. 
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Figure 2: Comparison of allocation options on a regional scale. The figure shows the regional allocation effects of international 
shipping emissions according to the various options. Source: [7] for option 5, [13] for option 6, own calculations based on [24], [1], and 
[26] for option 2, 4(a–c).
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At first glance, the picture looks extremely heterogeneous. To gain a better under-
standing, first it will be examined whether regions exist that score high in terms of 
allocated shipping emissions in all options. Next, it will be examined which option most 
equally distributes allocated shipping emissions across all regions. For this purpose the 
variation coefficient is used to illustrate the dispersion from the average within each 
option’s distribution. Finally, options 3–6 will be related to option 2—proportional add-
on of shipping emissions to existing total national emissions. This delivers insight 
regarding to what extent the shipping-based allocation options 3–6 deviate from the 
country emissions-based allocation option 2 in each region. The term “shipping-based 
allocation option” is associated with an allocation based on general shipping activities, 
for example selling marine bunker fuel or owning a ship, whereas the term “country 
emissions-based allocation option” is associated with an allocation based on emissions 
within national territories. 
In each option Europe is allocated at least 15% of total international shipping emis-
sions, scoring higher than all other regions in options 3, 4b, 4c, 5, and 6. Thus, no 
matter which option is chosen, Europe is burdened with a large share of total interna-
tional shipping emissions, followed by North East Asia and North America.  
Calculation of the variation coefficient shows that allocation in option 5 is less dis-
persed than in other options, allocating shipping emissions most equally across all 
regions, followed by options 3 and 2. 
Regarding the distinction between shipping-based allocation options 3–6 and country 
emissions-based allocation option 2, the following observations can be made. Europe is 
allocated more emissions by shipping-based options than by the country emissions-
based option, whereas the opposite is the case for North America and North East Asia. 
This implies that, if option 2 is chosen as an allocation rule, European shipping activi-
ties are underestimated. In contrast, if option 2 is chosen as an allocation rule, North 
American and North East Asian shipping activities are overestimated. 
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5. Discussion of allocation results 
5.1. Scenario description and evaluation criteria 
In the following it will be distinguished between two international climate regime 
scenarios and three criteria for evaluation will be defined. The first scenario “Kyoto 
Accord” is based on the countries presently taking action as they already have concrete 
emission reduction targets under the Kyoto regime (Annex I countries). The second 
scenario “Copenhagen Accord” includes all countries that have committed to plans for 
reducing their greenhouse gas emissions by 2020, despite varying commitment levels. 
This list is much longer than the Kyoto Protocol list of Annex I countries because it also 
includes large developing and transition countries such as China, India, Brazil and 
South Africa, since all of these have made some emission reduction commitments;
1
 
albeit not in internationally binding treaties.  
To evaluate the allocation results in the context of the two scenarios, three criteria are 
defined: The first evaluation criterion is that of environmental effectiveness, which 
examines the potential emission reductions. The second criterion is that of legal 
effectiveness, i.e., the potential for preventing regulation evasion. The third criterion is 
that of fair burden sharing and should be based on the polluter pays principle. The first 
group of polluters to be examined is defined as countries that import and export goods, 
thereby benefitting from trade, in which the shipping sector plays a large part. The 
second group of polluters is defined as countries that employ ships, i.e., the more ships 
are registered, owned or operated by that country, the more shipping emissions should 
be allocated to it. 
5.2. Discussion 
5.2.1. Environmental effectiveness 
The results for environmental effectiveness are presented in figure 3, showing the share 
of international shipping emissions in 2007 relative to the ideal case of a global climate 
regime (100% controlled emissions) according to the options 2, 3, and 4(a–c) which 
would be controlled in the two different scenarios described in section 5.1. Note that an 
                                                 
1
 A complete scenario description is in the Appendix B table B1, source for “Copenhagen Accord” list: 
http://www.usclimatenetwork.org/policy/copenhagen-accord-commitments. This list is updated regularly. 
Our scenario is based on the list’s status in August 2010.  
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analysis of this kind is not possible for the options discussed in [13] and [7] because 
they are based on a regional scale, making a distinction between Kyoto Annex I and 
non-Annex I countries impossible. The same applies to the second scenario “Copenha-
gen Accord” and in part to the third evaluation criteria “fair burden sharing”. 
 
 
Figure 3: Comparison of environmental effectiveness. The figure shows the environ-
mental effectiveness of allocation options 2, 3, 4a, 4b, and 4c according to scenarios 
Copenhagen and Kyoto Accord. Source: Own calculations based on [25], [1], [27]. 
 
It is evident that the registration of a ship as a basis for regulation (option 4a) would 
be environmentally ineffective both under the Kyoto and Copenhagen Accord scenarios 
because most shipping emissions would fall under flag states that have no commit-
ments. Moreover, the process of “flagging out a ship” is easily done. Under the Kyoto 
Accord scenario options 4c and 4b indicate the highest levels of controlled emissions 
and therefore should be preferred over the other options. However, under the Copenha-
gen Accord scenario apart from option 4a all the other options indicate a similarly high 
level of coverage, around 80%, with no great disparities between them. 
 66 
 
5.2.2. Legal effectiveness 
The global nature of the shipping sector entails the danger that if only few countries 
burden their shipping sector with emission regulation, its stakeholders will search for 
ways of evading the regulation. 
Owners or operators (4b and 4c) will simply relocate their head offices to a country 
where no such regulations exist or where they would be exempt from emission reduc-
tion targets. The same is true for option 4a, as flagging out a ship is easily done. 
Evasion of regulation on a grand scale is also possible for option 3, as ships can be 
fuelled up in countries without regulation or emission reduction commitments. Evasion 
in the case of Option 5 (departure/destination of ship) and 6 (destination of goods) is 
only possible if ships call at or imports (cargo) are discharged at ports in countries 
without regulation or emission reduction commitments [11, 28]. All these options imply 
that allocated shipping emissions would be directed away from committed countries to 
countries with no commitments or regulations. Only in the case of option 2 – adding 
shipping emissions to the grand total of national emissions as a fixed percentage for all 
countries – does the evasion of regulation have no effect on allocated emissions. In 
summary, environmental effectiveness is heavily dependent on the legal effectiveness, 
and, for all options, a level of cooperative enforcement is potentially desirable. 
The number of countries willing to regulate their shipping emissions should be fairly 
considerable taking into account the cost-effectiveness of abatement measures and the 
abatement potential in this sector, as laid out in the introduction. The downside of 
course is the evasion of regulation and loss of competitiveness in this highly global and 
competitive sector. However, if enough countries are willing to cooperate, they could 
introduce IMO regulation affecting operators, owners, or flag states. Ideally, it should 
be the responsibility of operators because they have control over shipping routes, speed, 
and other operational details determining emission levels—and they have the opportu-
nity to charge owners for their services as the two parties agree. Hence, if a certain 
number of countries implement the IMO regulation obliging operators to achieve certain 
targets, it comes into force. And, as explained in section 2.2, once an IMO regulation is 
in force, countries can impose the regulation on their operators even though the ship is 
registered under another flag. The allocation option 4b – allocated emissions to 
operators – is also beneficial for this purpose because it includes countries with very 
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busy ports such as EU countries, Singapore and Hong Kong, whose consent would be 
valuable for an effective implementation.  
5.2.3. Burden sharing 
Tables 3a and 3b represent the top 10 trading countries defined by their relative share of 
world goods exports and imports in 2007. They also show whether these countries are 
under the top ten most burdened countries according to each option (Figure 1 in section 
4.2). The listed countries are the top polluters of international shipping emissions 
according to our fairness criterion and, consequently, the largest share of emissions 
should be allocated to them. 
Table 3a: Representation of the top 10 trading countries defined by their relative share 
of world goods exports in 2007.  
 
Country 
Share of world goods 
exports in 2007 (%) 
Country included in options 
  2 3 4a 4b 4c 
Germany 9.84 x   x x 
China 8.89 x x x x x 
US 8.40 x x  x x 
Japan 4.94 x x  x x 
France 3.98      
Italy 3.66      
Netherlands 3.37  x    
UK 3.22 x  x x x 
Canada 3.15 x     
South Korea 2.76 x x  x  
Source: [26] (goods exports, BoP, current US$). 
Table 3b: Representation of the top 10 trading countries defined by their relative share 
of world goods imports in 2007.  
   
Country 
Share of world goods 
imports in 2007 (%) 
Country included in options 
  2 3 4a 4b    4c 
US 14.55 x x  x x 
Germany 7.98 x   x x 
China 6.69 x x x x x 
UK 4.59 x  x x x 
France 4.44      
Japan 4.24 x x  x x 
Italy 3.69      
Netherlands 3.01  x    
Spain 2.88  x    
Canada 2.75 x     
Source: [27] (goods imports, BoP, current US$). 
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A glance at the right column “Country included in options” highlights that no option 
perfectly mirrors this list of countries. The case which best accounts for the global 
distribution of trade and wealth is obviously option 2. This option is followed by option 
4b, 3 and 4c. It is obvious with the exception of China and the United Kingdom, that 
option 4c does not reflect the list of top 10 trading countries at all. 
The first result for the second group of polluters is that options 2, 3, 5 and 6 can be 
discarded as fair allocation options since they are not based on owning or operating 
ships or having them registered. Only the three sub cases of option 4 would lead to a 
fair allocation within the shipping sector. The second result is that out of all three sub 
cases option 4b – allocation based on operator – is favoured. The country where 
operators are based should be burdened with the emissions that are caused by their 
operations. This is because operators have the most control over their ship’s emission 
levels by regulating speed and routes. Furthermore, they are in a position to charge their 
clients or ship owners for their services. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Abatement cost studies that analyse the potential technological and operational meas-
ures for reducing CO2 emissions within the shipping sector and their costs show a 
considerable total abatement potential and that, even in the absence of a CO2 regulation, 
the implementation of most of these measures is economically beneficial. Due to this 
apparent cost-effectiveness, there is a strong case for regulating shipping emissions 
within either a UNFCCC climate regime or sectoral approach based on IMO regula-
tions. 
Focussing on regulation within a UNFCCC climate regime, in this paper various 
options for allocating CO2 emissions from international shipping to individual countries 
proposed by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice of the 
UNFCCC were analysed. The analysis has shown that there is no single allocation 
option that can be regarded as environmentally effective, legally effective, and allowing 
for fair burden sharing. It could be argued that the simplistic option 2 with the propor-
tional add-on is, in some respects, the best scoring option in the scenario “Copenhagen 
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Accord”, as it burdens the largest economies in terms of overall emissions and in terms 
of trade benefits. Thus, compared to other options, option 2 is environmentally effective 
and entails a fair burden sharing. However, it heavily disadvantages those large 
economies that are landlocked or do not significantly engage in shipping. It also 
advantages those small island states that benefit from being used as registration or re-
location destinations. Currently, due to the negotiations in Copenhagen 2009 failing, the 
“Kyoto Accord” scenario should be taken as the most serious basis for discussion. From 
this perspective, it is clear that the most environmentally effective options are those of 
4b (operator) and 4c (owner). As option 4b scores better than option 4c in terms of a fair 
burden sharing, it should be the preferred option. If, in addition, evasion of regulation is 
prevented by an IMO regulation, then operators have the most control over the emission 
levels of their ships by regulating speed and routes. Furthermore, they are in a position 
to charge their clients or the ship owners for their services. Consequently, the conclu-
sion is drawn that the best way to allocate international shipping emissions within a 
UNFCCC regime is on the basis of the operating company—option 4b. 
However, it is recognised that the political realisation will be difficult and it is not 
clear whether the international community will agree to shipping emission reductions, 
neither within the UNFCCC nor the IMO regime. As the BBC reported on 7
th
 October 
2010, China is against emissions regulations or standards in the shipping industry unless 
it is accompanied by financial aid to developing countries.
2
 Hence, the most effective 
ways to allocate shipping emissions within a UNFCCC regime have been sketched—but 
implementation thereof depends on political will and, currently, progress in this field is 
not likely. 
A number of limitations apply. First, the conclusions are based on results derived 
from 2007 data. Since this reflects the situation of the shipping sector for only one year, 
future studies should try to extend the analysis to several years making results more 
robust. Second, the use of ship movement data would be preferable to assess the actual 
miles that a country’s fleet travelled in one year. However, at present such data is not 
affordable for researchers. In the future it would be interesting to achieve a more 
detailed evaluation of who would gain or lose from regulating CO2 emissions from 
                                                 
2
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-11497829. 
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international shipping in a Post-Kyoto agreement and therefore oppose or support a 
specific allocation option. 
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8. Appendix A 
Tables A1 to A4 show the resulting top 10 countries according to allocation options 4a, 
4b, 4c, and 3, if international shipping emissions would be allocated to total national 
emissions.  
Table A1: Top 10 countries according to relative increase in total national emissions (in 
%).  
     
Country Relative increase (in %) Δ in 1000 t 
Option 4a (flag state)     
Marshall Islands 36 179 31 476 
Liberia 21 874 80 935 
Antigua & Barbuda 3 473 15 054 
Saint Vincent 2 988 5 737 
Panama 2 367 153 605 
Bahamas 1 689 36 330 
Bermuda 1 463 8 427 
Comoro Islands 1 251 786 
Vanuatu 1 239 1 120 
Malta 920 25 030 
     
Source: Own calculations based on IEA [26], Buhaug et al. [1], World Bank [27], and 
ISL [3]. 
 
Table A2: Top 10 countries according to relative increase in total national emissions (in 
%).  
      
Country Relative increase (in %) Δ in 1000 t 
Option 4b (operator)     
Bermuda 787 4 534 
Marshall Islands 189 165 
Denmark* 101 51 069 
Greece* 73 71 235 
Gibraltar 72 341 
Switzerland* 70 29 638 
Norway* 66 24 253 
Kiribati 64 18 
Singapore 61 27 508 
Hong Kong, China 57 24 735 
      
Source: Own calculations based on IEA [26], Buhaug et al. [1], World Bank [27], and 
ISL [3]. 
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Table A3: Top 10 countries according to relative increase in total national emissions (in 
%).  
     
Country Relative increase (in %) Δ in 1000 t 
Option 4c (owner)      
Bermuda 216 1 247 
Greece* 89 87 505 
Gibraltar 74 349 
Norway* 74 27 171 
Cyprus 66 4 815 
Kiribati 64 18 
Hong Kong, China 47 20 553 
Denmark* 45 22 493 
Singapore 40 17 931 
Bahamas 19 415 
      
Source: Own calculations based on IEA [26], Buhaug et al. [1], World Bank [27], and 
ISL [3]. 
 
Table A4: Top 10 countries according to relative increase in total national emissions (in 
%).  
     
Country Relative increase (%) Δ in 1000 t 
Option 3 (fuel sold)      
Gibraltar 817 3.84 
Singapore 216 97.28 
Netherlands Antilles 128 5.77 
Malta 98 2.67 
Hong Kong, China 60 25.95 
United Arab Emirates 34 44.22 
Netherlands* 28 50.92 
Belgium* 28 29.54 
Gabon 19 0.48 
Uruguay 18 1.04 
      
Source: Own calculations based on IEA [26] and World Bank [27]. 
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9. Appendix B 
Table B1: Scenario description.  
  
Kyoto Accord                 Copenhagen Accord 
Global 
Accord 
Australia Australia Romania all countries 
Austria Austria Russian Federation   
Belgium Belarusa
 
Singapore
a   
Bulgaria Belgium Slovak Republic   
Canada Brazila Slovenia    
Croatia  Bulgaria South Africaa   
Czech Republic Canada South Koreaa   
Denmark Chinaa Spain   
Estonia Croatia  Sweden   
Finland Czech Republic Switzerland   
France Denmark Ukraine   
Germany Estonia United Kingdom   
Greece Finland United Statesa   
Hungary France    
Iceland Germany    
Ireland Greece    
Italy Hungary    
Japan Iceland    
Latvia Indiaa    
Lithuania Indonesiaa    
Luxembourg Ireland    
Netherlands Italy    
New Zealand Japan    
Norway Kazakhstana    
Poland Latvia    
Portugal Liechtensteina
    
Romania Lithuania    
Russian Federation Maldivesa    
Slovak Republic Mexicoa    
Slovenia  Luxembourg    
Spain Netherlands    
Sweden New Zealand    
Switzerland Norway    
Ukraine Poland    
United Kingdom Portugal    
    
a
All countries that are not Party to the Kyoto Protocol but associated with action or targets in the 
Copenhagen Accord 
Source: USCAN http://www.usclimatenetwork.org/policy/copenhagen-accord-
commitments 
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Abstract 
In this paper, we analyze how much the shipping sector could contribute to global CO2 
emission reductions from an efficiency point of view. To do this, a marginal abatement 
cost curve (MACC) for the shipping sector is generated that can be combined with a 
MACC for conventional CO2 abatement in the production and consumption sectors 
around the world. These two MACCs are used to assess the following as regards the 
various global reduction targets: (a) what the maximum global cost savings would be 
that could be achieved by abating emissions in the shipping sector, (b) how much the 
shipping sector could contribute to abating emissions cost efficiently, and (c) what the 
potential additional costs of implementing a separate solution for the shipping sector 
would be. The focus is on the year 2020. We find that the shipping sector could always 
contribute to efficient global emission reductions and thus could always achieve global 
cost savings, but also that the size of the contribution and the size of cost savings 
depend heavily on the MACC case assumed, i.e., on how the existence of negative 
abatement costs is treated in a MACC, and on the reduction potentials and costs of 
measures assumed. 
 
Keywords: climate change, shipping sector, CO2 emissions, marginal abatement cost 
curve 
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1. Introduction 
The Second IMO GHG Study 2009 (Buhaug et al., 2009) of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) on greenhouse gases (GHG) in the shipping sector presented two 
important insights. First, the shipping sector contributed about 3.3% to global GHG 
emissions in 2007, which is more than what was assumed before.
1
 Second, the shipping 
sector’s CO2 emissions are projected to increase significantly in the coming decades if 
its emissions remain unregulated (Buhaug et al., 2009). The consequence would be that 
in the next decades the shipping sector’s CO2 emissions would constitute a considerable 
proportion of the maximum allowed emissions, i.e., the maximum emissions that are in 
line with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC) 
2°C target (UNEP, 2011). Thus, other sectors would have to emit less and reduce their 
emissions further to offset the increase in shipping emissions. 
This has led to discussions on how to regulate the shipping sector’s CO2 emissions, 
discussions which are continuing not only in the IMO, but also in the scientific commu-
nity. These discussions center around the question whether this sector should be subject 
to an emission cap or whether it should be subject to some other means of reducing 
emissions (UNEP, 2011). Progress was made when the IMO agreed on two mandatory 
efficiency measures to reduce CO2 emissions from shipping in July 2011, (MEPC, 
2011): the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI), which is exclusively for newly built 
ships, and the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP). Market-based 
policies for the shipping sector are also being discussed and investigated (MEPC, 2010). 
While there is some literature on the pros and cons of different allocation options to 
allocate shipping emissions to countries and on their effects for specific country groups 
(den Elzen et al., 2007, Gilbert and Bows, 2012, Heitmann und Khalilian, 2011, Wang, 
2010) and some literature on technical abatement potentials and the costs of different 
measures (Buhaug et al., 2009, Eide et al. 2011, 2009, Faber et al., 2011a/Wang et al., 
2010,
2
 Faber et al., 2009, Longva et al., 2010), the literature on how much the shipping 
sector should contribute to global emission reductions from an efficiency point of view 
                                                 
1
 In addition, the shipping sector was one of the world’s major CO2 emitters in 2007 (evidenced by 
comparing CO2 emissions of shipping in 2007 (Buhaug et al., 2009) with data on CO2 emissions from 
fuel combustion per country in 2007 (IEA, 2009b).  
2
 Note that Faber et al. (2011a) is an updated version of Wang et al. (2010), but that only the later 
provides data that we make use of in this paper. 
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remains limited. Only Eide et al. (2009) derive a decision criterion for regulating CO2 
emissions in the shipping sector that is in line with the 2°C target. Yet, the importance 
of regulating CO2 emissions in the shipping sector can only be assessed, when the 
potential cost savings are known. Also, how CO2 emissions should be regulated depends 
on what the efficient contribution of the shipping sector actually is. In this paper, we 
thus want to address these issues. 
From a methodological point of view, the problem is that global top-down economy-
climate models or integrated assessment models (IAMs) that are able to analyze the cost 
efficient contributions of various sectors do not or do not explicitly include the shipping 
sector. Another approach, which is less sophisticated and simpler, to include the 
shipping sector is using marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) (see Criqui et al., 
1999, Ellerman and Decaux, 1998). This approach is mostly used to analyze the impacts 
of international emissions trading at the country level (see, e.g., Ellerman and Decaux, 
1998, den Elzen et al., 2005, Löschel and Zhang, 2002, Rickels et al., 2012), but can 
also be used to calculate sectoral contributions to emission reductions. While using 
MACCs has some drawbacks and results have to be treated with care (Kesicki and 
Ekins, 2012, Kesicki and Strachan, 2011, Klepper and Peterson, 2006, Morris et al., 
forth.), MACCs can nevertheless provide an indication of the cost effective contribu-
tions of various nations/sectors to emission reductions. 
The information on abatement costs and potentials that is available for the shipping 
sector is a few expert-based MACC studies that have been published recently (Buhaug 
et al. 2009, Eide et al. 2011, Faber et al. 2011a/Wang et al. 2010, and Faber et al., 
2009). We use this information to generate a global MACC for the shipping sector that 
can be combined with a MACC for conventional CO2 abatement in the production and 
consumption sectors around the world. We then use these two MACCs to assess for 
various global reduction targets: (a) the maximum global cost savings that could be 
achieved by emission abatement in the shipping sector, (b) the cost efficient abatement 
contributions of the shipping sector to the global reduction targets, and (c) the potential 
additional costs that would be incurred by implementing a separate solution for the 
shipping sector. We focus on the year 2020.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some background information 
on the shipping sector, gives an overview of existing MACC studies, and discusses the 
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methodological challenges that arise when using an expert-based cost assessment in 
combination with MACCs generated by a top-down model. The main challenge is how 
to treat the negative abatement costs that are found in the MACC studies of the shipping 
sector. We discuss how these negative abatement costs can be interpreted and suggest 
three different approaches to deal with them in our context. Accordingly, we derive 
three different MACCs and corresponding marginal abatement cost functions for the 
shipping sector. Section 3 shows how the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model 
DART (Dynamic Applied Regional Trade) can be used to generate a global MACC, 
excluding the shipping sector, and a corresponding marginal abatement cost function. 
Section 4 describes three global emission reduction scenarios and presents the model 
results for these scenarios, in particular, the efficient contribution of the shipping sector 
and the global cost savings. Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 summarizes 
and concludes. 
 
2. Generating a MACC for the shipping sector 
2.1. Overview of MACC studies 
Faber et al. (2011b) provide a comparative analysis of recently published MACC 
studies for the world fleet. Overall, four major expert-based MACC studies exist that 
estimate the maximum reduction potential of abatement measures, which are mainly 
energy-efficiency measures, and their respective abatement costs for the world fleet (or 
a specific share of it) for the years 2010, 2020, and 2030 (Buhaug et al. 2009, Eide et 
al., 2011, Faber et al., 2011a/Wang et al., 2010, and Faber et al., 2009). Table 1 presents 
an overview of the assumptions made in these studies and results for the year 2020, the 
year we focus on in our analysis.
3
 
                                                 
3
 Faber et al. (2009) present a MACC for the year 2030 that is not included in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Overview of expert-based MACCs: assumptions and results  
 
a 
In
 
Faber et al. (2011a), the baseline is not given explicitly (central estimate 436 Mt are 33% of the 
baseline in 2020 and 340 Mt are 26% of the baseline  in 2020). 
 
Source: Own presentation based on Buhaug et al. (2009), Eide et al. (2011), and Faber 
et al. (2011a). 
 
The MACC estimates shown in Table 1 have in common that the maximum abate-
ment potential of the world fleet is large (about 15% – 40% relative to business-as-usual 
(BAU) emissions) and that an important share of the maximum abatement potential 
could be achieved at negative costs. This cost-effective abatement potential is, without 
any further regulation being required, in the order of between 255 Mt CO2
4
 and 340 Mt 
CO2 for 2020 (Eide et al., 2011, Faber et al., 2011a/Wang et al., 2010), or between 
20%–26% of projected emissions in 2020. 
Data is often not available on the costs and abatement potentials of abatement 
measures. Therefore, the MACC studies include only measures for which costs and 
abatement potential estimates exist (e.g., Faber et al., 2011a/Wang et al., 2010). Some 
measures may be mutually exclusive, which also has to be taken into account when 
generating the abatement cost curves from these data (Faber et al., 2011a). This fact also 
allows the generated curves to be interpreted as MACCs, which they are not in the 
narrower sense, since they only calculate the average cost per ton abated and not of the 
marginal (last) ton abated.  
The MACC studies often differentiate between several categories of abatement 
measures, which differ from each other in terms of, e.g., costs and implementation, see 
                                                 
4
 This number represents the central estimate of cost-effective potential (<0$/t) in Buhaug et al. (2009). 
Study Year
Base 
year
Baseline 
emissions 
(Mt CO2)
Maximum 
abatement 
potential 
(Mt CO2)
Cost effective 
potential <0$/t 
(Mt CO2)
Measures 
included
Measures 
applied to
Fuel price 
($/t)
Discount rate 
(in %)
Buhaug et 
al. (2009)
2020 2007 1250 210-440 135-365
25 
grouped 
into 10
fleet 
average
500 (1,000, 
1,500)
4 (16)
2020 1191 487 290
Faber et al. 
(2011a)
2020 2007 a~1290 436 340
22 
grouped 
into 15 
53 ship 
segments
700,  900 10 (4 and 18)
5
Eide et al. 
(2011)
2008 25
59 ship 
segments 
350 (HFO) 
500 (MDO) 
350-450 
(LNG)
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Table 2. For example, Faber et al. (2011a)/Wang et al. (2010) differentiate between 
operational and technical measures, whereas Eide et al. (2011) differentiate between 
operational and technical measures, alternative fuels and/or power sources, and 
structural changes. 
 
Table 2: Categories of measure types.  
 
a Faber et al. (2011a) 
Source: Own presentation based on Eide et al. (2011) and Faber et al. (2011a). 
 
Operational measures mainly concern the operation and maintenance of ships and are 
characterized by low investment and moderate operating costs, and low abatement 
potential. An example for such a measure is the implementation of a system that 
improves routing, i.e., to avoid unfavorable conditions that cause unnecessary fuel 
consumption. The measure reduces fuel costs and CO2 emissions, but incurs investment 
Operational measures Technical measures
Alternative fuels/ 
power sources
Structural changes
Purpose
operartion and 
maintenannce of 
ships
reduction of power 
requirement to 
engines or improving 
energy-efficiency 
alternative set of 
technical measures
include energy-
efficiency improvemnts 
in interaction between 
two counterparts in 
shipping
Examples
enhanced weather 
routing, hull and 
propeller cleaning, 
slow steaming
lower energy 
consumption in main 
and auxiliary engines, 
optimised hulls
LNG, wind power, 
solar panels
improved charter 
contracts, enhanced 
logistics and fleet 
planning
Costs
low investment 
costs, moderate 
operating costs
high investment 
costs, moderate 
operating costs,
high investment 
costs
Emission 
reduction 
potential
low high high high
Implementation in general all ships
often limited to new 
ships
a
lack of 
infrastructure 
(supply and size of 
storage tanks on 
bord), still R&D 
status, or only for 
niche market
in general hard to 
develop and implement
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costs to buy and implement the system and it incurs operating costs to maintain and 
manage the system. Technical measures mainly concern technical design features of 
ships and are characterized by high investment and moderate operating costs. An 
example for such a measure is the implementation of a waste heat recovery system that 
can be used to generate electricity alternatively to auxiliary engines and thus reduce fuel 
consumption (Faber et al., 2011a/Wang et al., 2010). Structural changes mainly concern 
the improvement of common practice, e.g., charter contracts or port efficiency, with 
regard to energy efficiency. Alternative fuels/power sources mainly concern substitutes, 
e.g., liquefied natural gas for motive power, for the use of carbon-intensive fuels. Both 
categories of measure types are characterized by high abatement potential, but at the 
same time are limited in application, e.g., because there is a lack of mature infrastruc-
ture for liquefied natural gas, or are difficult to develop (Eide et al., 2011, Faber et al., 
2011a). 
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that multiple actors in the shipping sector 
control the factors that determine a ship’s CO2 emissions, see Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Actors in shipping and their control over factors determining a ship’s CO2 
emissions. Source: Own presentation based on Faber et al. (2011a, 2010). 
 
Ship owners have control over technical measures and many operational measures, 
whereas the other actors mainly have control over operational measures only. The 
owner can decide whether or not to implement technical measures, whereas the other 
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actors cannot. Nevertheless, they might be able to decide whether or not to ap-
ply/implement operational measures, but this depends on the contract between the 
owner and the other actors (Faber et al., 2010). However, both technical and operational 
measures are mostly subject to the issue of split incentives (ICCT, 2011) and this 
distinction is crucial for constructing our own set of MACCs for the shipping sector 
and, in particular, for how we treat negative abatement costs. 
2.2. Negative abatement costs 
One problem with expert-based MACCs is the existence of negative abatement costs.
5
 
In contrast, MACCs generated by models (bottom-up partial-equilibrium models and 
top-down CGE models) by construction generate only positive abatement costs. The 
assumption in all models is that rational individuals implement abatement measures that 
have negative costs even in the absence of climate policy, whereas they implement 
abatement measures that have positive abatement costs only if climate policy gives rise 
to a price on CO2 emissions. However, the question arises why such abatement 
measures (that have negative abatement costs), which often represent established, 
nonrisky technological or operational measures, are not embraced by the market 
participants. Various studies have tried to explain the existence of negative abatement 
costs in expert-based MACC estimates in general (IPCC, 2007, Kesicki and Ekins, 
2012). Their main explanation is that expert-based MACCs are mostly based on a very 
narrow cost definition, namely project costs that ignore potential additional costs. The 
project costs are the costs of an individual abatement option that is assumed to have no 
significant indirect economic impacts on markets and prices. Of the potential additional 
costs that are ignored, those that stem from barriers to implementation are, in particular, 
important for the shipping sector. Several such barriers are presented in the shipping-
specific literature (Eide et al., 2011, Faber et al., 2011a/Wang et al., 2010, ICCT, 2011). 
Faber et al. (2011b) find four important reasons for nonadoption of cost-effective 
measures: low priority of energy-efficiency improvements, split incentives
6
 between the 
owner of a ship and a charterer, transaction costs to collect relevant information about 
                                                 
5
 See, e.g., the very popular abatement cost curves published by McKinsey (Enkvist et al., 2010). 
6 
Jaffe and Stavins (1994) argue that if the actor who invests in an efficiency-improving measure is not the 
same actor as the actor who benefits, implementation is unlikely. Investment will occur only, if the 
investor gets the investment recovered by the beneficiary of the efficiency-improving measure. In case of 
the shipping sector, this issue concerns the relationship between the ship owner and the charterer. 
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energy-efficiency improvement measures, and the possibility of time lags between the 
implementation of measures and the measures becoming cost-effective. Here, the issue 
of split incentives is that the ship owner bears the investment costs of an abatement 
measure (e.g., main engine retrofit), whereas the operator/charterer receives the benefits 
in terms of reductions in operating costs (e.g., less fuel consumption) (Faber et al., 
2010). Eide et al. (2011) stress in particular that the issue of split incentives between 
ship owners and charterers can, to a certain degree, explain the nonadoption of cost-
effective measures. Generally, Faber et al. (2011b) argue that the main barriers are of a 
technical, financial, and structural/institutional nature. Understanding the barriers to 
implementation is important in order to design effective regulation. Some barriers may 
be overcome by having price signals, whereas others may be overcome by enacting 
laws. 
We follow Hyman et al. (2002) to deal with negative abatement costs in expert-based 
MACCs. They propose two approaches to approximate a function based on an underly-
ing engineering estimate of marginal abatement costs. 
The first approach is to assume that no-regret options, i.e., measures that reduce 
emissions at negative net costs (IPCC, 2001), are not economical when accounting for 
all relevant costs and to shift up the MACC so that it lies above the horizontal axis. The 
second approach is to assume that all no-regret options are undertaken, even in the 
absence of any climate policy. Thus, only the positive part of the MACC, i.e., the 
reduction potential at positive marginal abatement costs (MACs), is relevant. Here, the 
negative part of the MACC needs to be subtracted from the baseline emissions, where 
the reduction potentials of these measures, i.e., the measures that have negative 
abatement costs, are not taken into account yet. The first approach implicitly assumes 
that the barriers to implementation or extra cost are relevant for the implementation of 
all measures, also for the ones with positive abatement costs. Since it assumes that the 
level of the extra costs is exactly the level of the measure with the highest negative 
costs, it uses, in some sense, a lower bound estimate for the extra costs. It thus tends to 
overestimate the size of the contribution of the shipping sector to emission reductions. 
The second approach underestimates total global CO2 emissions in the business-as-usual 
(BAU) or reference scenario without any emission reduction measures, since not all of 
the measures with negative abatement costs may actually be undertaken, and at the same 
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time it underestimates the size of the contribution of the shipping sector to emission 
reductions, since some of the measures with negative abatement costs may be imple-
mented only with the extra incentives of carbon prices. For this reason, we add a third 
approach to those of Hyman et al. (2002) that deals with the issue of barriers to 
implementation. The third approach is to assume that measures are subject to barriers to 
implementation, in particular, to the issue of split incentives, which is an apparent 
phenomena in the shipping sector. We assume that the issue of barriers to implementa-
tion is more pronounced for some measures than for others because some of the 
measures are already employed by a significant proportion of the world fleet according 
to ICCT (2011).
7
 We thus assume that all no-regret measures for which the issue of 
barriers to implementation is less pronounced are undertaken, arguing that these would 
nevertheless be implemented by the actors who have control over such measures and at 
the same time bear the fuel costs. These measures are thus not considered in the MACC 
as is done in the second approach.
8
 We further assume, that all no-regret measures for 
which the issue of barriers to implementation is pronounced are not economical when 
accounting for all relevant costs. The MACC is thus shifted up, so that costs lie above 
the horizontal axis as in the first approach. This implies that costs associated with 
abatement measures that have positive abatement costs for which the issue of barriers to 
implementation is pronounced are also shifted up. 
It is difficult to tell which of these approaches is most realistic. We clearly believe 
that there are barriers to implementation that have some kind of shadow price. Thus, we 
consider the first and third approaches to be realistic, whereas we consider the second 
approach to be rather academic. Although we acknowledge that shifting up the MACC 
by exactly the level of measure with the highest negative costs is an arbitrary choice, we 
nevertheless, consider the first approach to be best suited as our central case. 
                                                 
7
 This relates to the following measures: autopilot adjustment, water flow optimization, weather routing, 
hull cleaning, propeller polishing, and speed controlled pumps and fans. 
8
 Faber et al. (2011b) argue that measures that are already employed by ships should be excluded from a 
MACC analysis. We assume that a correction of BAU emissions is not necessary when excluding such 
measures from the analysis because the pre-fuel consumption of a ship, i.e., the fuel consumption before 
measures are employed, is assumed to already include the reduction potential of such measures. 
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2.3. Generating MACCs and MAC functions 
We follow the methodology presented in Eide et al. (2011) and Faber et al. 
(2011a)/Wang et al. (2010) in order to generate customized MACCs of the shipping 
sector. This methodology includes, in general, a projection of the fleet development, the 
determination of a business-as-usual (BAU) emissions scenario, i.e., determining the 
amount of CO2 emissions that would be emitted if no abatement measures were taken in 
a given year, and the calculation of CO2 reduction potential and corresponding costs per 
measure and ship for a given year.  
The MACC is obtained by ordering the costs in increasing order and then plotting 
them against their corresponding reduction potentials. 
We assume that abatement efforts in the shipping sector start in 2020, i.e., ships first 
start to implement abatement measures from 2020 onwards. This assumption is based 
on the given condition that ships currently have no incentives, despite the two mandato-
ry efficiency measures EEDI and SEEMP, to implement abatement measures. 
Based on this assumption, we first project the world fleet composition in 2020 based 
on the current world fleet composition and ship-type-specific growth and scrapping 
rates. We use data from SeaWeb (IHS Fairplay, 2012) in order to determine the current 
world fleet composition, i.e., the number of ships per ship-type/ship-age category, 
whereby a ship type is subdivided into various ship segments.
9
 These categories 
(subcategories) correspond to the categories in Buhaug et al. (2009), but since we work 
with data on abatement measures from Wang et al. (2010), the world fleet under 
consideration here consists of 14 major ship types that are divided into 53 size segments 
instead of 18 ship types and 70 segments, as in Buhaug et al. (2009).
10
 We use ship-type 
specific growth and scrapping rates from Eide et al. (2011) in order to project the 
current fleet up to 2020. This means we first allocate ships of the current fleet into ship-
segment/ship-age categories, which gives us the total number of ships per segment and 
the number per ship-segment/ship-age category. Then, we apply the growth and 
                                                 
9
 For example, the ship type crude oil tanker could be subdivided into various segments by deadweight 
(see Buhaug et al., 2009). 
10
 The 14 ship types are the following: crude tanker, products tanker, chemical tanker, LPG tanker, LNG 
tanker, other tankers, bulker, general cargo, other dry general cargo, container, vehicle carrier, roro, ferry, 
and cruise ships. The term world fleet might be misleading because most noncargo ships (fishing boats, 
military ships, service ships, etc.) are not included. However, the 14 ship types include all major ship 
types that are predominantly cargo ships engaged in merchant shipping and noncargo ships like passenger 
ships. Thus, we use the term fleet instead of world fleet in the following. 
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scrapping rates to the total number of ships in the ship segment. We add the number of 
new ships to the new age category, category 1, whereupon the former age category 1 
becomes age category 2, and subtract the number of scrapped ships from the last age 
categories. As in Wang et al. (2010) the age category ranges from 1 to 30 years. For 
simplicity, we treat those few ships older than 30 years that we find in the current age 
distribution of the world fleet the same as 30-year-old ships. In other words, abatement 
measures only have an effective duration of one year when applied to such ships, thus, 
causing high abatement costs. 
We determine the baseline CO2 emissions of the fleet as projected to 2020 by follow-
ing Eide et al. (2011) and Faber (2011a)/Wang et al. (2010), who assume the same 
operational profile as the 2007 fleet in Buhaug et al. (2009) for the projected fleet. The 
operational profile and the ship-type-specific characteristics (for more details, see 
Buhaug et al., 2009) determine the fuel consumption of a ship per year. Moreover, Eide 
et al. (2011) introduce a general improvement factor of 5% for ships built in 2010 and 
8% for ships built in 2020, which mirrors the assumption that new-built ships are more 
energy efficient than older ships. Given this, we assume that the fuel consumption of 
ships built between 2008 and 2010 decreases by 1.64% per year compared to ships built 
before 2008 and that of ships built between 2011 and 2020 by 0.28% per year. To 
calculate the BAU emissions, we multiply the number of ships per ship-segment/ship-
age category in 2020 by the pre-fuel consumption of a ship, i.e., its fuel consumption 
before abatement measures are implemented. 
The data on abatement measures from Wang et al. (2010) include high and low 
estimates of nonrecurring (investment) and annual recurring (operating and mainte-
nance) costs, and fuel reduction (and thus CO2 emissions abatement
11
) potentials for 22 
measures and 14 major ship types. In addition, an effective duration (in years) is 
assigned to each measure, e.g., a waste heat recovery system has an effective duration of 
8 years, whereas a solar energy system has an effective duration of 30 years (SNAME, 
2010). Because some of the measures are mutually exclusive, they are grouped into 15 
groups in order to avoid overestimating abatement potentials (Wang et al., 2010, ICCT, 
2011).
12
 Moreover, the individual reduction effects and corresponding CO2 emission 
                                                 
11
 The assumed conversion factor is 3.13. 
12
 The 15 groups consist of the following measures: operational speed reduction, weather routing, 
autopilot adjustment, propeller maintenance, hull cleaning, hull coating, optimization water flow of hull 
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abatement achieved by all the measures that could be implemented simultaneously on a 
ship are calculated first and then ordered according to their abatement costs per ton of 
CO2 (increasing order). The measure with the lowest abatement cost is selected and 
assumed to be applied first. Its emission reduction is calculated based on a ship’s pre-
installation fuel consumption and the individual reduction effect. Then, the individual 
reduction effects and abatement costs of all the remaining measures are recalculated. 
The fuel reduction potential of the second applied measure is calculated based on the 
reduced fuel consumption resulting from the first applied measure (Eide et al., 2011 and 
Faber et al., 2011a/Wang et al., 2010). 
We apply the same calculation approach as presented in Eide et al. (2009) and ap-
plied in Eide et al. (2011) to calculate abatement costs (in Eide et al., 2009, 2011 the 
costs are called CATCH, cost of averting a tonne of CO2-eq. heating). The abatement 
costs (AC) of a measure are determined by the net present value of total costs (Ct) minus 
total benefits (Bt) of a measure, whereby i represents the discount rate, divided by the 
total CO2 emission reduction potential (see Equation 1). 
 
red
T
t t
tt
COT
i
BC
AC
2
1 11




  
 with t=1,…,T.     (1) 
Total costs Ct depend on the nonrecurring (investment costs) and annual costs (operat-
ing costs).
13
 The total benefits Bt of a measure depend on the fuel reduction per year (in 
t) achieved by the measure and the bunker fuel price ($/t). The total CO2 emission 
reduction potential T*CO2
red
depends on the effective duration of a measure T (or 
remaining lifetime of the ship if this is less than the effective duration of the measure) 
and the fuel reduction per year multiplied by the conversion factor 3.13. Investment 
costs are annuitized either over the effective duration of a measure or over the remain-
ing lifetime of a ship in order to spread investment costs over years and to account for 
capital costs. The result can be interpreted as a measure’s cost of abating a ton of CO2 
                                                                                                                                               
openings, air lubrication, propulsion upgrade, main engine adjustment, waste heat recovery, wind power, 
solar power, low energy lightning, and speed control of pumps and fans (see Faber et al. (2011a)/Wang et 
al. (2010) and ICCT (2011) for more details). 
13
 Faber et al. (2011a)/Wang et al. (2010) additionally take opportunity costs into account, i.e., the costs 
for extra time to implement measures on a ship. 
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emissions (in net present value terms) when applied to a specific-ship segment/ship-age 
category. 
We assume, following Faber et al. (2011a)/Wang et al. (2010), an interest and dis-
count rate of 10% and bunker fuel prices amounting to $700 for the year 2020, $800 for 
the period 2021-2025, and $900 for the period 2026-2030.
14
 In addition, we also assume 
bunker fuel prices amounting to $900 for the period 2031 to 2050, albeit for measures 
with an effective lifetime of 30 years or more. 
We analyze two scenarios to cover the extremes: one that assumes high reduction 
potentials and low costs (hrlc) and one that assumes low reduction potentials and high 
costs (lrhc) of abatement measures. As Figure 2 shows, the difference between these 
two scenarios is mainly the amount of abatement potential at negative abatement costs 
and the level of these negative costs. The positive part of both curves is rather similar. 
How to treat the negative abatement costs it is thus very important. In this respect, we 
apply the three different approaches discussed in Section 2.2: 
The first MACC (case 1: full reduction potential (full_rp)) is a shifted-up version of 
the original MACC, where all parts of the MACC are above the horizontal axis. 
The second MACC (case 2: reduced reduction potential (reduced_rp)) is a truncated 
version of the original MACC, where only the positive part of the MACC is taken into 
account and the emission reductions associated with negative abatement costs are 
subtracted from BAU emissions (original baseline).  
The third MACC (case 3: barrier reduction potential (barrier_rp)) is a shifted-up 
version of a modified original MACC, where only measures which are subject to the 
issue of split incentives are taken into account.
15
  
The resulting six MACCs (two different assumptions on abatement poten-
tial/abatement costs and three possibilities to deal with negative abatement costs) and 
the respective original and modified original MACCs (MACCs including negative 
                                                 
14
 Sensitivity analysis shows that, in particular, fuel prices significantly affect the abatement costs of 
measures and, thus, the share of cost-effective reduction potential in the MACC , i.e., the share of 
measures that have negative abatement costs (Eide e al., 2009, Faber et al., 2011).  
15
 The model results in cases full_rp and reduced_rp show a more moderate increase in marginal 
abatement costs per reduction potential in the beginning than in case barrier_rp. The latter case shows 
that a negligible share of the maximum reduction potential is available at very low marginal abatement 
costs (roughly -220 US$/t), which causes a jump in the beginning of the MACC. We eliminated that 
negligible share of the maximum reduction potential from the MACC (0.2% of reduction potential) 
because it would cause the shift-up of the MACC to be distorted. Instead, we shifted-up the MACC by 
using the constant 200. 
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marginal abatement costs) are presented in Figures 2a and 2b. Their corresponding 
maximum reduction potentials are presented in Table 3. 
 
 
Figure 2a and 2b: MACCs including negative abatement costs and MACCs relating to 
the three cases under the two reduction potentials and costs scenarios (2a: hrlc and 2b: 
lrhc). Source: Own calculations. 
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Table 3: Maximum reduction potentials for the six cases in 2020.  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The three cases (full_rp, reduced_rp, and barrier_rp) differ in terms of maximum 
reduction potential and marginal abatement costs. The case full_rp always has the 
highest maximum reduction potential, followed by case barrier_rp and case reduced 
_rp. The maximum reduction potential in the lrhc scenario is less than 50% of that in 
the hrlc scenario. The share of maximum reduction potential that has negative (marginal 
abatement) costs is significant and amounts to about 90% in both scenarios. This is also 
apparent from the MACCs presented in Eide et al. (2011) and Faber et al. (2011a)/Wang 
et al. (2010), although it has to be remarked that their share of maximum reduction 
potential that has negative (marginal abatement) costs amounts to less than 90%. In Eide 
et al. (2011) it is 60% and in Faber et al. (2011a) it is 78%, but in Wang et al. (2010) it 
is roughly 90%. One explanation for this is that we base our calculations on the 
assumption that ships start to implement abatement measures in 2020 instead of 2007 as 
in Faber et al. (2011a) or 2008 as in Eide et al. (2011). As in previous studies, the fuel 
price is assumed to be higher as of 2020 and onwards, causing lower (marginal) 
abatement costs.
16
 The maximum reduction potential of the case barrier_rp is less than 
that of the original MACC (70% in the hrlc scenario and 85% in the lrhc scenario) 
because specific measures are excluded a priori, so that their reduction potential is no 
longer available (we assume, rather, that it is already included in the BAU emissions). 
Moreover, it is apparent from the figures that the negative part of the MACC is more 
affected than the positive part of the MACC by the different reduction potentials/costs 
estimates.  
                                                 
16
 The (original) MACCs presented here differ also in terms of maximum reduction potentials and 
(marginal abatement) costs from the MACCs presented in Eide et al. (2011) and Faber et al. 
(2011a)/Wang et al. (2010). The reasons for this, in addition to the above mentioned one, are the 
following: we base our fleet development analysis on data from 2012 instead of 2008 or 2010, and we 
present MACCs based on 30 age categories instead of age-category averages. 
full_rp reduced_rp barrier_rp full_rp reduced_rp barrier_rp
CO2 reduction 
potential in Mt
458 53 323 212 20 177
hrlc lrhc
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We fit continuous functions by testing linear, quadratic, and exponential functional 
forms to each of the six MACCs for the fleet in order to obtain marginal abatement cost 
functions (MAC(R)), see Equation 2. We decided to use the linear and quadratic forms 
that show the best fit for the ranges of optimal abatement in the shipping sector as 
derived in our analysis (see Section 4.2), where we find that optimal abatement in the 
shipping sector is about 230 MtCO2 maximum under the hrlc scenario and about 40 
MtCO2 under the lrhc scenario (see Equations 3, 4, 5). 
  2ijijijijijijij RcRbaRMAC  ,      (2) 
for i=1 : 00  ijij ba ;  j=1: 3000  ijR ,  j=2: 300  ijR  ,  (3) 
for i=2 : 0ija ;  j=1: 250  ijR ,  j=2: 100  ijR  ,   (4) 
for i=3 : 0ijc ;  j=1: 750  ijR ,  j=2: 500  ijR ,   
(5)
 
where R refers to emission reductions, i refers to cases (1) full_rp, (2) reduced_rp, and 
(3) barrier_rp, and j refers to (1) the hrlc scenario and (2) the lrhc scenario.
 
The parameters (aij,bij, and cij), the R
2
 (adjusted R
2
), and function plots are presented 
in Table A1 and in Figures A1–A6 in the Appendix. 
 
3. Combining the shipping MACC with a global MACC 
3.1. Construction of a CGE-model-based global MACC 
We use the DART (Dynamic Applied Regional Trade) CGE model, which is currently 
calibrated to the GTAP-7 database (Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008), to generate a 
global MACC for abatement measures used outside the shipping sector in 2020. The 
DART model is a multi-region, multi-sector recursive dynamic CGE model of the world 
economy designed for the analysis of international climate policies. For a more detailed 
description of the model see Klepper et al. (2003). The MACC contains options to 
reduce fossil fuel use, and thus to reduce CO2 emissions, in all production and consump-
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tions sectors of the world economy.
17
 The shipping sector is not included in the DART 
model.
18
 
The MACC of the DART sectors, which we denote in the following as all other 
sectors (AoS), is generated by implementing a harmonized global carbon tax of different 
levels in all model regions and then plotting the tax level, the carbon price, against the 
abatement (compared to a BAU emissions scenario without any climate policy or 
carbon price). To set up our partial MACC-based model, we again tested several 
functional forms to fit a continuous function to the MACC (see Figure A7 and A8 in the 
Appendix). Since it turns out in our scenario analysis that optimal abatement outside the 
shipping sector is always between 7,000 MtCO2 and 10,500 MtCO2 (see Section 4.2), 
we decided to use the quadratic form, see Equation 6: 
  27106012.20027.0 AoSAoSAoSAoS RRRMAC 
 , 120000  AoSR , (6) 
with R
2
= 0.999008. 
3.2. Discussion of combining both curves  
We aim to obtain an idea of what amount of emission reduction in the shipping sector 
would constitute an efficient contribution to achieving the global reduction target. To do 
this, we make use of the least cost theorem (see, e.g., Perman et al., 1999) and combine 
both MACCs. We suppose that both, AoS and shipping (S), have to achieve a given joint 
emission target, A. When both of them reduce their BAU emissions, Ei, by the amount 
Ri, the sum of individual emissions reductions thus needs to fulfil the overall condition  
  i ii ARE ,        (7) 
where },{ SAoSi . The costs of achieving the emission target are measured by the 
abatement cost functions, ACi(Ri), and amount to  i ii RAC . In both sectors, the 
                                                 
17
 The production sectors are represented by coal, refined oil, gas, chemical products, electricity, 
agriculture, crude oil, transport, energy intensive sectors, other light industries, other heavy industries, 
and services. The consumption sector is represented by a representative household per region.  
18
 The DART-model results are in 2004 US$. To compare the results to the shipping-model results, which 
are given in 2007 US$, we use the ratio 2007 US GDP Implicit Price Deflator/2004 US GDP Implicit 
Price Deflator. 
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optimal amount of emission reduction, Ri*, needs to be determined so that the sum of 
abatement costs is minimized. The optimization problem becomes: 
 
  .0..
min




i iiii
i iii iR
ERAREts
RACC
i       (8) 
The optimization problem is, in general, solved by first setting up the first-order 
conditions
19
 and second by solving the resulting equations simultaneously, which results 
in the marginal abatement costs being equal to the shadow price, p*, (tax or permit 
price) of the emission constraint (= target) over both sectors: 
  **' pRAC ii  .        (10) 
We are aware that the combination of both MACCs is in fact not entirely consistent 
because they are different by construction. The calculation of mitigation costs is based 
on a project-level analysis in the shipping framework, whereas the calculation is based 
on a macro-economic analysis in the DART model. The former analysis assumes that 
the implementation of individual (abatement) measures do not affect prices and markets 
indirectly, whereas the latter analysis takes into account general equilibrium effects of 
climate policies that affect prices and markets. However, the impact of abatement 
measures in the shipping sector on prices and markets can be assumed to be small and 
thus the inaccuracy of combining both MACCs should be rather small as well. 
 
4. Analysis of different emission reduction and climate policy scenarios 
4.1. Description of scenarios 
Before we describe the emission reduction and policy scenarios for our analysis, we 
need to describe the BAU emission scenarios of the two sectors under consideration: 
AoS and shipping. Knowledge of their BAU emissions is necessary in order to deter-
mine the emission reductions both sectors have to achieve under the reduction scenari-
os. The BAU emissions of AoS amount to 34.5 GtCO2 in 2020 according to the DART 
                                                 
19
 We obtain the marginal abatement costs functions directly from the MACC analysis. 
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model. This number includes the CO2 emissions of all the production and consumption 
sectors of the world economy, except the ones caused by shipping and aviation. The 
BAU emissions of shipping depend on the case analyzed. In cases full_rp and barri-
er_rp, the BAU emissions amount to 0.947 GtCO2 in 2020 according to our calcula-
tions. In case reduced_rp, the BAU emissions need to be corrected by the emission 
reduction potential that can be achieved at negative abatement costs (0.405 GtCO2 in 
hrlc and 0.192 GtCO2 in lrhc) because we assume that this potential is achieved even in 
the absence of any climate policy. As a result, the BAU emissions of shipping amount 
to 0.542 GtCO2 under the hrlc scenario and 0.755 GtCO2 under the lrhc scenario. The 
BAU emissions of aviation amount to 0.494 GtCO2 in 2020 according to the IEA 
(2009a). 
Now we can proceed to describe the emission reduction scenarios, of which there are 
three, each of which differ in terms of the assumed global reduction requirements. In the 
first scenario, the global reduction requirement is determined by the 2°C target, which 
was acknowledged by the Copenhagen Accord and the G8 summit. In the other two 
scenarios, the global reduction requirement is determined by the Copenhagen Pledges, 
which consist of an unconditional (CP low) and conditional (CP high) pledge scenario. 
These pledges are national reduction pledges for 2020, which have been submitted by 
many Annex I and non-Annex I countries to the UNFCCC in the context of the 
Copenhagen meeting (UNFCCC, 2010a,b,c) and which are the only targets – though 
nonbinding – that exist. 
Concerning the 2°C target, the UNEP report (UNEP, 2010) assumes that an overall 
greenhouse gas emission level of 45 GtCO2-eq. needs to be reached in 2020 to have a 
50–66% chance of meeting the 2°C target. For our analysis, we need to derive a target 
for CO2 emissions of the sectors covered in the DART model plus the shipping sector. 
To do so, we assume that the GHG share of CO2 emissions resulting from fossil fuel 
use, which was according to IPCC (2007) 56.6% in 2004, stay constant over time. 
Consequently, around 25.47 GtCO2 emissions from fossil fuel use can be emitted in 
2020. This still includes 0.494 GtCO2 emitted by aviation in 2020 (IEA, 2009a). Since 
we assume that aviation has no obligation to abate emissions, we also assume that these 
emissions stay constant and subtract them from 25.47 GtCO2 to arrive at our final 2°C 
target of 24.796 GtCO2 for the sectors covered in our analysis. 
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Concerning the Copenhagen Pledges, the low pledges from all countries would – 
according to den Elzen et al. (2011) – lead to a global emission level of 49.7 GtCO2-eq 
and the high pledges to a level of 48.6 GtCO2-eq. in 2020. These numbers include the 
CO2 emissions of international bunkers (and thus of shipping and aviation combined), 
which amount to 1.1 GtCO2 and are thus not consistent with our own BAU shipping 
emissions and the aviation emissions published by the IEA (2009a). To be consistent in 
our scenarios, we thus subtract these 1.1 GtCO2 and add our BAU shipping emissions 
(0.947 GtCO2 (hrlc and lrhc) in cases full_rp and barrier_rp and 0.542 GtCO2 (hrlc) 
and 0.755 GtCO2 (lrhc) in case reduced_rp) and the aviation emissions of 0.494 GtCO2 
published by the IEA (2009a) instead. The “revised Copenhagen Pledges” then amount 
to 50.041 GtCO2, respectively, 49.636 GtCO2 (hrlc) and 49.849 GtCO2 (lrhc) in case 
reduced_rp, in the low pledges and 48.941 GtCO2, respectively, 48.536 GtCO2 (hrlc) 
and 48.749 GtCO2 (lrhc) in case reduced_rp, in the high pledges scenario. Again, we 
then multiply these targets by 0.556 to obtain a target for CO2 emissions only and 
finally subtract aviation emissions. Table 4 shows the BAU emissions, emission targets, 
and implied reduction targets for our different scenarios. 
 
Table 4: Emission targets, BAU emissions, and implied reduction targets.  
 
a
 Revised numbers for case reduced_rp under the hrlc and lrhc scenarios. 
 
Source: den Elzen et al. (2011), UNEP (2010), IEA (2009a), and own calculations. 
 
The aim of our analysis is to assess for three different global reduction targets (a) the 
maximum global cost savings that could be achieved by emission abatement in the 
shipping sector, (b) the cost efficient abatement contributions of the shipping sector to 
 Targets 
(CO2-eq..)
Cases
full_rp & 
barrier_rp
reduced
_rp 
full_rp & 
barrier_rp
reduced
_rp
full_rp & 
barrier_rp
reduced
_rp
full_rp & 
barrier_rp
reduced
_rp
2°C 45.000 24.976 35.447
35.042/ 
35.255
29.5%
28,4%/ 
29.0%
CP  low 49.700 50.041
a
49.636 / 
49.849
27.829
a
27.600/ 
27.721
35.447
35.042/ 
35.255
21.0%
21,2%/ 
21.4%
CP high 48.600 48.941
a
48.536/ 
48.749
27.207
a
26.977/ 
27.098
35.447
35.042/ 
35.255
23.0%
23,2%/ 
23.1%
Revised Copenhagen 
Pledges (CO2-eq.)
Targets for AoS and S ∑ BAU emissions 
AoS and S
Reduction targets 
AoS+shipping
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the global reduction targets, and (c) the potential additional costs that would be incurred 
by implementing a separate solution for the shipping sector. We base our analysis on 
two alternative policy scenarios. One policy scenario assumes that AoS and shipping 
have a joint target, i.e., both sectors contribute (efficiently) to the joint overall reduction 
target (joint target scenario). The other policy scenario assumes that AoS has to bear the 
full reduction burden, while the shipping sector remains unregulated (AoS without 
shipping scenario). Comparing both scenarios indicates the potential gains that could be 
achieved by including the shipping sector in climate policy on CO2 emission reductions.  
4.2. Results 
We start by discussing the results of the policy scenario joint target (these results are 
also summarized in Table 5) and thereafter discuss the results of the comparison 
between the policy scenario joint target and policy scenario AoS without shipping. 
The CO2 prices range, depending on the case analyzed and assumed reduction poten-
tials/costs scenario (hrlc and lrhc), between $53.5 and $56.8 under the 2°C target, 
between $34.5 and $35.7 under the low Copenhagen Pledges, and between $38.7 and 
$39.9 under the high Copenhagen Pledges. CO2 prices are always higher in the lrhc 
scenario than in the hrlc scenario because it has a smaller reduction potential and higher 
cost per abated ton of CO2. CO2 prices are always the lowest in case reduced_rp, 
independent of the assumed reduction potentials/costs scenario (hrlc or lrhc), because 
the BAU emissions in cases full_rp and barrier_rp are higher than in case reduced_rp, 
causing higher reduction needs. 
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Table 5: CO2 prices, efficient reduction relative to BAU emissions and to overall target.  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The efficient contribution of shipping to overall reductions varies between 0.1% and 
2.2% under the 2°C target, between 0.1% and 2.4% under the low Copenhagen Pledges, 
and between 0.1% and 2.3% under the high Copenhagen Pledges. It is the highest in 
case full_rp, followed by case barrier_rp and case reduced_rp in the hrlc scenario (see 
Figure 3a). The reason for this is that the MACCs of cases full_rp and barrier_rp have 
higher maximum reduction potentials and are less steep in the beginning than in case 
reduced_rp (see Figure A9 in the Appendix). The picture is different in the lrhc 
scenario. The efficient contribution of shipping to overall reductions is the highest in 
case barrier_rp (except under the low Copenhagen Pledges scenario), followed by case 
full_rp and case reduced_rp in the lrhc scenario (see Figure 3b). Here, the MACCs of 
cases full_rp and reduced_rp are steeper in the beginning, but start at a lower cost level 
than case barrier_rp (see Figure A9 in the Appendix). Moreover, the lower the overall 
reduction target (CP low < CP high < 2°C), the higher the efficient contribution of 
shipping to the overall target in cases full_rp and reduced_rp in both of the reduction 
potentials and costs scenarios (hrlc and lrhc) assumed. This is caused by the quadratic 
functional form of the approximated MAC functions. The opposite, i.e., the lower the 
overall reduction target (CP low < CP high < 2°C), the lower the efficient contribution 
of shipping to the overall target, is true for case barrier_rp. This is caused by the linear 
functional form of the approximated MAC functions. 
 
Reduction/
costs 
scenario
Cases CO2 price RS rel.to 
BAU 
emissions
RS rel.to 
overall 
target
CO2 price RS rel.to 
BAU 
emissions
RS rel.to 
overall 
target
CO2 price RS rel.to 
BAU 
emissions
RS rel.to 
overall 
target
full_rp
55.11 24.2% 2.19% 34.59 19.2% 2.38% 38.71 20.28% 2.33%
reduced_rp 53.52 4.1% 0.22% 34.51 3.3% 0.24% 38.70 3.47% 0.23%
barrier_rp
56.43 6.9% 0.63% 35.52 4.3% 0.53% 39.73 4.80% 0.55%
full_rp 56.77 2.6% 0.23% 35.66 2.0% 0.25% 39.91 2.15% 0.25%
reduced_rp
55.34 1.1% 0.08% 35.20 0.9% 0.09% 39.42 0.93% 0.09%
barrier_rp
56.67 3.8% 0.34% 35.67 1.9% 0.23% 39.90 2.26% 0.26%
2°C CP low CP high
hrlc
lrhc
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Figure 3a and 3b: Efficient contribution of shipping to the three overall reduction 
targets in the hrlc scenario (a) and the lrhc scenario (b). Source: Own calculations. 
 
The emission reductions of the shipping sector relative to its BAU emissions range, 
depending on the analyzed case and assumed reduction potentials/costs scenario, 
between 1% and 24% under the 2°C target, between 1% and 19% under the low 
Copenhagen Pledges, and between 1% and 20% under the high Copenhagen Pledges. 
Emission reductions relative to BAU emissions are always the highest in case full_rp, 
followed by case barrier_rp and case reduced_rp in the hrlc scenario. The order 
changes in the lrhc scenario. Here, emission reductions relative to BAU emissions are 
always the highest in case barrier_rp, followed by case full_rp and case reduced_rp, 
except under the low Copenhagen Pledges. The reason for this is that the increase in 
marginal abatement costs is less steep in case barrier_rp (see Figure A9). Emission 
reductions relative to BAU emissions in AoS range between 29% and 30% under the 
2°C target, between 21% and 22% under the low Copenhagen Pledges, and between 
23% and 24% under the high Copenhagen Pledges. Figures 4a and 4b compare the 
efficient emission reductions relative to BAU emissions in shipping and AoS. 
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Figure 4a and 4b: Comparison of efficient emission reductions relative to BAU 
emissions of AoS and S (a) in hrlc scenario and (b) in lrhc scenario. Source: Own 
calculations. 
 
They show, first, that the variation between the different shipping cases is higher in the 
hrlc scenario (Figure 4a) than in the lrhc scenario (Figure 4b), second, that efficient 
emission reductions relative to BAU emissions in shipping and AoS are only similar in 
the case full_rp in the hrlc scneario. In all other cases, the relative reductions of 
shipping are significantly lower than the ones of AoS. This has policy implications, 
which we discuss in Section 5. 
Now, we discuss the results of the comparison between the policy scenario joint 
target and the policy scenario AoS without shipping, i.e., the scenario where only AoS 
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has to bear the entire reduction burden. The results are shown in the following Figures 
5a and 5b.  
 
  
Figure 5a and 5b: Relative global cost savings of the two policy scenarios: (a) AoS and 
S have a joint target versus AoS without S in the hrlc scenario and (b) AoS and S have a 
joint target versus AoS without S in the lrhc scenario. Source: Own calculations. 
 
The relative cost savings range, depending on the case analyzed and reduction potentials 
and costs scenario assumed, between 0.1% and 3.5% under the 2°C target, between 
0.1% and 3.7% under the low Copenhagen Pledges, and between 0.1% and 3.6% under 
the high Copenhagen Pledges. The relative cost savings are always positive if AoS and 
shipping have a joint target because shipping contributes an additional reduction 
potential at low (marginal) abatement costs. Naturally, the cost savings are larger under 
the optimistic hrlc scenario than in the pessimistic lrhc scenario. The relative cost 
savings are always the highest in case full_rp, followed by case barrier_rp and re-
duced_rp. 
The change in CO2 prices compared to the joint reduction scenario is small (< 1%) in 
all the cases and under all the reduction scenarios. Only in case full_rp under the hrlc 
scenario, where shipping contributes significantly more to overall reduction than in all 
other cases under both reduction potentials and costs scenarios assumed, does the CO2 
price increase by more than 3% under all reduction scenarios. When looking at the share 
of shipping’s abatement costs (ACs) in overall abatement costs (ACAoS+ ACS), this is 
smaller than the share of its reductions (RS) in overall reductions (RAoS+ RS) in most 
cases under the hrlc and lrhc scenarios. Thus, overall cost savings are higher than the 
mere share of reductions in the shipping sector suggests. While the shipping sector 
overall does not contribute a large share of reductions, the potential reduction measures 
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are relatively cheap. Case barrier_rp is the only exception under all three global 
reduction target scenarios. 
Tables A2–A4 in the Appendix provide more results (in absolute terms) of the three 
global reduction requirement scenarios. 
 
5. Discussion 
Our results show that the shipping sector could always contribute to efficient global 
emission reductions and that this contribution could always achieve global cost savings. 
However, the contribution of the shipping sector to efficient global emission reductions 
and the potential cost savings depend to a large degree on the MACC case assumed, i.e., 
depend on how the existence of negative abatement costs is treated in a MACC, and on 
the reduction potentials and costs of measures assumed. 
If we are generally optimistic about reduction potentials and costs (hrlc scenario), the 
contribution and potential cost savings are significant in the case with the highest 
maximum reduction potential (full_rp), almost negligible in the case with the smallest 
maximum reduction potential (reduced_rp), and small in the case with the moderate 
maximum reduction potential (barrier_rp). The reasons for this are obviously that in 
case barrier_rp, fewer measures are taken into account and in case reduced_rp, a huge 
share of the maximum reduction potential (the reduction potential at negative costs) is 
assumed to be achieved even in the absence of climate policy, so that this reduction 
potential no longer contributes to cost savings when regulating the shipping sector. 
Thus, only a small share of the maximum reduction potential remains. However, it is 
difficult to say which of the cases resulting from the approaches presented in Section 
2.2 is most realistic. We clearly believe that there are barriers to implementation that 
have some kind of shadow price so that we see the second approach as rather academic. 
Therefore, its corresponding case (reduced_rp), the one with the smallest maximum 
reduction potential, seems to be less realistic than the other two cases because it 
assumes that all reduction potentials at negative costs will be implemented, i.e., that 
there are no barriers to implementation or extra costs, whereas both cases, full_rp and 
barrier_rp, assume that barriers to implementation or extra costs exist. However, the 
case barrier_rp might underestimate the reduction potential by excluding measures 
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from the MACC analysis that are assumed to be already used by a significant share of 
the world fleet. The opposite might be true for case full_rp by assuming that all the 
analyzed measures are not being used yet. Moreover, shifting up the MACC by exactly 
the level of the measure with the highest negative costs involves making an arbitrary 
choice. Extra costs could be even higher (or lower), affecting the contribution of 
shipping to efficient abatement. Nevertheless, we suggest that the case with the highest 
maximum reduction potential (full_rp) should be considered the most realistic one. 
If we are generally pessimistic about reduction potentials and costs (lrhc scenario) 
the general picture is different. Now global cost savings are almost negligible (in the 
order of less than 0.5%) and there is no significant difference between cases full_rp and 
barrier_rp. 
Comparing the two reduction potential and costs scenarios (hrlc/lrhc) shows that the 
difference between the maximum reduction potentials is large, the difference between 
the marginal abatement costs is not so obvious (see Figure 2a and 2b). Thus, results are 
more affected by the assumption about the potential reduction effects of measures than 
by the assumption about the range of potential costs (see in addition the discussion in 
Eide et al., 2011). Consequently, more research should be conducted in order to reduce 
the uncertainty about the potential performance of measures, i.e., to minimize the range 
of a measure’s potential reduction effect.  
Comparing the three emission reduction scenarios, the status of today’s climate 
negotiations suggests that the scenario low Copenhagen Pledges will be the most 
realistic one. This scenario is in favor of the inclusion of the shipping sector. The 
smaller the joint reduction target is, the larger the shipping sector’s relative contribution 
is to efficient global emission reductions in cases full_rp and redcued_rp. This implies 
that the shipping sector accommodates a small, but at the same time, a cost-effective 
reduction potential that should be exploited for global emission reductions. 
The results for all the scenarios also provide us with an idea of what the efficient 
reduction targets should be when a separate solution for the shipping sector is the 
regulatory choice. The separate solution is being discussed in the IMO, as mentioned in 
the Introduction, but also in the EU. The Council of the European Union (2009) 
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proposed a 20% reduction target for the shipping sector below 2005 by 2020.
20
 Our 
calculations show that this target is close to the cost minimizing reduction level when 
assuming high reduction potentials and low costs (hrlc scenario) and the full reduction 
potential (full_rp). When we compare to this target our targets implied by the Copenha-
gen pledges, we find that there is in this case a perfect match, while we find in the case 
of the 2°C target that the optimal reduction target in the shipping sector would be about 
25%. Under these assumptions, requiring the same relative reductions in the shipping 
sector and AoS is thus almost cost efficient. Under all other assumptions (low abate-
ment potentials and higher costs, i.e., all lrhc scenarios and all reduced_rp and barri-
er_rp scenarios), the relative reduction target for the shipping sector that is cost 
minimizing is much lower than 20% and mostly in the order of a 1–5% reduction only. 
A comparison to the other studies (see Table 1) shows that the shipping sector’s cost-
effective reduction potential becomes considerably smaller when treating the existence 
of negative marginal abatement costs as a calculation artifact caused by the narrow cost 
definition of project-level analysis (our scenarios full_rp and barrier_rp). According to 
Eide et al. (2011), emission reductions in the order of between 27% and 31% relative to 
BAU emissions could be achieved in 2020 if a decision criterion (marginal cost 
threshold) of <20US$/t, <50US$/t, respectively, were to be applied. These emission 
reductions include not only reductions that have positive costs, but also the ones that 
have negative costs. We, on the other hand, found that (efficient) emission reductions 
amount to 19% relative to BAU emissions in the most optimistic scenario (full_rp/hrlc) 
and to only 1% in the most pessimistic case (reduced_rp/lrhc) under the low Copenha-
gen Pledges (~35US$/t). 
 
6. Conclusion 
While it is clear that emissions generated by the shipping sector are substantial and can 
be reduced, at least partially, at low costs, it has not been analyzed so far how much 
emissions should actually be reduced when the objective is to reach a given global 
emission target at minimal costs. In this paper, we have thus determined whether the 
                                                 
20
 The reduction in absolute terms would be ~311 MtCO2. We based the calculation on the emission 
estimate for 2005 in Buhaug et al. (2009) and the BAU emissions used in this paper. 
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shipping sector could contribute to reducing global emissions efficiently to reach certain 
global emission targets under different policy scenarios by making use of marginal 
abatement cost curves (MACC). We have presented an approach to deal with the 
existence of negative abatement costs in the expert-based MACC generated for the 
shipping sector in order to combine it with a CGE model-based MACC generated for 
abatement measures used outside the shipping sector. We focus on the year 2020. 
The main findings are that the shipping sector could always contribute to efficient 
global emission reductions and thus could always achieve global cost savings. Yet, the 
optimal contribution and the possible cost savings depend much on the MACC case 
assumed, i.e., depend on how the existence of negative abatement costs in a MACC is 
treated, and the assumed reduction potentials and costs of measures. Under optimistic 
assumptions about the use of abatement measures, the shipping sector can reduce costs 
by 3.5%, while under less optimistic assumptions it can only reduce costs by less than 
1%. 
Yet, it is important to point out that we did not have data for the reduction potentials 
and costs of all possible abatement measures in the shipping sector and also since we 
only included 14 ship types, representing only a part of the world fleet, although this 
part is significant in terms of transported tonnage. This implies that the reduction 
potential might increase when more measures and more ship types are included in the 
analysis. 
Overall, we thus conclude that emissions generated in the shipping sector should be 
regulated in order to prevent emissions generated by the shipping sector from consum-
ing a considerable share of allowed emissions in the coming decades and to prevent 
other sectors from having to compensate by exploiting more expensive abatement 
options. Since there is uncertainty about what the optimal reduction level in the shipping 
sector would be, an approach that allows equalization of marginal abatement costs in the 
shipping sector and other sectors (such as including the shipping sector in an emission 
trading scheme or applying a carbon tax at a level of prices in existing emission trading 
schemes) is preferable to isolated regulation of the shipping sector. 
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8. Appendix 
Table A1: Parameter values and (adjusted) R
2
 of approximated marginal abatement cost 
functions.  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
  
Case
Reduction and 
costs scenario
R
2
adj.R
2
a b c
hrlc 0.00105054 0.980893 0.980891
lrhc 0.09675131 0.968225 0.968214
hrlc 0.34804264 0.09087283 0.995681 0.995653
lrhc 1.36010899 0.60900788 0.997943 0.997940
hrlc 2.054096808 0.82941192 0.968542
lrhc 15.28405984 1.15011927 0.851306
full_rp
reduced_rp
barrier_rp
Parameter values
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A1–A3 A4–A6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures A1–A3: show the approximated functions for the high reduction and low costs 
scenario (hrlc). Source: Own calculations. 
Figures A4–A6: show the approximated functions for the high reduction and low costs 
scenario (lrhc). Source: Own calculations. 
 
Figure A7 shows three approximated functions for AoS. As the figure shows, the 
quadratic form (gray dashed line: bx+cx
2
) has a better fit than the other quadratic (black 
dashed line: cx
2
) and the exponential form (black dotted-dashed line: exp(a+bx)) for 
abatement levels between 7,000 and 10,500 MtCO2. 
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Figure A7: Comparison of functional fits with global (AoS) MACC. Source: Own 
presentation. MACC generated with the DART model. 
 
 
Figure A8: Residuals plots. Source: Own calculations. 
 
Figure A9: Global (AoS) MACC and shipping MACCs. Source: Own calculations. 
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Table A2: Emissions, abatement costs, and prices under the 2°C target.  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Policy 
scenario
Reduction 
and costs 
scenario
Cases Emissions after 
efficient reduction 
(in Mt) in shipping 
sector
Emissions after 
efficient 
reduction (in Mt) 
in AoS
Abatement costs 
shipping (ACS in 
billion 2007US$)
Abatement costs 
AoS (ACAoS in  
billion 2007US$)
Abatement costs 
(ACAoS + ACS in  
billion  2007US$)
CO2 
price/ton (in 
2007US$)=
MACAoS
CO2 price/ton (in 
2007US$) 
=MACAoS=MACS
Business-as-usual 
emissions shipping 
and AoS (in Mt)
Jo
in
t 
ta
rg
e
t 
fo
r 
A
o
S
 a
n
d
 s
h
ip
p
in
g
hrlc
full_rp 947 34500 718 24258 4.21 235.65 239.86 55.11
reduced_rp 542 34500 519 24456 0.43 224.87 225.30 53.52
barrier_rp 947 34500 881 24095 1.92 244.76 246.68 56.43
Jo
in
t 
ta
rg
e
t 
fo
r 
A
o
S
 a
n
d
 s
h
ip
p
in
g
lrhc
full_rp 947 34500 922 24053 0.46 247.10 247.56 56.77
reduced_rp 755 34500 746 24230 0.17 237.22 237.39 55.34
barrier_rp 947 34500 911 24065 1.29 246.43 247.72 56.67
full_rp 34500 24029 248.48 56.97
reduced_rp 34500 24434 226.07 53.70
barrier_rp 34500 24029 248.48 56.97
full_rp 34500 24029 248.48 56.97
reduced_rp 34500 24221 237.69 55.41
barrier_rp 34500 24029 248.48 56.97
Jo
in
t 
ta
rg
e
t 
fo
r 
A
o
S
 a
n
d
 s
h
ip
p
in
g
A
o
S
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
sh
ip
p
in
g AoS 
(DART)
AoS 
(DART)
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Table A3: Emissions, abatement costs, and prices under the low Copenhagen Pledges target.  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Policy 
scenario
Reduction 
and costs 
scenario
Cases Emissions after 
efficient reduction 
(in Mt) in shipping 
sector
Emissions after 
efficient 
reduction (in 
Mt) in AoS
Abatement 
costs shipping 
(ACS in billion 
2007US$)
Abatement costs 
AoS (ACAoS in  
billion 2007US$)
Abatement costs 
(ACAoS + ACS in  
billion  2007US$)
CO2 
price/ton (in 
2007US$)=
MACAoS
CO2 price/ton (in 
2007US$) 
=MACAoS=MACS
Business-as-usual 
emissions shipping 
and AoS (in Mt)
Jo
in
t 
ta
rg
e
t 
fo
r 
A
o
S
 a
n
d
 s
h
ip
p
in
g
hrlc
full_rp 947 34500 765 27063 2.09 110.78 112.87 34.59
reduced_rp 542 34500 524 27076 0.22 110.36 110.58 34.51
barrier_rp 947 34500 906 26922 0.76 115.73 116.49 35.52
Jo
in
t 
ta
rg
e
t 
fo
r 
A
o
S
 a
n
d
 s
h
ip
p
in
g
lrhc
full_rp 947 34500 927 26901 0.23 116.48 116.71 35.66
reduced_rp 755 34500 748 26972 0.09 113.99 114.07 35.20
barrier_rp 947 34500 929 26900 0.45 116.53 116.98 35.67
full_rp 34500 26882 117.17 35.79
reduced_rp 34500 27058 110.97 34.62
barrier_rp 34500 26882 117.17 35.79
full_rp 34500 26882 117.17 35.79
reduced_rp 34500 26965 114.22 35.24
barrier_rp 34500 26882 117.17 35.79
Jo
in
t 
ta
rg
e
t 
fo
r 
A
o
S
 a
n
d
 s
h
ip
p
in
g
A
o
S
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
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ip
p
in
g AoS 
(DART)
AoS 
(DART)
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Table A4: Emissions, abatement costs, and prices under the high Copenhagen Pledges target.  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
Policy 
scenario
Reduction 
and costs 
scenario
Cases Emissions after 
efficient reduction 
(in Mt) in shipping 
sector
Emissions after 
efficient 
reduction (in 
Mt) in AoS
Abatement costs 
shipping (ACS in 
billion 2007US$)
Abatement costs 
AoS (ACAoS in  
billion 2007US$)
Abatement costs 
(ACAoS + ACS in  
billion  2007US$)
CO2 
price/ton (in 
2007US$)=
MACAoS
CO2 price/ton (in 
2007US$) 
=MACAoS=MACS
Business-as-usual 
emissions shipping 
and AoS (in Mt)
Jo
in
t 
ta
rg
e
t 
fo
r 
A
o
S
 a
n
d
 s
h
ip
p
in
g
hrlc
full_rp 947 34500 755 26452 2.48 133.18 135.66 38.71
reduced_rp 542 34500 523 26454 0.26 133.11 133.37 38.70
barrier_rp 947 34500 901 26305 0.95 138.93 139.88 39.73
Jo
in
t 
ta
rg
e
t 
fo
r 
A
o
S
 a
n
d
 s
h
ip
p
in
g
lrhc
full_rp 947 34500 926 26280 0.27 139.93 140.20 39.91
reduced_rp 755 34500 748 26350 0.10 137.16 137.26 39.42
barrier_rp 947 34500 925 26281 0.59 139.89 140.48 39.90
full_rp 34500 26260 140.74 40.05
reduced_rp 34500 26435 133.84 38.83
barrier_rp 34500 26260 140.74 40.05
full_rp 34500 26260 140.74 40.05
reduced_rp 34500 26343 137.44 39.47
barrier_rp 34500 26260 140.74 40.05
Jo
in
t 
ta
rg
e
t 
fo
r 
A
o
S
 a
n
d
 s
h
ip
p
in
g
R
o
W
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
sh
ip
p
in
g AoS 
(DART)
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(DART)
 117 
 
Paper III: Including Maritime Transport in the EU´s Climate Change Policy: Country -Based 
Allocation and Effects 
Part II 
Climate Change Policy 
 
Paper III: Including Maritime Transport in the 
EU´s Climate Change Policy: Country-Based 
Allocation and Effects 
 
 
 
 
Heitmann, N., 2013. 
Including Maritime Transport in the EU´s Climate Change Policy: Country-Based 
Allocation and Effects, Kiel Working Paper No. 1824, Kiel Institute for the World 
Economy. 
 
 
 118 
 
Including Maritime Transport in the EU´s Cli-
mate Change Policy: Country-Based Allocation 
and Effects * 
 
Nadine Heitmann
a
  
a
 Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Hindenburgufer 66, 24105 Kiel, Germany 
 
Abstract 
The European Union (EU) is actively campaigning for the global regulation of carbon 
emissions generated by maritime bunker fuels because these emissions are presently 
barely regulated and are projected to increase significantly in the coming decades. 
However, since a global regulation has not been reached yet, the EU is seeking ways to 
include the shipping sector in its greenhouse gas reduction commitment for 2020. 
In this paper, we look at the effect of including the shipping sector’s emissions in the 
EU reduction commitment that is based on the nationality of a ship. Emissions that are 
generated by ships owned, operated or flagged by the 27 EU countries are allocated to 
the EU total GHG emissions. We first analyse the effects on the reduction commitment 
caused by the three allocations. We then use marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) 
in order to determine how much the shipping sector of the 27 EU countries, defined by 
the three allocations, could contribute efficiently to a total given emission reduction 
target for all sectors in the EU. Moreover, we use MACCs in order to determine if some 
country fleets could reduce emissions in the shipping sector relatively more efficiently 
than other countries under a given emission reduction target for all sectors. Our findings 
indicate that the shipping sector could contribute efficiently to the EU’s emission 
reductions by up to 8.5%. Since the composition of the individual country fleets and 
                                                 
*
 I am grateful to Katrin Rehdanz for her helpful suggestions and comments. Moreover, I would like to 
thank Matthias Weitzel and Alvaro Calzadilla Rivera, who provided the MACC generated with the 
DART model, Hendrik Goll for his research assistance, and Paul Kramer for his linguistic assistance. The 
German Research Foundation (DFG) provided welcome financial support through The Future Ocean 
Cluster of Excellence. The usual caveats apply. 
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applied measures are similar across countries, their individual reductions relative to 
their fleet-specific business-as-usual (BAU) emissions are on average the same. 
 
Keywords: EU, climate change, shipping sector, CO2 emissions, marginal abatement 
cost curve 
JEL classification: Q52, Q54, Q58 
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1. Introduction 
Carbon dioxide emissions generated by the shipping sector accounted for about 3% of 
global carbon emissions in 2007.
1
 These emissions are projected to increase significant-
ly by 2050 and are presently barely regulated (Buhaug et al., 2009). Discussions on how 
to regulate such carbon dioxide emissions
2
 have originated over 15 years ago in the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate change (UNFCCC) and are still continuing in the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), in the European Union (EU), and in the 
scientific community. These discussions focus on the question whether the shipping 
sector’s emissions should be capped or whether they should be subject to other means 
of regulation (UNEP, 2011). The EU is actively engaged in making progress in this 
matter with a global solution being the most preferred way. On the one hand, it has 
proposed a global reduction target of 20% relative to 2005 levels by 2020 for the 
shipping sector (Council of the European Union, 2009). On the other hand, it is seeking 
ways to include emissions generated by the shipping sector in its greenhouse gas 
reduction commitments should no global regulation be reached in the IMO (EU, 2009).
3
  
An important question that needs to be addressed before implementing any regula-
tion as regards the shipping sector’s emissions is the size of emission reduction that the 
shipping sector could contribute efficiently to a given overall target. In this paper, the 
focus is thus on how much the shipping sector could contribute to a given emission 
reduction target for all sectors in the EU, assuming a policy instrument that equalizes 
the marginal abatement costs of all sectors. This gives us an idea if the shipping sector 
could at all contribute efficiently to a given emission reduction target. In order to do 
this, we first have to define a way of allocating a proportion of the shipping sector’s 
emissions generated globally to the EU consisting of 27 countries. In doing this, we 
look at a way that is based on suggestions made by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific 
and Technological Advice (SBSTA) of the UNFCCC. It has suggested using various 
allocation rules to allocate the shipping sector’s emissions to individual countries 
                                                 
1
 The shipping sector’s emissions can be divided into international and domestic shipping emissions. 
However, the major share of emissions is caused by international shipping (Buhaug et al., 2009). 
2
 We denote carbon dioxide emissions from now on as emissions. 
3
 Background information of the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP) Working Group on 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions from ships is available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/events/0035/index_en.htm. 
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(SBSTA, 1996).
4
 One rule (SBSTA rule No. 4) is to use (1) the nationality of the ship 
owner, (2) the nationality of the ship operator, or (3) the flag state registration to 
allocate emissions. Doing so, would increase the EU countries’ total national emissions 
and thus the EU’s reduction effort to achieve its committed emission target. However, if 
abatement in the shipping sector is more cost-effective than in the currently regulated 
sectors, then including the shipping sector in the reduction efforts to achieve the EU’s 
target may reduce overall abatement costs. 
Several studies (Eide et al., 2011, Faber et al., 2011, Buhaug et al., 2009, Faber et al., 
2009) conclude that there are ways that the shipping sector could reduce emissions cost-
effectively. Moreover, another study (Heitmann and Peterson, 2012) discusses the 
shipping sector’s potential contribution to efficient global emission reductions and its 
effect on global cost savings. However, the magnitude of the contribution and the cost 
savings depend heavily on the assumed reduction potentials and costs of the various 
measures applied to specific shipping fleets. Hence, from a regional or a country 
perspective, the contribution of a country’s or region’s fleet to reducing total national 
emissions efficiently might be important. 
While there is a growing number of studies that look at the effects on regions or 
countries of various allocation rules applied to the shipping sector’s emissions (den 
Elzen et al., 2007, Gilbert and Bows, 2012, Heitmann and Khalilian, 2011, Wang, 
2010), only a few studies exist on how to include the shipping sector’s emissions in the 
EU reduction commitment (Faber et al., 2009, Nelissen and Faber, 2012).
5
 Faber et al. 
(2009) provide estimates of emissions generated by ships in various regions and in 
particular in the EU region, whereby emissions generated by ships in a region refer to 
emissions generated by ships calling at or departing from ports in a particular region. In 
doing so, Faber et al. (2009) show that the EU accounted for 31% of the shipping 
sector’s emissions generated globally in 2006. Moreover, they present and discuss 
various policy instruments on how to reduce the shipping sector’s emissions in a 
                                                 
4
 The SBSTA suggested 8 allocation rules in total, e.g., allocating emissions in proportion to the national 
emission inventories of countries or allocating emissions according to the country that owns the 
transported cargo. Note, that the allocation of emissions to regions or countries leaves the way of how to 
effectively regulate the shipping sector’s emissions to the regions’/countries’ discretion, for example, the 
regions/countries could use market-based or command-and-control policy instruments in order to regulate 
the emissions. 
5
 Not only is the EU actively engaged in seeking solutions. The UK is also actively seeking solutions, 
e.g., it is seeking ways to include the aviation and shipping sectors’ emissions in its 2050 emission target 
and carbon budgets to be legislated in the future (Committee on Climate Change, 2011). 
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European framework, namely: an emission trading scheme (ETS), an emission-based 
tax, an efficiency standard, a baseline-and-credit trading scheme, and voluntary action. 
They conclude that emissions generated by ships in the EU region account for a large 
share of the shipping sector’s emissions generated globally and that an ETS would be 
the policy instrument that is environmentally effective and feasible to implement. 
Nelissen and Faber (2012) carry out a qualitative analysis of how the main policy 
instruments that are currently discussed at the EU level, namely two types of compensa-
tion funds managed by industry, an ETS, a fuel-based or emission-based tax, and two 
types of mandatory emission reduction per ship (for more details, see ECCP, 2011) 
would affect emissions in the EU. They conclude that an ETS covering emissions of 
ships calling at, departing from, or moving between EU ports would be the best choice 
as regards environmental effectiveness. However, Nelissen and Faber point out that 
controlling for emissions of ships departing from EU ports may be challenging. 
Moreover, they point out that a quantitative assessment is currently not possible because 
detailed data as regards the ships that would be in the scope of the various policy 
instruments is lacking. 
We contribute to the literature by analyzing how the allocation rule No. 4 of the 
SBSTA, which includes three allocation ways, would alter the EU’s total emissions and 
its reduction commitment for the year 2020. Beyond that, in a first step, we determine 
with the help of marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs), how much the EU shipping 
sector (defined by the three allocation ways), compared to the other EU sectors, could 
contribute to the reduction commitment. In a second step, we determine if some country 
fleets could reduce emissions in the shipping sector relatively more efficiently than 
other countries under the given emission reduction commitment. Furthermore, we 
assess the increase in abatement costs that is caused by including the shipping sector’s 
emissions in the reduction commitment. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, an overview of climate change poli-
cy is given. In Section 3, the three allocation ways are presented and how they would 
affect the EU’s reduction commitment is discussed. In Section 4, MACCs for the EU 
shipping sector in accordance with the three allocation ways and a MACC for all other 
EU sectors are presented. In Section 5, emission targets are determined and policy 
scenarios are described. Further, the results of the policy scenarios, including the 
 123 
 
country-level analysis, are presented. In Section 6, the results are discussed. In Section 
7, the final section, a summary is given and conclusions are drawn. 
 
2. Climate change policy 
The anthropogenic emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) causes an increase in the 
atmosphere’s GHG concentration, thereby affecting the Earth’s average global tempera-
ture and causing climate change (IPCC, 2007). The emission of GHG is a negative 
externality that impacts mankind globally and independent of its geographical location 
(see, e.g., Perman et al., 1999). It is thus a global problem that requires a global 
solution. 
Climate change policy to combat climate change takes place on various levels. It 
takes place on the international level within the framework of the UNFCCC, on regional 
levels, e.g., in the framework of the EU climate and energy package,
6
 and even on 
national levels, e.g., in the framework of the German Integrated Energy and Climate 
Package (BMU, 2007) and Energy Concept Germany (BMWi and BMU, 2010). 
The first step undertaken towards combating climate change internationally was that 
the world community adopted the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 in the framework of the 
UNFCCC. It obliged a group of industrialized countries to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHG) by 5% in the period 2008–2012 (called first commitment period) 
against 1990 emission levels (the countries, which committed themselves to an emission 
reduction target, are called Annex I countries). Emissions of the international sectors 
aviation and maritime shipping are excluded from the 1990 emission levels.
7
 The Kyoto 
                                                 
6
 The EU climate and energy package aims to achieve the EU’ s climate and energy targets for 2020 
(called 20-20-20 targets) and consists of four legislative acts: Directive 2009/29/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and 
extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the Community (“ETS-Directive”), 
Decision No 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the effort 
of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s greenhouse gas 
emission reduction commitments up to 2020 ("Effort Sharing Decision"), Directive 2009/28/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from 
renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC 
("Renewable Energy Directive"), and Directive 2009/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 April 2009 on the geological storage of carbon dioxide (CCS-Directive).    
7
 Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol states that Annex I countries should reduce emissions from interna-
tional aviation and marine bunker fuels with the help of the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) and the IMO. 
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Protocol has been prolonged for 8 more years (second commitment period 2013–2020) 
at the UN Climate Change Conference in Doha in December 2012 (UNFCCC, 2012). 
Currently, the Kyoto Protocol is the only existing international agreement that is 
legally binding. However, not all countries have legally binding reduction commitments 
under the Kyoto Protocol (these countries are called non-Annex I countries).
8
 Despite 
this, many non-Annex I countries, in particular major emitters such as China and India, 
pledged in addition to many Annex I countries national reduction targets for 2020 in the 
course of the UNFCCC conference in Copenhagen in 2009 (UNFCCC, 2010a, 2010b), 
called the Copenhagen Pledges. These pledges, however, are not legally binding. 
The EU belongs to the group of Annex I countries of the Kyoto Protocol and it also 
committed itself to reduce its GHG emissions in the course of the UN Climate Change 
Conference in Copenhagen. The EU pledged to reduce its emissions unilaterally by 20% 
by 2020 relative to 1990 levels (this reduction is called the unconditional or low pledge 
because it is not conditional on other countries pursuing more ambitious reduction 
targets). In addition, the EU also pledged to reduce its emissions by 30% by 2020 
relative to 1990 levels conditional on other countries also pursuing more ambitious 
reduction targets (this reduction is called the conditional or high pledge). According to 
den Elzen et al. (2011), the EU’s maximum GHG emissions would amount to 4.45 
GtCO2-eq. with the unconditional pledge and to 3.90 GtCO2-eq. with the conditional 
pledge in 2020. According to a European Environment Agency report (EEA, 2012), the 
EU’s GHG emissions amounted to 4.60 GtCO2-eq. in 2011 and to 5.58 GtCO2-eq. in 
1990. 
To reach the emission reductions in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Proto-
col and under the Copenhagen Pledges, the EU has implemented various climate change 
policy instruments, whereby the EU ETS is the most important one. It includes over 
11,000 power and heat plants, energy-intensive industrial plants, and commercial 
airlines.
9
 However, the shipping sector’s emissions are neither included in the EU ETS 
nor tackled by any other climate change policy instrument. 
 
                                                 
8
 Canada withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol and Japan indicated not to take on a commitment to reduce 
emissions in the second commitment period 2013–2020 (UNFCCC, 2012). 
9
 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm. 
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3. Allocation rules and effects of including the shipping sector’s emis-
sions in the EU reduction commitment 
3.1. Absolute versus relative target 
As mentioned in the introduction, the EU is seeking ways to include the shipping 
sector’s emissions in its 20% reduction target. Possible approaches to include the 
shipping sector’s emissions are: (1) keeping the absolute target for 2020 and enlarging 
the set of regulated sectors or (2) reassessing the 1990 base year emissions and enlarg-
ing the set of regulated sectors.
10
 In the following, we focus on the EU’s 20% reduction 
target, the unconditional pledge, because it seems more realistic when looking at the 
current status of climate negotiations (see Section 2).  
The first approach (Figure 1) assumes that the absolute emission target in the refer-
ence year remains constant and that shipping emissions are added on top of the current-
ly regulated business-as-usual emissions in the reference year (2020). The base year 
emissions (emissions in 1990) remain the same, i.e., no shipping emissions are added on 
top. We call this approach the partial integration approach. 
                                                 
10
 Emission reduction commitments are in general based on a specific set of GHG emissions and included 
sectors in a base year. Ideally, the required emission reductions in the reference year are also based on the 
same specific set of GHG emissions and sectors as the emissions in the base year. We define these 
emissions as currently regulated emissions. In the case of the current EU reduction commitment, the set 
does not include all the relevant GHG emissions and sectors. The carbon emissions from land use, land-
use change and forestry (LULUCF) or from the international shipping and aviation sectors are not 
included in the EU’s 1990 base year emissions, as is evident, for example, when looking at the European 
Environment Agency report (EEA, 2012). 
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Figure 1: Partial integration approach (absolute reduction target remains constant) 
Source: Own presentation. 
Notes on variables used in Figure 1: 
a)
 denotes the regulated BAU emissions in the base year 1990 and in the reference year 2020 (without the 
shipping sector’s emissions being included) 
b)
 denotes the shipping sector’s BAU emissions in base year 1990 and in reference year 2020; 
c)
 denotes the target when the partial integration approach (absolute target remains= the current 2020 
target of the EU) would be applied 
 
The second approach (Figure 2) assumes that the relative reduction target in the 
reference year 2020 remains the same (20%), but that the shipping sector’s emissions 
are both included in the set of base year emissions (emissions in 1990) and added on top 
of the regulated business-as-usual (BAU) emissions in the reference year (2020). This 
approach would cause an increase in the base year emissions and would make it 
necessary to raise the absolute emission target in the reference year (2020) in order to 
achieve the same relative target of 20% reduction (see Figure 2). Raising the absolute 
emission target would allow more emissions to be emitted and thus less emission 
reduction is required than with the first approach. We call this approach the full 
integration approach. 
In both cases, under the partial and full integration approach, the EU’s emission 
reduction requirements would increase. They would increase more under the partial 
integration approach than under full integration approach. 
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Figure 2: Full integration approach (relative reduction target remains the same) 
Source: Own presentation. 
Notes on variables used in Figure 2: 
a)
 denotes the regulated BAU emissions in the base year 1990 and in the reference year 2020 (without the 
shipping sector’s emissions being included) 
b)
 denotes the shipping sector’s BAU emissions in base year 1990 and in reference year 2020; 
d)
 denotes the current 2020 target of the EU (without the shipping sector’s emissions being included) 
e) 
denotes the target when the full integration approach (relative target remains) would be applied 
 
3.2. Applying the UNFCCC allocation rule: the resulting emissions 
As mentioned in the introduction, the SBSTA of the UNFCCC suggested various 
allocation rules to allocate emissions to countries (SBSTA, 1996). In the following, we 
focus on one of the allocation rules called “allocation according to the nationality of the 
transporting company, or to the country where the vessel is registered, or to the country 
of the operator” (SBSTA, 1996). This allocation rule, which actually deals with three 
different ways to allocate emissions (henceforth allocation ways), mirrors the complex 
structure of the shipping sector: a ship may have owners and operators of different 
nationalities and, in addition, may be registered (flagged) in a third country. We 
therefore look at the three ways to allocate emissions according to this allocation rule 
separately. 
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Before we can investigate the effect of the various allocation ways on the emission 
reduction target in 2020, however, a number of steps need to be taken. This includes (1) 
the determination of the number of ships in 2020 per allocation way, (2) the determina-
tion of the BAU emissions in the reference year 2020 per allocation way, and (3) the 
determination of the emissions in the base year 1990. 
The first step is to determine the number of ships, i.e., the number per ship-type/ship-
segment
11
 and ship-age category, that are currently owned by, operated by, or registered 
in the 27 EU countries. In doing so, we use data from SeaWeb (IHS Fairplay, 2012). 
The ship-type and ship-segment categorization we use corresponds basically to the 
categorization used in Buhaug et al. (2009), which categorizes the world fleet into 18 
ship types and 70 segments. However, we consider only 14 major ship types that are 
divided into 53 size segments.
12
 This gives us three different EU fleets, which we define 
as EU-owned fleet, EU-operated fleet, and EU-registered fleet. Then, we use the current 
fleet composition and ship type specific growth and scrapping rates to determine what 
the composition of these three EU fleets will be in the reference year 2020. We apply 
the same procedure to the three EU fleets as Heitmann and Peterson (2012) apply to the 
world fleet, that is, we take growth and scrapping rates from Eide et al. (2011), apply 
them to the total number of ships in each ship segment, add the number of new ships to 
the first age category, and subtract the number of scrapped ships from the last age 
categories. 
The second step is to determine the BAU emissions of the three EU fleets in 2020 by 
multiplying the number of ships per ship-segment/ship-age category in 2020 by the fuel 
consumption of ships (the BAU emissions of the three EU fleets in 2020 are presented 
in Table 1).
13
 
                                                 
11
 Buhaug et al. (2009) categorize a ship type in various ship segments depending on specific characteris-
tic, e.g., such as deadweight for crude oil tankers. 
12
 The reason for this is that in Section 3.1 we use data from Wang et al. (2010) on marginal abatement 
costs that is available for only 14 of the 18 ship types. The 14 ship types that are included are predomi-
nately merchant ships and ferries/passenger ships. The 4 ship types that are excluded are of less 
importance including the following: yacht, offshore (such as tug boats), service (such as research ships), 
miscellaneous (such as trawlers) (for more details, see Buhaug et al., 2009). 
13
 The fuel consumption of a ship per year is determined by the operational profile and the ship-type-
specific characteristics of a ship (for more details, see Buhaug et al., 2009). To determine the fuel 
consumption per ship type/segment, we follow Eide et al., (2011), who assume that the projected fleet has 
the same operational profile as the fleet presented in Buhaug et al. (2009), which is based on activity data 
from 2007. However, unlike Buhaug et al. (2009), Eide et al (2011) apply a general improvement factor 
of 5% to ships built as of 2010 and a general improvement factor of 8% to ships built as of 2020. 
 129 
 
Table 1: BAU emissions of the EU fleet in 2020 according to the three ways of 
allocating emissions: owner, operator, and flag registration. 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
BAU emissions are the highest when emission allocation is based on the nationality of 
the owner and the lowest when it is based on flag state registration. The difference in 
BAU emissions between the two allocation ways operator and owner is not significant, 
but it is significant between the two ways and flag registration. More ships are owned 
or operated by the 27 EU countries than are registered under the flags of these countries 
(IHS Fairplay, 2012).
14
 In terms of the individual countries’ share of the total number of 
EU 27 ships, we find that Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom (listed in alphabetical order) are the top six as regards the categories 
owner and operator (with a total joint share of 79% and 76%, respectively). This is not 
true for the category flag. Here, Malta, Greece, Italy, Cyprus, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom are the top six (with a total joint share of 79%). The top five ship 
types, which have a total joint share of over 70% as regards all three categories, are 
general cargo, bulker, container, chemical tanker, and (ropax) ferry. Of these five ship 
types, container ships contribute the most to the BAU emissions in 2020. 
Now that we have determined the BAU emissions in 2020, the third step is to deter-
mine the effects the two approaches, the partial integration approach (absolute target 
remains constant) and the full integration approach (relative target stays constant, but 
base year emissions change) would have on the emission reduction target in 2020. To 
determine the effects of the partial integration approach, we add the shipping sector’s 
BAU emissions to the regulated BAU emissions in 2020. The difference between the 
sum of the shipping sector’s BAU emissions and regulated BAU emissions and the 
absolute emission target of 4.45 GtCO2-eq in 2020 gives us the required emission 
reductions. 
                                                 
14
 Once again, we consider only the 14 ship types as described earlier. 
Owner Operator Flag
BAU emissions 
of the EU fleet 
in Mt
286 276 173
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To determine the effects of the full integration approach (relative target stays con-
stant, but base year emissions change) on the emission reduction target in 2020, we 
need to determine the new basis, i.e. the reassessed base year emissions, which is 
defined as the sum of original base year emissions and the shipping sector’s emissions. 
Thus, we have to make assumptions about the amount of the shipping sector’s emis-
sions in 1990. We know from Heitmann and Peterson (2012) that BAU emissions of the 
(global) shipping sector are projected to amount to 947 MtCO2 in 2020. Thus, the 
relative share of the EU shipping sector’s emissions on the global shipping sector’s 
emissions would amount to ~30% in the case of the EU-owned fleet, to ~28% in the 
case of the EU-operated fleet, and to ~18% in the case of the EU-registered fleet in 
2020 (see Table 2 for the absolute amount of BAU emissions per allocation way in 
2020). We assume that these shares were in the same proportion in the base year of 
1990,
15
 and that, according to Buhaug et al. (2009), the BAU emissions of the shipping 
sector in that year amounted to 468 MtCO2. Thus, we add 140 MtCO2 in case of the 
EU-owned fleet to the regular base year emissions in 1990 (see Figure 2), 131 MtCO2 in 
the case of EU-operated fleet, and 84 MtCO2 in the case of EU-registered fleet. This 
gives us the new basis. To this new basis, we apply the relative emission reduction 
target of 20% (the reduction targets are calculated in Section 4.1). 
 
4. Generating marginal abatement cost curves for the shipping sector 
in the 27 EU countries 
4.1. MACCs and corresponding abatement cost functions for the shipping sector 
We use MACCs in order to determine how much the shipping sector of the 27 EU 
countries (henceforth EU fleet) could contribute efficiently to a total given emission 
reduction target for all regulated sectors in the EU. Moreover, we use MACCs in order 
to determine if some countries could reduce emissions in the shipping sector more 
efficiently than other countries under the given emission reduction target for all sectors. 
                                                 
15
 We have neither information about owner, operator, or flag state registration nor about the operational 
profiles of ships for the year 1990. 
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Eide et al. (2011) and Faber et al. (2011)/Wang et al. (2010)
16
 present a methodology 
to generate MACCs for the shipping sector. This methodology includes, in general, 
three elements:  
1. Projection of the fleet composition, i.e., the projection of the current fleet composi-
tion (ship-type/ship-age categories) to the reference year based on ship-type-
specific growth and scrapping rates. 
2. Determination of a business-as-usual (BAU) emission scenario, i.e., the determina-
tion of the fleet emissions in the reference year if no abatement measures are ap-
plied. 
3. Calculation of project-level abatement costs (AC), i.e., the calculation of the 
abatement costs per measure applied to a specific ship-type/ship-age category. For 
example, the calculation approach presented in Eide et al. (2009) and applied in 
Eide et al. (2011) is based on a net present value analysis, which determines the 
abatement costs of a measure using the net present value of total costs (Ct) minus 
total benefits (Bt) of a measure, whereby i is the discount rate, divided by the total 
CO2 emission reduction potential (
redCOT 2 ), see Equation 1: 
 
red
T
t t
tt
COT
i
BC
AC
2
1 11




  
 with t=1,…,T.      (1) 
By ordering the abatement costs of measures in an increasing order and then plotting 
them against the corresponding reduction potentials, the MACC is obtained.  
In this paper, we use the reduction potentials and abatement costs per measure calcu-
lated in Heitmann and Peterson (2012) to generate MACCs of the EU shipping sector in 
2020. They assume that ships start to apply abatement measures from 2020 onwards 
because they currently have little incentives to implement abatement measures.
17
 The 
data on costs and reduction potential of 22 abatement measures is taken from Wang et 
al. (2010) and applied to the 14 major ship types. They work with two scenarios: high 
reduction potentials and low costs of abatement measures (hrlc) and low reduction 
potentials and high costs (lrhc). Thus, combining their reduction potential and abate-
                                                 
16
 Faber et al. (2011) is an updated version of Wang et al. (2010). 
17
 The EEDI (Energy Efficiency Design Index) and the SEEMP (Ship Energy Efficiency Management 
Plan) are the only mandatory measures that currently exist (MEPC, 2011). 
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ments costs data with the three projected EU fleets (defined by the three allocation 
ways), we obtain 6 MACCs in total. The resulting MACCs are presented in Figures 3(a) 
and 3(b) and the maximum reduction potentials in Table 2.  
 
 
Figure 3(a): MACCs in 2020 according to the three allocation ways in the hrlc (high 
reduction potentials and low costs) scenario Source: Own calculations (prices are in 
2007 US$). 
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Figure 3(b): MACCs in 2020 according to the three allocation ways in the lrhc (low 
reduction potentials and high costs) scenario Source: Own calculations (prices are in 
2007 US$). 
 
Table 2: Maximum reduction potentials and BAU emissions in 2020 (in MtCO2 
emissions). 
 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
The three MACCs differ in absolute terms of the maximum reduction potential. 
Looking at the reduction potential relative to the respective BAU emissions  under the 
hrlc scenario (see Table 2) shows that all three are in a similar range: between 47% and 
49% of BAU emissions could be abated under each allocation way. Moreover, the 
major share of the reduction potential is available at negative marginal abatement costs. 
This result is not specific to the MACCs generated here, but also to the MACCs 
Allocation way Owner Operator Flag
hrlc 139 133 81
lrhc 64 61 37
BAU emissions of the 
EU fleet in Mt
286 276 173
Reduction/costs 
scenarios
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presented in the shipping-specific literature, e.g., in Buhaug et al. (2009), Eide et al. 
(2011), Faber et al. (2011)/Wang et al. (2010), and Heitmann and Peterson (2012). 
For the purpose of illustration, assuming, e.g., a carbon price in the range of 30–50 
US$/t in 2020, the EU shipping sector could reduce its emissions, depending on the 
applied allocation way and reduction potentials/costs scenario (hrlc and lrhc), by 35–
136 MtCO2. However, the presented MACCs are based on a project-level cost analysis. 
This kind of costs analysis does not take into account potential barriers to implementa-
tion, which we discuss in Section 4.3. 
4.2. MACC and corresponding abatement cost function for all other EU sectors 
We use the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model DART to generate a regional 
MACC for all other production and consumption sectors, i.e., all sectors except for 
shipping and aviation (henceforth all other sectors (AoS)), in the EU27.
18
 The DART 
model is currently calibrated to the GTAP-8 database (Narayanan et al., 2012) and 
includes 14 world regions.
19
 Europe is divided into the EU27 and Rest of Europe 
(Norway, Switzerland, and Island). The DART model is described in greater detail in 
Klepper et al. (2003). Figure 4 shows the generated MACC for AoS in the EU27 in 
2020. 
                                                 
18
 The production sectors are represented by coal, refined oil, gas, chemical products, electricity, 
agriculture, crude oil, transport, energy intensive sectors, other light industries, other heavy industries, 
and services. The consumption sector is represented by a representative household per region.  
19 
The regions are the following: Japan, India, Canada, USA, EU27, Rest of Europe (non EU27), Former 
Soviet Union, Australia and New Zealand, Latin America, China, Pacific Asia, Middle East, North 
Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Figure 4: MACC for all other sectors of the EU27 in 2020. Source: Own presentation 
based on the CGE model DART (prices are in 2007 US$). 
 
In order to determine how much AoS and the shipping sector could contribute to a given 
reduction target in 2020, we need to approximate marginal abatement cost functions. In 
doing this, we tested for several functional forms. Since it turns out in our scenario 
analysis (see Section 5.3.1) that optimal abatement outside the shipping sector is in a 
range of less than 1,500 MtCO2, we decided to use the quadratic form because it fits the 
MACC best in this range. Equation 2 presents the approximated marginal abatement 
cost function for AoS (MACAoS(RAoS)). 
  2AoSAoSAoS 0000578.0R0.0182965RMAC AoSR ,    (2) 
for 15000  AoSR , 
with adjusted R
2 
= 0.999166, 
where RAoS refers to emission reductions. 
Ideally, emissions from the aviation sector should also be included in our analysis 
because, like emissions from the shipping sector, they are projected to increase in the 
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coming decades.
20
 Furthermore, the EU has started to regulate the aviation sector’s 
emissions under the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), but emis-
sions generated in 2012 are exempted in order to promote upcoming negotiations in the 
framework of the International Civil Aviation Organization to find a global solution 
(EC, 2012).
21
  We exclude the aviation sector from our analysis because information 
needed to calculate a sector-specific MACC for the aviation sector is unavailable. This 
would include emission estimates based on activity data (as for the shipping sector 
presented in Buhaug et al., 2009),
22
 projection of such emissions to 2020, and also data 
on reduction potentials and costs of abatement measures for specific types of aircraft. 
This is a limitation, but it is unlikely to affect our results significantly; the reduction 
potential in aviation is assumed to be small (see Anger and Köhler, 2010). Aviation is 
more likely being a buyer than seller of emission permits, for this reason we might 
underestimate the contribution of the shipping sector. 
4.3. Combining both types of MACCs 
The results of Section 4.1 showed that MACCs constructed with the above presented 
methodology can generate negative abatement costs. This is in contrast to model-
derived MACCs (e.g., the CGE model DART in Section 4.2) that by construction only 
generate positive abatement costs. The underlying assumption is that rational individu-
als exploit abatement potential with negative abatement costs because they bring a net 
benefit even in the absence of climate policy (for more details, see, e.g., Heitmann and 
Peterson, 2012). In Section 5, we aim to combine both types of MACCs in order to 
determine how much the shipping sector could contribute efficiently to the EU’s 
reduction commitment for 2020 and in order to determine the resulting abatement 
costs.
23
 For this purpose, we make use of an approach presented in Hyman et al. (2002) 
                                                 
20
 Gudmundsson, S.V., Anger, A. (2012) provide a meta-analysis of various studies projecting the 
aviation sector’s emissions up to 2050 and find that the results vary significantly.  
21
 All domestic and international flights that arrive at or depart from an airport located in the EU are 
subject to the EU ETS (Directive 2008/101/EC). There are some studies analyzing the effects of including 
the aviation sector’s emissions in the EU ETS (Scheelhaase et al., 2010, Anger, 2010, Anger and Köhler, 
2010). 
22
 For example, the Annual European Union greenhouse gas inventory 1990 – 2010 and inventory report 
2012 (2012) presents numbers for international bunker fuel emissions (aviation and shipping) that are 
mainly based on national fuel statistics. 
23
 The combination of both MACCs is based on the least cost theorem (see e.g. Perman et al., 1999). The 
shipping sector and AoS are required to jointly achieve a given target at least costs.  
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and applied to the shipping sector by Heitmann and Peterson (2012). The approach 
assumes that all measures that reduce emissions at negative net costs are not economical 
when accounting for all relevant costs and to shift up the MACC so that it lies above the 
horizontal axis. This approach implicitly assumes that the barriers of implementation or 
extra costs are relevant for the implementation of all measures, also for the ones with 
positive abatement costs. 
We tested, again, for several functional forms to approximate marginal abatement 
cost functions for the three EU fleets (EU-owned fleet, EU-operated fleet, and EU-
registered fleet) under the partial integration approach and the full integration ap-
proach. We decided to analyze two functional forms in more depth under the partial 
integration approach, namely the exponential and the quadratic functional form. Both 
functional forms (Equations 3 and 4) fit the ranges of optimal abatement in the shipping 
sector best as derived in our scenario analysis in Section 5.3.1. The exponential 
functional form fits the MACC better for lower carbon prices (amount of reduction is 
small) than the quadratic one, but starts to deviate more from the MACC towards higher 
carbon prices (see Figures A1–A6 in the Appendix). It thus tends to underestimate 
abatement costs, whereas the quadratic functional form tends to overestimate abatement 
costs.
24
 However, we decided to use the exponential form because it fits best under the 
full integration approach (Figures A7–A12) and therefore it fits in most scenarios better 
than the quadratic one.
 
  )exp(exp ijijijijij RbaRMAC  ,       (3) 
  2ijijijquadij RcRMAC  .         (4) 
For both equations i refers to the different allocation ways – owner (i=1), operator 
(i=2), and flag (i=3) – and j refers to the two different scenarios considered – hrlc (j=1) 
and lrhc (j=2). Depending on the allocation rule and scenario considered under the 
partial or the full integration approach, the volume of emission reductions (Rij) is 
exposed to different value restrictions (Table 3). The parameters (aij,bij, and cij) used for 
calculation and the R
2
 (adjusted R
2
) are presented in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix. 
                                                 
24
 When looking at how much the shipping sector could contribute efficiently to the joint target, both 
functional forms give rise to very similar values. 
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Table 3: Value restrictions under the partial and the full integration approach 
Integration  
approach 
Rij i=1 (owner) i=2 (operator) i=3 (flag) 
Partial  
integration 
j=1 (hrlc) [0,90] [0,85] [0,50] 
j=2 (lrhc) [0,8] [0,8] [0,4.5] 
Full  
integration 
j=1 (hrlc) [0,60] [0,55] [0,35] 
j=2 (lrhc) [0,6.5] [0,6.2] [0,4] 
Figures 5 and 6 present the graphical combination of both MACCs (AoS and shipping) 
assuming an exponential functional form for the shipping sector MACCs in the hrlc 
scenario and in the lrhc scenario under the partial integration approach (Figure 5) and 
under the full integration approach (Figure 6). 
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Figure 5: Combination of both MACCs under the partial integration approach (hrlc 
and lrhc scenario) 
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Figure 6: Combination of both MACCs under full integration approach (hrlc and lrhc 
scenario) 
 
5. Analysis of policy scenarios  
5.1. Determination of BAU emissions and emission targets 
We start by describing scenarios for the BAU emissions of the shipping sector and all 
other production and consumption sectors (AoS) in the EU27 that use fossil fuels. This 
is necessary in order to determine the required emission reductions both sectors, 
shipping and AoS, have to achieve under the two reduction commitment scenarios 
(partial and full integration approach). The projected BAU emissions of the EU27 
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(AoS), which result from fossil fuel use, amount to 4,249 MtCO2 in 2020 according to 
the DART model. As mentioned before, this number includes CO2 emissions of all 
production and consumption sectors of the EU27 economy, except the ones generated 
by shipping and aviation. The shipping sector’s BAU emissions depend on the analyzed 
case (owner, operator, and flag registration) as presented in Section 3.2. Table 4 gives 
an overview of AoS’ emissions resulting from fossil fuel use in the EU27 and the 
shipping sector’s emissions according to the allocation ways applied in 2020. 
 
Table 4: Unregulated BAU emissions of the shipping sector and all other sectors (AoS) 
in the EU27 in 2020 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Because we are mainly interested in the abatement of CO2 emissions resulting from 
fossil fuel use in the EU27, we need to derive a target for CO2 emissions of the sectors 
covered in DART (AoS) plus the shipping sector. Therefore, we analyze only the share 
of CO2 emissions in total GHG emissions. 
We assume that the share of CO2 emissions resulting from fossil fuel use in total 
GHG emissions stays constant over time, which was about 82% in 2010 according to 
the EEA (2012).
25
 The emission targets of the two approaches partial integration and 
full integration are determined as follows: if we apply the partial integration approach 
(absolute target remains constant), we know from Section 3.1 that total allowable GHG 
emissions, including CO2, in the EU27 are 4,450 MtCO2-eq. in 2020. We multiply this 
number with the share of CO2 emissions in total GHG emissions (82%) in order to 
determine the joint target for AoS and the shipping sector in 2020. This results in 3,649 
MtCO2 emissions from fossil fuel use to stay in line with meeting the absolute target in 
2020. If we apply the full integration approach (the shipping sector’s emissions are 
                                                 
25
 This number excludes CO2 emissions from LULUCF. 
EU AoS
Owner Operator Flag
BAU emissions 
in Mt
4249 286 276 173
EU shipping fleet
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included in the base year emissions), the amount of total allowable GHG emissions by 
2020 changes and thus does the joint target for AoS and the shipping sector as well. In 
the case of owner allocation, AoS and shipping are allowed to emit around 3,774 
MtCO2, in the case of operator allocation 3,767 MtCO2, and in the case of flag alloca-
tion 3,730 MtCO2. The difference between BAU emissions (sum of AoS and shipping 
emissions) and the allowed emissions gives the (joint) emission reduction target (Table 
5).  
Table 5: Joint emission reduction targets (in Mt CO2) of the shipping sector and AoS in 
2020 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
5.2. Determination of policy scenarios 
As mentioned in the Introduction, this analysis assesses, in a first step, how the EU 
reduction commitment changes if the shipping sector’s emissions were included and, in 
a second step, the efficient contribution of AoS and the shipping sector to each assumed 
target and the magnitude of an increase in abatement costs under each assumed target. 
We define two policy scenarios that include the shipping sector and compare it to a 
policy scenario that mirrors the status quo, i.e., the shipping sector is not included in the 
EU reduction commitment. The scenarios are as follows: 
1. Scenario: the shipping sector’s emissions are included in the reduction commitment 
and the shipping sector and AoS are required to achieve the given target jointly. We 
define this scenario in the following as S included in reduction effort, whereby S 
refers to the shipping sector. 
2. Scenario: the shipping sector’s emissions are included in the reduction commit-
ment, but the shipping sector is not required to achieve abatement, thus, AoS is re-
quired to achieve the given target alone. We define this scenario in the following as 
S out of reduction effort, whereby S refers, again, to the shipping sector. 
Allocation way
Integration approach Owner Operator Flag
Partial integration 886 876 773
Full integration 761 758 692
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3. Scenario: the shipping sector’s emissions are not included in any reduction com-
mitment. We define this scenario in the following as status quo.
26
 
A comparison of the first two scenarios against the last one gives some insight into 
additional costs that the EU27 faces if the shipping sector’s emissions were included 
according to one of the three allocation ways (owner, operator, and flag registration) in 
its reduction commitment. Moreover, it sheds light on the question if the shipping sector 
should be obliged or not to contribute to CO2 emission abatement. 
Moreover, we are interested in how the three ways of allocating emissions to the 
fleets of the 27 countries would affect the potential of a country fleet to reduce emis-
sions efficiently. We do this by: 
 first, determining how much emissions the fleets of the various EU countries 
reduce relative to their fleet-specific BAU emissions under a given emission reduc-
tion target for all sectors and 
 second, comparing the resulting numbers to how much emissions the total EU fleet, 
which equals the sum of the individual country fleets, reduces relative to its fleet-
specific BAU emissions under the same given reduction target for all sectors. 
In order to keep the presentation and the discussion of this additional analysis of results 
simple, we analyze only the scenario, where the shipping sector’s emissions are 
included in the reduction commitment and the shipping sector and AoS are required to 
achieve the given target jointly (S included in reduction effort, full integration ap-
proach, and hrlc scenario). 
5.3. Results 
5.3.1. EU27-level analysis 
We start by presenting the results of scenario S included in reduction effort under the 
partial and the full integration approach (see Table 6 for a summary). 
  
                                                 
26
 The difference between AoS BAU emissions (4,249 MtCO2) and allowed emissions (3,649 MtCO2), 
i.e., the allowed emissions resulting from fossil fuel use, in 2020 to stay in line with meeting the absolute 
target gives the reduction target for AoS in the scenario status quo: 600 MtCO2. 
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Table 6: Resulting CO2 prices (in US$) and efficient reductions in relative terms in 
2020 for scenario S included in reduction effort 
 
a)
Rs refers to emission reductions of the shipping sector. 
Source: Own calculations. 
The CO2 prices are in a range between 45 and 61 US$/t under the partial integration 
approach and in a range between 40 and 47 US$/t under the full integration approach. 
The allocation rule owner, independent of the assumed reduction potentials/costs 
scenario and of the approach to include the shipping sector’s emissions into the 
reduction commitment (partial and full integration approach), causes always the 
highest CO2 prices and relative emission reductions, directly followed by the allocation 
way operator, and by far followed by the allocation way flag. This follows our projec-
tions on the joint emission reduction targets (see Table 5 in Section 5.1). 
Although the difference between the two allocation ways owner and operator is 
almost negligible, this is not true for the difference between the two allocation rules and 
the allocation rule flag. The reason is that more emissions are allocated to the EU27 
according to the allocation ways owner and operator. The lrhc scenario, which is 
characterized by a smaller reduction potential and higher costs per abatement measure 
than the hrlc scenario, always causes higher CO2 prices. This is also the case for the 
partial integration approach (absolute target remains constant) compared to the full 
integration approach (relative target remains constant). The reason is that under the 
partial integration approach more emissions need to be abated (see Table 5, Section 
5.1). 
The emission reductions of the shipping sector relative to its BAU emissions is in a 
range between 20% to 25% in the hrlc scenario and significantly less, in the order of 
Reduction 
potentials/costs 
scenario
Allocation 
way
CO2 price 
(in US$)
a)
RS rel.to BAU 
emissions
a)
RS rel.to 
overall target
CO2 price 
(in US$)
a)
RS rel.to 
BAU 
emissions
a)
RS rel.to 
overall target
Owner 53.38 24.6% 7.94% 41.34 20.6% 7.74%
Operator 52.72 24.0% 7.56% 41.28 20.5% 7.45%
Flag 44.52 22.8% 5.10% 39.98 19.8% 4.96%
Owner 60.73 2.5% 0.80% 46.72 2.2% 0.84%
Operator 59.61 2.4% 0.74% 46.44 2.2% 0.80%
Flag 48.26 2.3% 0.51% 39.98 2.1% 0.53%
Partial integration approach Full integration approach
hrlc
lrhc
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less than 3%, in the lrhc scenario. Compared to this, the emission reductions of AoS 
relative to its BAU emissions is between 16% and 21%, depending on the assumed 
reduction potentials/costs scenario and on the approach to include the shipping sector’s 
emissions into the reduction commitment (partial and full integration approach). 
Looking at Figure 7, which shows the efficient contribution (in %) of the shipping 
sector to the assumed targets under the partial and full integration approach, it is 
apparent that the efficient contribution of the shipping sector under the full integration 
approach (at most 7.74%) is almost the same (hrlc scenario) or even slightly higher 
(lrhc scenario) than under the partial integration approach (at most 7.94%), although 
absolute emission reduction is higher in the latter one. The reason for this is that the 
shipping sector provides a small but at the same time a relatively cheap abatement 
potential, at least in the beginning of the range of optimal abatement, compared to AoS. 
Consequently, the relative contribution of the shipping sector is higher under the full 
integration approach because it requires less emission reductions in total. 
 
Figure 7: Efficient contribution (in %) of the shipping sector to the assumed targets 
under the partial and the full integration approach. Source: Own calculations. 
 
A comparison between scenario S included in reduction efforts (shipping sector is 
obliged to abate emissions) and scenario S out of reduction efforts (shipping sector is 
not obliged to abate emissions) shows that the EU27 could realize cost savings if 
scenario S included in reduction efforts is the preferred option, see Figure 8. 
 146 
 
 
Figure 8: Abatement costs savings (in %) if the shipping sector would be included in 
reduction efforts under the partial and the full integration approach. Source: Own 
calculations. 
 
Cost savings are significant in the hrlc scenario, ranging between 8% and 16%. This is 
in particular the case, when we assume an exponential functional form instead of a 
quadratic one because the area under the marginal abatement cost function represents 
the abatement costs based on a specific emission reduction.
27
 Cost savings are less 
pronounced in the lrhc scenario, ranging between 1.0% and 1.8%. The reason is that the 
shipping sector’s reduction potential is much smaller than in the hrlc scenario. Thus, the 
amount of emission reduction that the shipping sector contributes additionally to the 
overall target, although it is relative cheap, has no significant effect on the cost savings. 
A comparison of scenario S included in reduction effort and scenario S out of reduc-
tion efforts with scenario status quo shows that the CO2 price and abatement costs 
increase significantly if the EU would include the shipping sector’s emissions in its 
reduction commitment; see Table A3–A4 in the Appendix and Figure 9, which shows 
the increase in the abatement costs between the scenario S included in reduction efforts 
and scenario status quo (the shipping sector’s emissions are not included in the EU 
reduction commitment). The increase in abatement costs is in a range between 74% and 
170% under the partial integration approach and between 30% and 82% under the full 
integration approach, depending on the reduction potentials/costs scenario assumed. 
                                                 
27
 See, e.g., Ellerman and Decaux (1998). 
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The increase in abatement costs is particularly pronounced when applying the allocation 
way owner and the partial integration approach and by assuming the lrhc scenario 
(about 170%) because the amount of emission reduction is the highest, but the reduction 
potentials of measures are assumed to be low and costs are assumed to be high.  
 
Figure 9: Increase in abatement costs (in %) if the shipping sector would be included in 
reduction efforts under the partial and the full integration approach compared to the 
status quo. Source: Own calculations. 
 
5.3.2. Shipping sector-specific country-level analysis 
Moving from the regional to the country-level, the results for the scenario S included in 
reduction effort under the full integration approach assuming the hrlc scenario are 
summarized in Table 8. This table presents the ratio of how much emissions each 
individual country fleet reduces relative to its fleet-specific BAU emissions in relation 
to how much emissions the total EU fleet reduces relative to its fleet-specific BAU 
emissions under the given reduction target for all sectors, see Equation 5:  



k
BAU
k
k
BAU
k
k
kk
E
R
E
R
ratio
*
*
 ,       (5) 
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where k represents the individual 27 EU countries, *
kR refers to the optimal emission 
reduction of country fleet k and 
kBAU
E to the fleet-specific BAU emission reduction of 
country k in the scenario S included in reduction effort under the full integration 
approach assuming the hrlc scenario. Values larger than 100% indicate that the specific 
country fleet (defined by the three allocation ways) reduces its emissions more than the 
average EU fleet, i.e., the fleet consisting of the total ships that the 27 countries own, 
operate, or register under their flags together. Values smaller than 100% indicate that 
the specific country fleet reduces its emissions less than the average fleet. 
 
Table 7: Ratio of country-specific emission reduction and EU fleet emission reduction 
in 2020 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Looking at Table 7 shows that the way of allocating emissions to the individual 
countries affects their position of being a country that reduces its fleet-specific emis-
sions relative to its fleet-specific BAU emissions more than the average EU fleet. For 
example, by allocating emissions according to the nationality of the owner of a ship, 
Table 7 shows that Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Slovenia, and the 
Country ratiok Country ratiok Country ratiok
Belgium 97.83% Belgium 99.58% Belgium 99.28%
Cyprus 99.14% Cyprus 102.76% Cyprus 99.27%
Denmark 100.50% Denmark 101.55% Denmark 98.26%
France 101.35% France 104.09% France 96.51%
Germany 100.89% Germany 98.98% Germany 105.73%
Greece 98.48% Greece 98.21% Greece 97.52%
Italy 96.78% Italy 95.98% Italy 96.66%
Netherlands 101.11% Netherlands 100.98% Malta 99.41%
Slovenia 101.60% Slovenia 106.99% Netherlands 98.29%
Spain 98.31% Spain 96.76% Spain 99.99%
Sweden 98.86% Sweden 102.51% Sweden 98.49%
UK 99.69% UK 98.04% UK 103.51%
EU27rest 100.45% EU27rest 100.48% EU27rest 100.66%
FlagOwner Operator
Allocation way
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countries included in the EU27rest
28
 reduce their emissions by more than the average, 
whereby Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (UK) 
reduce their emissions less than the average. The picture looks different by allocating 
emissions according to the nationality of the operator of a ship, e.g., Germany reduces 
its emissions less than the average EU fleet, whereas Sweden reduces its emissions 
more than the average EU fleet. 
Moreover, the results show that the individual countries do not deviate significantly 
from the allocation-specific EU fleet average no matter which of the three allocation 
ways is applied. The reason for this is that the composition of fleets and of the efficient 
measures, i.e., the measures that are applied under the full integration approach and the 
hrlc scenario, is on average the same. This has implications for the policy design that is 
chosen in order to reduce the shipping sector’s emissions, which we discuss in Section 
6. 
 
6. Discussion 
Our results show that including the shipping sector’s emissions into the EU27 reduction 
commitment for 2020 always, as a matter of course, increases the amount of required 
emission reductions and thus the abatement costs. This is particularly pronounced if we 
apply the allocation ways owner and operator and opt for the more ambitious approach 
(partial integration approach) to include the shipping sector’s emissions into the 
reduction commitment. 
We start to discuss our results by comparing the two approaches to include the ship-
ping sector’s emissions into the EU reduction commitment. The comparison shows that 
opting for the approach that keeps the relative target of 20% (full integration approach) 
should be the preferred option.  
                                                 
28
 The selection of countries is a mixture of the top 10 emitting country fleets in 2020 and two country 
fleets with little emissions in 2020. The EU27rest of the allocation ways owner and operator include 
Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Irish Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Slovakia. The EU27rest of the allocation way flag 
includes Slovenia instead of Malta because Malta belongs in this case to the top 10 emitting country fleets 
in 2020. 
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First, the approach also gives rise to significant emission reductions, but at the same 
time incurs less abatement costs (abatement costs increase non-linear).  
Second, the approach seems to be politically more feasible. The reason is the follow-
ing: as mentioned before, the EU committed itself to reduce its emissions in 2020 at 
least by 20% against 1990 levels or even up to 30% if other countries would also pursue 
more ambitious reduction targets (EC, 2008).
29
 However, the commitment was based on 
a specific set of activities and sectors resulting in GHG emissions that excluded 
international bunker fuel emissions.
30
 It can be assumed that the EU decided not to 
include international bunker fuel emissions into its reduction commitment because these 
emissions had been excluded from any commitment stated in the Kyoto Protocol during 
that time and thus were exempted from the national emissions regulated by the Kyoto 
Protocol. Instead the Kyoto Protocol’s Article 2.2 requested that Annex I states should 
reduce emissions from international marine bunkers fuels by working through the 
IMO.
31
  
Enlarging the set of regulated GHG emissions in 2020 should therefore demand a 
reassessment of the base year emissions by including the shipping sector’s emissions. 
The other approach, i.e., the approach of including the shipping sector’s emissions into 
the EU’s emissions in 2020 and leaving the absolute emission target of 4.45 GtCO2-eq. 
constant (partial integration approach), would not only increase the required emission 
abatement in absolute terms, but also, in addition, give rise to much a sharper increase 
in abatement costs (assuming non-linear increasing abatement costs). Thus, the EU 
would actually reduce emissions by more than 20%. 
Beyond that, we showed that the increase in abatement costs is significant under both 
approaches if the EU would include the shipping sector’s emissions into its reduction 
commitment. However, the increase in abatement costs is higher if no reassessment of 
the base year emissions takes place. 
                                                 
29
 The EU reconfirmed its reduction commitment in the process of associating with the Copenhagen 
Accord (EC, 2010). According to this reconfirmation developed countries should reduce their GHG 
emissions together by about 25% to 40% in 2020 compared to 1990 levels in order to stay in line with 
meeting the 2°C target.  
30
 Total GHG emissions do not include emissions from international bunkers (EEA, 2012). 
31
 The focus on the IMO as the responsible institution to regulate emissions from international shipping 
was also reinforced by the UNFCCC working group report of 2009 (UNFCCC, 2009). This report 
presented several options in the negotiation text for the Cop15 in Copenhagen on how to regulate the 
shipping sector’s emissions. For example, according to one option, the IMO should set an emission 
reduction target for marine bunker fuels as equal to 20% below 2005 levels by 2020. 
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If the EU decides to include the shipping sector and the optimistic reduction potentials 
and costs scenario (hrlc scenario) can be assumed to be more realistic, then the shipping 
sector should definitely be included in the reduction efforts and not left outside any 
obligations as it is currently the case. The shipping sector could contribute efficiently to 
emission reductions (up to about 8%) and decrease abatement costs of achieving the 
given target (up to about 16%). Moreover, the burden of emission reduction for other 
EU sectors would be released and thus a fair burden sharing between a more complete 
set of sectors would be reached. If the pessimistic reduction potentials and costs 
scenario (lrhc scenario) can be assumed to be more realistic, then the shipping sector’s 
inclusion into reduction efforts would yield only small contributions to efficient 
emission reduction (less than 1%) and small abatement cost savings (less than 2%). 
Almost all emission reductions would be burdened on the other EU sectors. 
Comparing the three allocation ways (owner, operator, and flag) in the light of prac-
ticality, all three rules tend to be vulnerable to evasion (Faber and Rensma, 2008, 
Heitmann and Khalilian, 2012). This is conditioned by the global nature of the shipping 
sector. If the EU burdens its shipping sector with emission regulation, whereby the 
scope of the shipping sector refers to one of the three allocation ways, the shipping 
sector’s affected stakeholders will search for ways to evade the regulation. Flagging out 
a ship is easily done and owners or operators will simply relocate their head offices to 
countries where they would be exempt from such a regulation. As pointed out by Faber 
and Rensma (2008), this is in particular the case for the allocation way owner as ships 
are often owned by investment vehicles, e.g., Limited Partnerships (UK). The major 
share of these investment vehicles is currently based in OECD countries. However, they 
can easily relocate to other countries at little cost and thereby potentially evade the 
regulations.  
So far, we have discussed the results only in the light of the optimal solution, which 
assumes that all sectors participate in a system that causes the marginal abatement costs 
of each sector to be equalized (e.g., market-based policy instruments). However, the 
debate in the IMO also highlights the option to regulate the shipping sector separately, 
e.g., by implementing market-based measures or command-and-control measures only 
for that sector (IMO, 2012). How the shipping sector’s emissions should actually be 
regulated in order to contribute efficiently to a given emission reduction target depends 
 152 
 
on the structure of the reduction potential. The sectoral analysis of the shipping sector 
showed that all the country fleets reduce their BAU emissions by almost the same share 
(about 20%) by applying almost the same measures in the optimal scenario no matter 
which allocation way is chosen. Thus, regulating the emissions of the shipping sector by 
mandating the implementation of particular measures, i.e., the measures that are cost-
effective under the optimal scenario, might be an effective policy instrument to reduce 
emissions in the shipping sector in the shot-run. In the long-run, however, the shipping 
sector’s emissions should be regulated in a global agreement together with those of 
other transport modes. The reason for this is that a modal shift may occur and thus the 
shipping sector’s emissions may be substituted by other unregulated transport modes’ 
emissions that might be more emission-intensive and thus increase overall emissions.
32
 
For example, Faber et al. (2009) argue that this is likely the case for transport routes, 
where maritime transport competes with rail, road or aviation transport. 
 
7. Summary and conclusions 
While it is clear that the EU aims to include the shipping sector’s emissions in its 
reduction commitment, it has not been analyzed so far how the inclusion would affect 
the EU reduction commitment for 2020 and the abatement costs. In this paper, we 
analyze these effects with the help of MACCs. Moreover, we determine if some country 
fleets could reduce emissions in the shipping sector relatively more efficiently than 
other country fleets under a given emission reduction target for all sectors. In order to 
do this, we first allocated the shipping sector’s emissions to the EU27 based on the 
SBSTA rule No. 4: allocate emissions based on the nationality of (1) the ship owner, (2) 
the ship operator, or based on (3) the flag state registration. Second, we proposed two 
approaches to include the shipping sector’s emissions into the EU27 reduction commit-
ment for 2020: partial integration approach, which leaves the absolute target of 4.45 
GtCO2-eq. constant and adds shipping emissions on top of total emissions in 2020, and 
the full integration approach, which leaves the relative target of 20% reduction constant 
                                                 
32
 This issue is discussed in Buhaug et al. (2009) and in Faber et al. (2009). 
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and reassesses the base year emissions in 1990 by including the shipping sector’s 
emissions.  
The main findings are that the increase in the amount of required emission reductions 
and resulting abatement costs are in particular pronounced if we apply the allocation 
ways owner and operator and opt for the more ambitious approach (partial integration 
approach). Moreover, we find that the shipping sector could contribute efficiently to 
emission reductions (at most by 8.5%) if it was included in reduction efforts and 
decrease abatement costs of achieving the given target (at most by 16%). Moreover, the 
results show that the individual countries do not deviate significantly from the alloca-
tion-specific EU fleet average no matter which of the three allocation ways is applied. 
The reason for this is that the composition of the individual country fleets and of the 
efficient measures applied to them is on average the same. 
Overall, we conclude that the EU27 should include the shipping sector’s emissions in 
its reduction commitment if no global solution is achieved in the near future. Otherwise, 
these emissions are left outside any regulation and jeopardize the achievement of 
climate change goals, in particular, the 2°C target. Comparing the two integration 
approaches, the discussion in Section 5 shows that the relative target of 20% reduction 
in combination with a reassessment of the base year emissions in 1990 should be 
applied. Beyond that the shipping sector should also be included into abatement efforts. 
The reasons for this are that the shipping sector’s emissions are substantial and thus a 
contribution to overall emission reductions, as other sectors of the economy are required 
to do, seems to be appropriate. At the same time, the shipping sector provides cost-
effective abatement potential that should be exploited in order to alleviate the increase 
in abatement costs. 
However, the practicality of including the shipping sector’s emissions in the EU 
reduction commitment based on one of the allocation ways needs to be analyzed in 
greater detail. On the one hand, all three ways tend to be vulnerable to regulation 
evasion, thus making it harder to control the shipping sector’s emissions effectively. On 
the other hand, the reassessment of the base year emissions is limited due to data 
availability. The approach of including the shipping sector’s emissions into the EU ETS 
by obliging all incoming and outgoing ships to surrender EU ETS allowances, inde-
pendent of the nationality of the owner, operator, or flag state registration, would 
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control emissions more effectively. However, the EU commission’s moratorium on the 
aviation sector that excludes the aviation sector from surrendering EU ETS allowances 
in April 2013 for emissions generated in 2012 shows that regulating international 
mobile emitters by a regional policy instrument is a challenging task. Therefore, we 
conclude that regulating the emissions of the shipping sector by mandating the imple-
mentation of particular measures, i.e., the measures that are cost-effective under the 
optimal scenario, might be an effective policy instrument to reduce emissions in the 
shipping sector in the shot-run. In the long-run, however, emissions of the shipping 
sector should be included in a global market-based policy instrument with other sectors. 
But all these questions are deferred to future research. Overall, the IMO should foster to 
improve the data availability relating to emissions in order to reduce the level of 
uncertainty that is prevailing in all current studies.  
A number of limitations are worth mentioning. Determining the emissions of the 
fleets in 1990 in order to reassess the base year emissions is challenging because we 
have neither information about ship owners, ship operators, or ships’ flag state registra-
tion nor about the operational profiles of these ships for the year 1990. For this reason 
we have worked with the assumption that the projected relative shares of the EU 
shipping sector’s emissions on the global shipping sector’s emissions in 2020 were the 
same proportionately as in the base year of 1990. Moreover, including the aviation 
sector’s emissions in the analysis is currently not possible because of data availability. 
Finally, we worked with data for only 14 ship types. These 14 ship types do not 
represent the whole world fleet, yet they represent a very large proportion of the 
transported tonnage globally. 
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9. Appendix 
Table A1: Estimates for marginal abatement cost functions assuming an exponential 
functional form under the partial integration approach 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Table A2: Estimates for marginal abatement cost functions assuming an exponential 
functional form under the full integration approach 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
  
Allocation 
way
Reduction/costs 
scenario
R
2
a b
hrlc -0.18852 0.05926 0.903777
lrhc -0.54954 0.65629 0.933384
hrlc -0.04894 0.06064 0.910114
lrhc -0.35586 0.68333 0.957638
hrlc 0.00558 0.09607 0.909094
lrhc -0.33453 1.07121 0.952663
Owner
Parameter values
Operator
Fleet
Allocation 
way
Reduction/costs 
scenario
R
2
a b
hrlc -1.18216 0.08321 0.956860
lrhc -1.04041 0.76531 0.958404
hrlc -0.94782 0.08263 0.96646
lrhc -0.53262 0.71697 0.956814
hrlc -0.96219 0.13331 0.969958
lrhc -0.75045 1.20378 0.970225
Owner
Operator
Fleet
Parameter values
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hrlc scenario/partial integration approach lrhc scenario/partial integration approach 
Owner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Owner Owner  
Operator  Operator  
Flag Flag 
a 
The gray large-dashed line represents the fit of the exponential functional form, the gray short-dashed 
line represents the fit of the quadratic functional form, and the black dotted line represents the data plot. 
Figures A1–A6: Data and function plots of owner, operator, and flag registration 
under the partial integration approach
a
.
 
Source: Own calculations. 
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hrlc scenario/full integration approach lrhc scenario/full integration approach 
Owner Owner 
Operator  Operator  
Flag Flag 
a 
The gray large-dashed line represents the fit of the exponential functional form, the gray short-dashed 
line represents the fit of the quadratic functional form, and the black dotted line represents the data plot. 
Figures A7–A12: Data and function plots of owner, operator, and flag registration 
under the full integration approach
a
.
 
Source: Own calculations.  
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Table A3: Emissions, abatement costs, and CO2 prices under the partial integration approach assuming an exponential functional form 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
  
Policy 
scenario
Reduction/  
costs scenario
Allocation 
way
Emissions after 
efficient reduction 
(in Mt) in shipping 
sector
Emissions after 
efficient reduction 
(in Mt) in AoS
Abatement costs 
shipping (ACS in 
billion 2007US$)
Abatement costs 
AoS (ACAoS in  
billion 2007US$)
Abatement costs 
(ACAoS + ACS in  
billion  2007US$)
CO2 
price/ton (in 
2007US$)=
MACAoS
CO2 price/ton (in 
2007US$) 
=MACAoS=MACS
Business-as-usual 
emissions shipping 
and AoS (in Mt)
Jo
in
t 
ta
rg
e
t 
fo
r 
A
o
S
 a
n
d
 s
h
ip
p
in
g
 (
sc
e
n
a
ri
o
 1
)
hrlc
Owner 286 4249 216 3433 0.89 16.54 17.43 53.38
Operator 276 4249 210 3439 0.85 16.23 17.09 52.72
Flag 173 4249 134 3515 0.45 12.53 12.98 44.52
Jo
in
t 
ta
rg
e
t 
fo
r 
A
o
S
 a
n
d
 s
h
ip
p
in
g
 (
sc
e
n
a
ri
o
 1
)
lrhc
Owner 286 4249 279 3370 0.09 20.15 20.24 60.73
Operator 276 4249 269 3380 0.09 19.58 19.67 59.61
Flag 173 4249 169 3480 0.04 14.18 14.22 48.26
Owner 4249 3363 20.58 61.59
Operator 4249 3373 19.97 60.38
Flag 4249 3476 14.37 48.68
AoS 
(scenario 3)
4249 3649 7.46 31.79
AoS 
(scenario 2)
A
o
S
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
sh
ip
p
in
g
Jo
in
t 
ta
rg
e
t 
fo
r 
A
o
S
 a
n
d
 s
h
ip
p
in
g
 (
sc
e
n
a
ri
o
 1
)
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Table A4: Emissions, abatement costs, and CO2 prices under the full integration approach assuming an exponential functional form 
 
Source: Own calculations 
Policy 
scenario
Reduction/   
costs scenario
Allocation 
way
Emissions after 
efficient reduction 
(in Mt) in shipping 
sector
Emissions after 
efficient reduction 
(in Mt) in AoS
Abatement costs 
shipping (ACS in 
billion 2007US$)
Abatement costs 
AoS (ACAoS in  
billion 2007US$)
Abatement costs 
(ACAoS + ACS in  
billion  2007US$)
CO2 
price/ton (in 
2007US$)=
MACAoS
CO2 price/ton (in 
2007US$) 
=MACAoS=MACS
Business-as-usual 
emissions shipping 
and AoS (in Mt)
Jo
in
t 
ta
rg
e
t 
fo
r 
A
o
S
 a
n
d
 s
h
ip
p
in
g
 (
sc
e
n
a
ri
o
 1
)
hrlc
Owner 286 4249 227 3547 0.49 11.18 11.70 41.34
Operator 276 4249 220 3547 0.49 11.15 11.65 41.28
Flag 173 4249 139 3591 0.27 9.44 9.71 39.98
Jo
in
t 
ta
rg
e
t 
fo
r 
A
o
S
 a
n
d
 s
h
ip
p
in
g
 (
sc
e
n
a
ri
o
 1
)
lrhc
Owner 286 4249 280 3494 0.06 13.49 13.54 46.72
Operator 276 4249 270 3497 0.06 13.36 13.43 46.44
Flag 173 4249 169 3561 0.03 10.62 10.66 39.98
Owner 4249 3488 13.79 49.01
Operator 4249 3491 13.65 48.15
Flag 4249 3557 10.77 40.34
AoS 
(scenario 3)
4249 3649 7.46 31.79
AoS 
(scenario 2)
Jo
in
t 
ta
rg
e
t 
fo
r 
A
o
S
 a
n
d
 s
h
ip
p
in
g
 (
sc
e
n
a
ri
o
 1
)
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